Event Notification Report for January 18, 2011

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SR-90 CATHETER STUCK WHILE BEING CALIBRATED

The following report was received via fax:

"K&S Associates were attempting to perform a routine calibration of a Beta-Cath system, when the Sr-90 source train became stuck in the 'out' position. They believed they could cut the catheter and isolate the source train and subsequently place the train and housing unit into a pig and send the system back to the manufacturer. While cutting the plastic catheter, they misjudged where the source train was located and severed the train. Approximately 10 mL of water spilled out onto a table, along with the train. Paper toweling was used to wipe up the water. A survey was performed to account for the seeds. The total leaking activity was under 3.5 milliCuries. The entire source train of 4 cm contained 16 seeds with a total activity of 56 milliCuries. After the Division received the notification from K&S, two members of our staff from the Nashville Field Office responded to the incident to investigate. The Division found that K&S Associates were performing work they were licensed to do. However, when the catheter was cut, an unlicensed task was performed. A Notice of Noncompliance was issued. K&S responded to the noncompliance letter with the actions that were implemented as a result of this incident."

Tennessee Report Number: TN-11-10

CONFIRMED POSITIVE TEST FOR ILLEGAL DRUG

A non-licensed employee supervisor has a confirmed positive test for an illegal drug during a random fitness for duty test. The employees access to the plant has been cancelled. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for more details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

SIREN GROWL HEARD OFFSITE

"On January 18, 2011, at about 0830 PST, a State Park Ranger notified SONGS [San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station] Security that a siren growl was heard in the San Clemente State Park. Security subsequently notified the Control Room. Site Emergency Planning initiated an investigation of the event and informed the City of San Clemente Emergency Planning at approximately 0945 PST of the park ranger's call.

"SONGS investigation by its siren technicians into the potential SONGS siren growl resulted in absolutely no indication of activation of any of SONGS emergency sirens. It should be noted that quarterly growl tests have been scheduled during working hours January 18-20, 2011, and this information is posted on the City of San Clemente web site. However the tests had not been initiated at the time of the ranger report.

"In compliance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), requiring licensees to report any event that results in notification to other government agencies, SCE [Southern California Edison] is providing this notification to the NRC.

"At the time of the State Park Ranger notification, Unit 2 was at approximately 100 percent power and Unit 3 was shutdown for a Steam Generator Replacement Outage. SCE will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report."

* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS MORRIS TO JOE O'HARA AT 1954 ON 1/18/11 * * *

"SONGS telecommunications confirmed that the siren which was reported earlier was associated with Camp Pendleton and not associated with SONGS."

Notified R4DO(O'Keefe)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED SOIL MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following information was provided by the State of California via email:

"A CPN MC1DR soil moisture density gauge was run over by a piece of earth moving equipment at a jobsite in Bel Aire, CA on 1-18-2011. This gauge contained 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am-241 sealed sources. The source rod was retracted at the time. The work was immediately stopped, people were kept away, and the area was secured until a CDPH [California Department of Public Health] representative arrived. The sources were leak tested and analyzed on 1-19-2011. The leak test results were negative - less than 0.0005uCi of removable contamination.

"GeoSoils Consultants, Inc. is arranging for proper disposal."

CA Notification # 011811

BOTH LOOPS OF LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"On 1/18/2011 at 1731 CST, it was discovered that the open position indication light for RR-MO-53A, Reactor Recirculation [RR] Pump A discharge valve operator, was de-energized. The RR-MO-53A operator is powered by a 250 VDC motor with 125VDC control power. Investigations revealed that the 125 VDC control power circuit fuses for the valve operator were open. RR-MO-53A must close at a reactor pressure of 199 to 221 psig to allow Residual Heat Removal [RHR] Loop A to inject to the reactor during a LOCA involving Reactor Recirculation Loop B. This condition rendered RHR Loop A Low Pressure Coolant Injection [LPCI] function inoperable. At the time of discovery, RHR Loop B LPCI function was inoperable for planned maintenance. This maintenance was being performed on the service water side of the RHR heat exchanger, RHR-MO-25B, RHR Loop B Injection Outboard Isolation valve operator, RHR pump B motor, and RHR-MO-39B, Suppression Chamber Cooling Loop B Outboard Isolation valve operator. As specified by the Required Action for LCO 3.5.1 Condition H, two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, LCO 3.0.3 was immediately entered. LCO 3.0.3 requires the plant to be shutdown to Mode 2 within 7 hours. Preparations to commence plant shutdown were initiated in parallel with investigations to determine the cause of the open control power fuses. Subsequent troubleshooting revealed a failed light socket caused the fuses to open. The fuses were replaced and the circuit tested satisfactorily. At 1915 CST on 1/18/2011, RHR Loop A LPCI was declared Operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. The plant shutdown procedure was terminated prior to any power reduction occurring.

"Initial review of this condition for immediate reportability under 50.72(b)(3)(v), Condition that Prevents Fulfillment of a Safety Function, concluded the condition was not reportable based on the availability of Core Spray Pump A [CS-P-A], Core Spray Pump B [CS-P-B ], and RHR Pump D [RHR-P-D]. Procedure 2.0.11.1, Safety Function Determination Program, states that Emergency Core Cooling System [ECCS] Safety Function is maintained if three low pressure ECCS Injection/Spray pumps remain operable. CS-P-A, CS-P-B and RHR-P-D all were operable at the time of discovery of the condition. RHR Pump B was restored to available at 1510. The maintenance on RHR Loop B did not remove RHR-P-D from service and an injection path was available at time of discovery of LPCI Loop A inoperable as RHR-MO-25B, RHR Loop B Injection Outboard Isolation valve, post work testing had been completed and the injection capability restored at 1701. Subsequent review determined that the reportability decision under 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a Condition that Prevents Fulfillment of a Safety Function should be based on safety function at the system level, rather than at the ECCS function level. The decision to report the simultaneous inoperability of both RHR LPCI Loops under 50.72(b)(3)(v) was made at 1549 on 1/21/2011."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.