Event Notification Report for November 16, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/15/2010 - 11/16/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
46421464244642546523
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46421
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KOGELSCHATZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL KOGELSCHATZ
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 11/16/2010
Notification Time: 05:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 00:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2010
Notification Time: 05:48 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 00:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE INOPERABLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE LEAKAGE DURING ECCS PUMP SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"The Licensee identified that Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage exceeded the allowable limit as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This is being reported as an Unanalyzed Condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)® Control of Rad Release.
"The leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection discharge relief valve occurred during Low Head Safety Injection Pump surveillance testing. Efforts to resolve the lifting of the Low Head Safety Injection discharge relief valve are in progress.
"At 0001 [EST] on 11/16/10, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 determined that leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection system in conjunction with a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with transfer to Safety Injection Recirculation would result in dose exceeding the Dose Analysis for the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Control Room. The projected dose would exceed the 10CFR50.67 EAB dose limit, and the 10CFR50 GDC 19 Control Room limit, assuming the leakage continued during the postulated DBA event.
"Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2 share a common Control Room Envelope, which has been declared inoperable as a result of this condition. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.10, Condition B, has been applied.
"The Senior NRC Resident has been informed of the condition [by the Licensee]."
Notified R1DO (Harold Gray).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SHARBAUGH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1448 EST ON 11/17/2010 * * *
"Actions have been completed to prevent leakage from the degraded Low Head Safety Injection System relief valve at BVPS Unit 1. Following successful completion of the post-maintenance test, the BVPS Unit 1 Low Safety Injection System was declared operable and applicable Technical Specification Actions at both BVPS Units were exited at 1545 hours on 11/16/1010.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Gray).
"The Licensee identified that Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) leakage exceeded the allowable limit as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This is being reported as an Unanalyzed Condition in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)® Control of Rad Release.
"The leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection discharge relief valve occurred during Low Head Safety Injection Pump surveillance testing. Efforts to resolve the lifting of the Low Head Safety Injection discharge relief valve are in progress.
"At 0001 [EST] on 11/16/10, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 determined that leakage from the Low Head Safety Injection system in conjunction with a postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) with transfer to Safety Injection Recirculation would result in dose exceeding the Dose Analysis for the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) and the Control Room. The projected dose would exceed the 10CFR50.67 EAB dose limit, and the 10CFR50 GDC 19 Control Room limit, assuming the leakage continued during the postulated DBA event.
"Beaver Valley Units 1 & 2 share a common Control Room Envelope, which has been declared inoperable as a result of this condition. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.10, Condition B, has been applied.
"The Senior NRC Resident has been informed of the condition [by the Licensee]."
Notified R1DO (Harold Gray).
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SHARBAUGH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1448 EST ON 11/17/2010 * * *
"Actions have been completed to prevent leakage from the degraded Low Head Safety Injection System relief valve at BVPS Unit 1. Following successful completion of the post-maintenance test, the BVPS Unit 1 Low Safety Injection System was declared operable and applicable Technical Specification Actions at both BVPS Units were exited at 1545 hours on 11/16/1010.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R1DO (Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46424
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNNIE EDWARDS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHNNIE EDWARDS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/16/2010
Notification Time: 23:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 22:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2010
Notification Time: 23:43 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 22:10 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 26 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP BASED ON DECREASING STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
"At 2210 EST on 11/16/2010, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped based on decreasing S/G level in Loop 4. Prior to the reactor trip power was at 26% and ascending following completion of a scheduled refueling outage. Moisture Separator Reheater 1C1 safety valve lifted and would not reseat. Turbine was tripped at 2206 EST to isolate steam leak. Following the Turbine trip, automatic S/G level control did not maintain S/G level. Manual control was taken however, S/G level could not be recovered. A manual reactor trip was initiated due to low narrow range S/G level. All other plant systems responded as expected."
