Event Notification Report for February 07, 2011

MEDICAL EVENTS - ACTUAL DOSE LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE

Nine breast cancer patients were treated with a multi-channel high dose rate afterloader with the incorrect dwell positions input into the afterloader controller. The intended prescription was for 5 mm between dwell positions. The actual input was 2.5 mm between dwell positions. The prescribed dose was for 3400 cGy and the actual dose delivered was approximately 25% less. No adverse clinical effects are expected.

The doctors and patients will be notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM DR. VIVIAN ARTERBERY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1507 EST ON 03/07/11 * * *

There were a total of eleven breast cancer patients involved. Seven of the eleven patients had small areas of unintended target that received unplanned dose.

The doctors and patients have been notified.

Notified R3DO (Riemer) and FSME (McIntosh)

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

SEVEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS LOST

Luzenac America Inc. purchased their property from Cypress Minerals Corporation in February 1988. Seven Tritium exit signs were included in the transfer. However, these exit signs were not inventoried nor were their locations documented. These signs cannot be located and have been declared missing.

Sign Manufacturer: Self Powered Lighting
Model: 710
Activity: 25 Ci each at the time of manufacture

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSIS FOR AUX STEAM TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING

"On December 15, 2009, Callaway Plant reported a condition in which valve FBV0146, an isolation valve on an auxiliary steam line in the Auxiliary Building, was found to be kept normally open. With FBV0146 open, the auxiliary steam line downstream of FBV0146 must be considered a high energy line. This configuration was not consistent with the analysis of record for High Energy Line Break (HELB) events. Valve FBV0146 was closed upon discovery of the condition.

"This condition was reported under EN # 45571 as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. EN #45571 was then retracted on January 21, 2010 when analysis showed that no safety-related components would be rendered inoperable in a postulated HELB event due to the condition. Based on this analysis, FBV0146 was reopened.

"Subsequent review of this condition now shows that, with FCV0146 open, a harsh environment from a postulated HELB downstream of FBV0146 could be transmitted to other areas of the Auxiliary Building. This would occur via a flow path through door gaps and an Auxiliary Building elevator shaft. This flow path had not been considered by the previous analysis.

"The areas that could be affected by a postulated line break contain safe shutdown equipment (such as equipment for the Component Cooling Water system) that is not assumed to experience harsh conditions. Because of the potential impact on this equipment, this condition is considered to have met the criteria for reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"FBV0146 is now closed.

"This review was performed as part of the ongoing evaluation of HELB Program deficiencies described in Callaway Plant License Event Report (LER) 2010-009-00.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The auxiliary steam line in the Auxiliary Building feeds non-safety related components.

* * * UPDATE AT 1519 EDT ON 4/8/11 FROM KEITH DUNCAN TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On 02/07/2011, EN #46597 documented that a harsh environment from a postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) could be transmitted to areas of the Auxiliary Building not qualified for harsh environments. This break was postulated to occur on an Auxiliary Steam line downstream of valve FBV0146 when FBV0146 is open. This condition was initially reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

"When EN #46597 was reported, the analysis of the Auxiliary Steam line included postulated break locations at any intermediate fitting, welded attachment, or valve. Subsequent analysis shows that this section of Auxiliary Steam piping is able to withstand safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loadings and rupture loadings. For piping of this qualification, line breaks are only assumed to occur at terminal ends and at the locations specified for ASME Class 2 and 3 piping. Breaks at intermediate fittings, welded attachments, and valves are not required to be assumed.

"Postulated breaks of this Auxiliary Steam line at the locations described above have been analyzed. This analysis demonstrates reasonable assurance that safety-related equipment would have performed their safety functions following a postulated break of this Auxiliary Steam line. Therefore, this condition is not an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Event notification #46597, made on 02/07/2011, is hereby retracted.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).

POTENTIAL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR BEARING FAILURES

The following information was received via e-mail:

"Linear indications (hot tears) were observed on one main bearing by the FM [Fairbanks Morse] production inspector. The indications were only on one edge of the bearing. The indications went across the entire edge and extended about 1 inch deep into the bearing, being visible on the outside diameter and the inside diameter for about 1 inch. Subsequent 100% liquid penetrant inspection (PT) of all finished bearings in stock has found linear indications on 13 of 454 bearings (3% reject rate) made from permanent mold castings.

"No bearing failures in engines have been linked to linear indications. The root cause of the problem occurs during the casting of the aluminum material in the permanent mold. The linear indications occur only on one edge of the casting, which has been identified as the bottom of the casting. During the cooling and solidification of the molten material poured into the permanent mold tool, the material shrinks and must be continuously replenished with molten material from the top of the casting. If the top of the casting solidifies before the bottom, there is no additional molten material available from the top to feed the bottom as it cools and shrinks, resulting in tears (hot tears) to the material on the bottom of the casting. It is suspected these hot tears are occurring due to improper cooling of the mold tool core. Because there are no cooling passages within the solid mold tool core, the core becomes progressively hotter throughout the production run until the core reaches a temperature hot enough to cause the hot tears."

Affected plants are: Limerick, Peach Bottom and Prairie Island.

CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"On February 07, 2011 at 2225 EST, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to pre-planned maintenance to upgrade the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System. This maintenance renders the control room envelope out of service for a portion of the maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service in 4 hours.

"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM LOURDES PORRO TO DONG PARK AT 0040 EST ON 2/7/11* * *

"[As of 0013 EST, the] Control Room and TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.