Event Notification Report for November 18, 2010

PLANNED TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE

"This ENS is being issued in advance of a planned activity.

"On November 18th 2010 at 0300, Limerick Generating Station [will apply] a clearance to perform corrective maintenance associated with MD-1 (Outside Air Damper). During the time that the block is applied, the TSC ventilation system will not be available to be restored in a time period required to staff and activate the TSC ERO [Emergency Response Organization].

"This work is expected to be complete on 11/18/10 at 1800. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation becomes necessary the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3) due to the loss of an emergency response facility (ERF) because of unavailability of the emergency ventilation system.

"An update will be provided when the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC resident has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL MARVEL TO DONG PARK AT 1729 EST ON 11/18/10 * * *

Planned work on the TSC ventilation system has been completed at 1700 on November 18, 2010. The TSC has been restored to normal status.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Gray).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO OSHA DUE TO ONSITE FATALITY

The American Centrifuge Plant reported an employee collapsed in the Centrifuge Test and Training Facility, was transported offsite to a medical facility, and subsequently died. Initial reports indicate that the employee died of natural causes.

The licensee notified Region 2 (D. Hartland) of the event.

* * * UPDATE FROM CRABTREE TO KLCO ON 11/19/2010 AT 1054 EST * * *

On 11/18/2010, at 1551 EST, the licensee commenced notification of OSHA and completed notification at 1602 EST on the same day.

Notified R2DO (Rich), NMSS-E(McCartin) and IRD (Grant).


* * * UPDATE AT 1555 EST ON 11/29/10 FROM THOMAS MARTIN TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

The licensee called with administrative corrections (facility, docket and license numbers) to the original event notification.

Notified R2DO (Schaffer), NMSS-E(Benner) and IRD (Grant).

POTENTIAL POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN UNANALYZED CONDITION

"A Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSSD) circuit analysis identified that certain fuses installed within Train 'B' Exciter/Voltage Regulator cabinet NE106 are susceptible to failure in the event of postulated fire-induced hot shorts within the control room. Loss of power to this circuit will prevent operation of these functions. The emergency pre-positions and manual voltage adjustment circuits are not credited for PFSSD following a control room fire. However, field flashing is credited following a fire in the control room. Failure of field flashing after a postulated fire will prevent voltage generation on the 'B' diesel generator. This could result in the inability of the 'B' train EDG to supply its associated safety bus during the postulated fire.

"Compensatory measures are established for early detection and extinguishment of a fire associated with this circuit in the Control Room. Additional compensatory measures are being developed."

The licensee is not in any tech. spec LCO's as a result of this condition and has established fire watches as a compensatory measure.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

POTENTIAL FOR REVERSE POLARITY ON HPCI TURBINE EG-R HYDRAULIC ACTUATORS

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has completed an evaluation of the 'Reverse Polarity on HPCI EG-R Hydraulic Actuators,' and has concluded that this is a Reportable Condition in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21 (d).

"Discussion:
"GEH provided a refurbished HPCI turbine EG-R Hydraulic Actuator, (GEH Part number DD213A8527P003), as a safety related component, to a domestic BWR/4. When the customer installed the EG-R Hydraulic Actuator at the plant, calibration and post maintenance testing found that the turbine governor valves went to the full open position when the proper response was a fully closed position. Troubleshooting of the newly installed component revealed that the polarity of the component was reversed. An improperly configured EG-R Hydraulic Actuator cannot be utilized in the system because the reversed polarity causes the turbine governor control valves to operate in a manner opposite to the expected response, and calibration of the component by plant personnel cannot be completed.

"GEH contracted Engine Systems Incorporated (ESI) to perform the repair/refurbishment of this EG-R Hydraulic Actuator. This particular EG-R Hydraulic Actuator is identified as GEH part number DD213A8527P003. The specific EG-R Hydraulic Actuator that was identified with this defective condition was identified as serial number 2288717.

"Conclusion:
"This condition would change the operational characteristics of the HPCI system and would create a Substantial Safety Hazard or a violation of a Technical Specification Safety Limit. As such this condition has been determined to be a Reportable Condition within the context of 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d).

"ABWR and ESBWR Design Certification Documentation Applicability:
"The issues described above have been reviewed for applicability to documentation associated with 10CFR 52 and it has been determined that there is no affect on the technical information contained in either the ABWR certified design or the ESBWR design in certification.

"Recommended Action:
"GEH recommends that [the Hatch, Hope Creek and Peach Bottom] sites that have received EG-R Hydraulic Actuator(s) (GEH Part number DD213A8527P003), check warehouse inventory. If the EG-R Hydraulic Actuator remains 'in stock,' the potential exists that incorrect internal wiring could exist resulting in the EG-R Hydraulic Actuator not responding as expected. GEH recommends that if an EG-R Hydraulic Actuator (GEH Part number DD213A8527P003) is in warehouse stock, that the component be returned to GEH for verification of the internal wiring configuration."

INVALID ACTUATION OF MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

"This report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System on Oconee Unit 3 on 11/18/10 while moving the 3A Motor Driven EFW Pump (MD EFWP) control switch from position 'Auto 1' to 'Auto 2.' EFW is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

"The 3A MD EFWP was inadvertently started during operation of the control switch in the Oconee Unit 3 Control Room. The start signal was a manual start when the operator moved the control switch beyond the intended position. The functioning/behavior of the MD EFWP control switch and human error are being investigated in the site corrective action program. This is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The manual start only affected the 3A MD EFWP.

"On 11/18/10, a Unit 3 startup from a refueling outage was in progress. Unit 3 was in Mode 3. While performing a step in OP/3/A/1102/001 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup), the Operator inadvertently started 3A MD EFWP when positioning 3A MD EFWP control switch from position 'Auto 1' to 'Auto 2.'

"Specific Information Required per NUREG 1022:
(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated was the 3A MD EFWP and the A train of EFW. The 3B MD EFWP and the Turbine Driven EFW Pump were not affected by this event.
(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The manual actuation was considered complete (i.e. all necessary components responded to the start signal to provide EFW to the Steam Generator (SG). The A train control valve (3FDW-315) was open, as expected for the evolutions in progress. This allowed EFW to reach the SG.
C) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 3A MD EFWP and train started and operated successfully until secured by Operations personnel.

"Initial Safety Significance: None, there was no significant transient.

"Corrective Action(s): EFDW was secured within approximately one minute by placing 3A MD EFWP control switch in the Auto 2 position. This event has been entered into the site corrective action program for resolution."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.