Event Notification Report for December 20, 2010

FISH KILL CAUSED BY RATE OF TEMPERATURE CHANGE IN DISCHARGE CANAL

"At 0938 hours (EST), the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) was notified of a fish kill. The fish kill is due to the rate of temperature change in the discharge canal, associated with an unscheduled and non-routine plant shutdown for a reactor recirculation pump repair. As of 0930 hours, seven (7) Speckled Sea Trout and two (2) Black Drums were reported dead west of the route 9 bridge in the stations discharge canal.

"The [New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System] NJPDES discharge to surface water permit No. 0005550 part IV-B/C item 11, rate of temperature change states, "The rate of temperature change shall not cause mortality of fish or shellfish."

"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for the occurrence of any event or situation related to protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been made."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FUEL POOL/REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST PLENUM PRIMARY POWER SUPPLY FAILED

"At 0357 December 20, 2010 the 'A' division Fuel Pool/Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum Primary Power Supply failed, resulting in upscale readings on both the Fuel Pool and Reactor Building Ventilation Plenum radiation monitors. This condition resulted in closure of the Group II Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV), isolation of Secondary Containment (SCT), initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT), and a transfer of the Control Room Ventilation (CRV) and Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) systems to the High Radiation Mode. Conditions and Required Actions were entered for Technical Specification 3.3.6.2 (SCT Instrumentation), 3.3.7.1 (CREF Instrumentation), and 3.4.5 (RCS Leakage Detection - CAM). Radiation levels were verified to be normal in the affected areas. Isolations signals were reset and Secondary Containment ventilation systems were restored to a normal lineup.

"Repairs are currently in progress to replace the high voltage power supply to the affected radiation monitors and are expected to complete within the required action time limits of the applicable technical specifications."

The licensee is in a 24 hour LCO. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State of Arizona emailed the following information:

"This First Notice constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information is as initially received WITHOUT verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Agency Staff [Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency] at this time.

"At approximately 8:00 AM December 20, 2010, the licensee phoned the Agency [state] to report of a stolen Troxler Laboratories Model # 3430, serial # 36977. The truck from which the gauge was stolen was located at 3330 West Greenway Road Bld. #7, Phoenix, AZ. The gauge contained 8 milliCuries of Cesium-137 and [40 milliCuries (typical) Americium-241: Beryllium]. Phoenix Police were notified at 6:00 AM by the employee. The employee stated that his keys were stolen out of his apartment. The thief then took the gauge out of its agency required lockbox from the bed of a company truck. Phoenix PD is also investigating this event.

"The Agency continues to investigate the actions of the licensee and timeliness of reporting the theft. Mexico, the States of CA, CO, NE, NM, UT, and TX as well as the U.S. NRC and the Arizona Governor's office have been notified of this event. Press coverage is not anticipated."

First Notice: 10-014

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

ACCESS TO PRIMARY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY NOT POSSIBLE DUE TO FLOODING

"Notified by the Security Shift Commander at 2020 [PST] that access to the primary EOF is not possible due to flooding. San Onofre will activate the alternate EOF if an event is declared. There are no other affected systems or loss to emergency response capabilities due to this flooding."

Access to the site has not been impacted due to the flooding. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

FUSE FAILURE CAUSES LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY TO BE INOPERABLE

"On December 20, 2010, the low pressure core spray (LPCS) system was declared inoperable due to loss of power to the LPCS minimum flow valve. The minimum flow valve supports operability by providing a flow path to prevent pump damage during situations where the LPCS pump has been started in response to a transient, but reactor vessel pressure is not low enough to allow LPCS injection. The power loss was caused by the clearing of all 3 line power fuses for the motor starter for the minimum flow valve. An apparent cause evaluation concluded that the most likely cause of the fuses clearing was a random fuse failure of one of the fuses at less than design amperage attributable to a defect in the fuse solder joint.

"The Technical Specification (TS) Required Action for LCO 3.5.1 Condition A, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, was complied with by restoring the LPCS system to operable within the allowed completion time.

"The safety functions for LPCS are to provide inventory makeup and spray cooling during large breaks in the reactor coolant system that uncover the core. All remaining ECCS subsystems were operable and at no time did this event result in the loss of a safety function. The low pressure injection function was not challenged due to all three loops of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) mode being operable while the core spray function was satisfied by the operable High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system.

"This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident tor a single train system.

"Historically, LPCS inoperabilities at Columbia (including initial review of this event) were not considered to be a single train system for reportability purposes. The basis for the historical consideration was assessment of LPCS inoperabilities consistent with the plant safety analysis and the associated system and safety function groupings which do not single out LPCS as a single train system. There are two pertinent groupings in the safety analyses which are aligned with the credited safety functions of LPCS. The two groupings are the low pressure injection system function (combined with LPCI), and a core spray system function (combined with HPCS). Industry precedent has been consistent with the historical position. However, recent NRC interpretations have considered safety function at the lowest system level which result in LPCS being considered as a single train performing a safety function in scope of the reportability rules in 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. A Licensee Event Report will be submitted for this event.

"As a result of the recent interpretation with regard to LPCS, a review of prior LPCS inoperabilities within the past three years is being performed to determine if the reporting criteria were met during prior events. If necessary, additional 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CPR 50.73 notifications/reports will be made on prior LPCS inoperabilities .

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

FIRE IN FUEL HANDLING BUILDING HVAC PANEL

"Smoke and sparks were identified as coming from a level 4 Control Building Normal Fuel Handling Building HVAC Heater Control Panel. The heater control panel was deenergized. The fire team was dispatched. The fire was contained in the heater control panel. Smoke removal is in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM HANS BISHOP TO PETE SNYDER AT 0219 EST ON 12/20/10 * * *

At 0218 the licensee terminated the Notice of Unusual Event.

Notified R2DO (Henson), NRR EO (Evans), DHS (Strangfeld), and FEMA (Hollis).

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A FIRE IN THE MAIN GENERATOR BUS DUCT

"At 0050 EST on 12/20/2010, Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to a reported fire inside the Unit 1 main generator bus duct.

"A fire was reported at 0045 EST in the Unit 1 bus duct which is located inside the turbine building. The Unit 1 reactor was tripped to remove power from the generator bus. After the reactor trip, the fire was extinguished by the application of water to the bus duct by the fire brigade. The fire was reported extinguished at 0100 EST.

"Method of decay heat removal is via steam dumps. Current temperature and pressure: Temp. 548 degrees and stable; Pressure 2239 psig and stable. No indication of any primary/secondary leakage. All rods are inserted. Electrical alignment is normal, supplied from off-site power. No impact to Unit 2, [and] Unit 2 is operating at 100% power [in] Mode 1."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION MAINTENANCE

"On 12/20/10, at 0700, planned maintenance is being performed on the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System. Air handling unit #1 for the TSC supply ventilation is undergoing its 5 year PM. The TSC ventilation system will be tested following maintenance and returned to normal in service lineup. The system is expected to be out of service for a total time of 8 hours.

"This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a result of a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

EVENT REQUIRING OFFSITE NOTIFICATION WITH POTENTIAL MEDIA INTEREST

"On 12/20/10 at approximately 0624 CST, the control room received notification that a vehicle/pedestrian accident had occurred on plant property near the south office building complex outside of the protected area. An emergency medical technician from the station's security department immediately responded to the scene of the accident to render emergency medical treatment. A 911 call was placed to local authorities to obtain response by appropriate agencies. Local fire department and ambulance services responded to the site. The individual was transported via helicopter to a trauma center in Green Bay, Wisconsin.

"The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. A press release is not planned at this time, however, the station will respond to media inquiries as needed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."