All rods fully inserted into the core during the trip. The reactor is at normal operating pressure and temperature and operators are removing decay heat via the steam dumps to condenser. As expected, the auxiliary feedwater system actuated during the transient. The grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Plant response to the trip was considered normal and uncomplicated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 2210 EST on 11/16/2010, the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped based on decreasing S/G level in Loop 4. Prior to the reactor trip power was at 26% and ascending following completion of a scheduled refueling outage. Moisture Separator Reheater 1C1 safety valve lifted and would not reseat. Turbine was tripped at 2206 EST to isolate steam leak. Following the Turbine trip, automatic S/G level control did not maintain S/G level. Manual control was taken however, S/G level could not be recovered. A manual reactor trip was initiated due to low narrow range S/G level. All other plant systems responded as expected."
All rods fully inserted into the core during the trip. The reactor is at normal operating pressure and temperature and operators are removing decay heat via the steam dumps to condenser. As expected, the auxiliary feedwater system actuated during the transient. The grid is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. Plant response to the trip was considered normal and uncomplicated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 46425
Rep Org: ABERDEEN TEST CENTER
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN PROVING GROUNDS State: MD
County:
License #: SUB-834
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES DILLARD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN PROVING GROUNDS State: MD
County:
License #: SUB-834
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES DILLARD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/17/2010
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2010
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
40.60(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
MARK THAGGARD (FSME)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
MARK THAGGARD (FSME)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
CONTAMINATION OUTSIDE BOUNDARY AREA DUE TO A PROJECTILE OFF FLIGHT PATH
The licensee was conducting live fire exercises at the Ford Farms section of the Aberdeen Test Center when a depleted uranium (DU) projectile went off its flight path and struck metal causing the projectile to shatter and become friable. Ford Farms is an indoor hard target facility that is targeted from weapons outside of the facility. The projectile shattered outside of Ford Farms thus the contamination is outside the facility.
Initial surveys indicate contamination levels as high as 400 cpm > background. The licensee has roped off the contaminated area and is sampling the air continuously while they formulate a cleanup plan. They estimate cleanup will take approximately two weeks with an additional week required for post-cleanup surveys.
The licensee has made notification to the USNRC Region I office.
The licensee was conducting live fire exercises at the Ford Farms section of the Aberdeen Test Center when a depleted uranium (DU) projectile went off its flight path and struck metal causing the projectile to shatter and become friable. Ford Farms is an indoor hard target facility that is targeted from weapons outside of the facility. The projectile shattered outside of Ford Farms thus the contamination is outside the facility.
Initial surveys indicate contamination levels as high as 400 cpm > background. The licensee has roped off the contaminated area and is sampling the air continuously while they formulate a cleanup plan. They estimate cleanup will take approximately two weeks with an additional week required for post-cleanup surveys.
The licensee has made notification to the USNRC Region I office.
Part 21
Event Number: 46523
Rep Org: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: FAIRBANKS MORSE ENGINE
Region: 3
City: BELOIT State: WI
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DOMINIC DEDOLPH
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 01/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2011
Notification Time: 17:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/07/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
PART 21 GRP
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
PART 21 GRP
PART 21 REPORT FOR POTENTIAL SAFETY HAZARD ON SPEED SWITCH INSTALLED ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG)
The following was received via fax:
"[Fairbanks Morse (FM) determined] that when the speed switch assembly was mounted on a conductive surface, the voltage regulator grounded out the 24 volt direct current power through the heat sink preventing the speed switch from operating.
"This condition was not detected prior to the first speed switch being shipped to Hope Creek in September, 2010. It was never installed on the EDG prior to being recalled. The unit was returned to FM and has since been reworked and verified to be in compliance with the latest design to eliminate the deficiency."
The following was received via fax:
"[Fairbanks Morse (FM) determined] that when the speed switch assembly was mounted on a conductive surface, the voltage regulator grounded out the 24 volt direct current power through the heat sink preventing the speed switch from operating.
"This condition was not detected prior to the first speed switch being shipped to Hope Creek in September, 2010. It was never installed on the EDG prior to being recalled. The unit was returned to FM and has since been reworked and verified to be in compliance with the latest design to eliminate the deficiency."