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Event Notification Report for November 12, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/11/2010 - 11/12/2010

EVENT NUMBERS
46414464154641646417

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46414
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 08:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
CONTROL ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE NOBLE GAS CHANNEL SETPOINTS NON-CONSERVATIVE

"At 0818 CST, 11/12/10, Radiation Protection determined that the setpoints for the Control Room Outside Air Intake Noble Gas channels are non-conservative. This affects Tech Spec 3.3.7 required monitors 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B and 0PR34B (Noble gas channels). The current setpoints for 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B and 0PR34B are High Alarm 9.55E-05 microCi/cc and Alert Alarm 9.55E-06 microCi/ml. The calculated required setpoints are High Alarm 6.61E-05 microCi/cc and Alert Alarm 6.61E-06 microCi/cc. This is approximately a 30% decrease in setpoints from the current setpoints. LCO 3.3.7 conditions A and B were entered at 0818, 11/12/10. LCO 3.3.7 conditions A and B required actions completion time is 1 hour. All required actions were complete at 0900 11/12/10, less than 1 hour.

"This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, 8 hour non-emergency notification.

"Both trains of radiation monitor setpoints were non-conservative and actuate control room ventilation in emergency mode. The margin available in the control room dose analysis will be reviewed to confirm impact on safety function. The setpoints have been non-conservative since 1999."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BART KELLER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1414 EST ON 01/20/11 * * *

"At 0818 CST, 11/12/2010, Radiation Protection determined that the setpoints for the Control Room Outside Air Intake Noble Gas channels are non-conservative. This affects Tech Spec 3.3.7 required monitors 0PR31B, 0PR32B, 0PR33B, 0PR34B (Noble Gas channels). ENS notification was made under ENS 46414 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The design basis accidents do not credit automatic actuation of the Control Room Outside Air Intake system to the Emergency mode from a high radiation signal. Therefore, the high radiation signal is not needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident and this event did not result in a safety system functional failure.

"Therefore, ENS notification 46414 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. Notified R3DO (Bloomer)


Power Reactor
Event Number: 46415
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE DEBOARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST

"At 1300, on November 12, 2010, Exelon Generation Company LLC concluded that inaccurate information contained in the PRA technical bases for a 1987 License Amendment Request (LAR) for Byron and Braidwood Stations would have potentially impacted the acceptability of the LAR by the NRC. The LAR was to extend Allowed Outage Times (AOT) from 72 hours to 7 days for several systems, to include the Component Cooling (CC) and Residual Heat Removal (RH) Systems.

"The original design intent of the CC system was that each unit has two independent CC pumps and a fifth pump (U0) CC pump could be used as an operable spare for any of the unit specific pumps. This is how CC was modeled in the PRA technical justification for the 1987 LAR. However, a piping configuration design flaw that was recently evaluated in that the U0 CC pump could not be considered an operable spare for either unit's B pumps was not correctly modeled in the PRA.

"During the evaluation to assess the potential significance of this CC design flaw on the PRA justification for the 1987 LAR, another potentially significant discrepancy was discovered in that it appears the operational practice to always split CC trains after a design basis LOCA was not modeled correctly in the RH analysis.

"Administrative controls have been put in place to restrict the AOT for the CC pumps and RH trains to the pre-LAR timeframe of 72 hours pending the permanent corrective actions. In addition, administrative controls have been put in place to prohibit the U0 CC pump from being an operable spare for either unit's B trains.

"This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified"


Power Reactor
Event Number: 46416
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LEO WEHNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST

"At 1300, on November 12, 2010, Exelon Generation Company LLC concluded that inaccurate information contained in the PRA technical bases for a 1987 License Amendment Request (LAR) for Byron and Braidwood Stations would have potentially impacted the acceptability of the LAR by the NRC. The LAR was to extend Allowed Outage Times (AOT) from 72 hours to 7 days for several systems, to include the Component Cooling (CC) and Residual Heat Removal (RH) Systems.

"The original design intent of the CC system was that each unit has two independent CC pumps and a fifth pump (U0) CC pump could be used as an operable spare for any of the unit specific pumps. This is how CC was modeled in the PRA technical justification for the 1987 LAR. However, a piping configuration design flaw was recently evaluated in that the U0 CC pump could not be considered an operable spare for either unit's B pumps was not modeled in the PRA.

"During the evaluation to assess the potential significance of this CC design flaw on the PRA justification for the 1987 LAR, another potentially significant discrepancy was discovered in that it appears the operational practice to always split CC trains after a design basis LOCA was not modeled correctly in the RH analysis.

"Administrative controls have been put in place to restrict the AOT for the CC pumps and RH trains to the pre-LAR timeframe of 72 hours pending the permanent corrective actions. In addition, administrative controls have been put in place to prohibit the U0 CC pump from being an operable spare for either unit's B trains.

"This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified"


Power Reactor
Event Number: 46417
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3     State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN RAJKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 11/12/2010
Notification Time: 20:42 [ET]
Event Date: 11/12/2010
Event Time: 12:10 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/12/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 47 Power Operation 47 Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED 10CFR50 APPENDIX R SCENARIO

"At approximately 1210 on November 12, 2010, a fire protection assessment identified a potentially unanalyzed condition in the plant's 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis. In the unlikely event of a fire in the main control room or cable spreading room, coincident with a fire induced loss of off site power, in which the control room must be evacuated, Operations personnel would proceed to the Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) panel to perform required safe shutdown activities. During certain scenarios, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) may start on a reactor low-low water level signal or on high drywell pressure signal. Since HPCI is not controlled manually from the ASDS, a postulated fire induced short could prevent the HPCI system high reactor water level trip and possibly result in reactor vessel overfill.

"Operation of the Safety Relief Valves in this condition has not been analyzed. For this scenario, the following unlikely sequence of events is required:
1. A fire would have to occur in the main control room or cable spreading room
2. The fire would have to be significant enough to require main control room evacuation
3. Offsite power would have to be lost
4. HPCI would have to initiate
5. A fire induced short preventing HPCI from tripping automatically would have to occur

"Applicable safety systems remain operable, and Operations personnel are trained in procedures to handle complex fire scenarios, including fires in the main control room and cable spreading room. Additionally, the cable spreading room is protected by an automatic Halon fire suppression system.

"As a precaution, a fire watch has been established as a compensatory measure. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.