Event Notification Report for November 10, 2010

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INITIATION DURING TESTING

"At 10:56 [EST] on Wednesday, November 10, 2010, Nine Mile Point Unit [1] One automatically scrammed from rated power. The cause of the scram was Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure. The MSIV closure occurred during Instrument and Control Lo-Lo Level Surveillance Testing. The Lo-Lo Surveillance Test has been secured and all Reactor Protection System (RPS) Level Signals returned to normal. Two of four MSIVs went closed; troubleshooting to follow to determine the cause of the equipment malfunction [unexpected MSIV closure].

"Following the automatic scram, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. At 10:58, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation set point and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was initially established on the Emergency Condensers (ECS). The MSIVs have been re-opened and the normal heat removal capability has been re-established [to the Main Condensers].

"All off-site power sources remain available [with a normal electrical alignment].

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection
System occurs.

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant
Injection System occurs.

"There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."

All control rods inserted and the unit is stable in Mode 3 with reactor pressure and temperature approximately 600 psig and 480 degrees. All other safety systems operated as expected.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the New York State Public Service Commission.

RHR PUMP TRIPPED WHILE OPERATING IN SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE

"On November 10, 2010, at approximately 0518 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 during Refueling Outage (RFO) 22, the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump tripped while operating in the shutdown cooling mode resulting in an interruption of the primary means of decay heat removal for approximately 30 minutes. During this period the maximum increase in reactor temperature was approximately 2 degrees Fahrenheit with a calculated time to boil of approximately 33.9 hours. There was no loss of decay heat removal due to the fact that both trains of Fuel Pool Cooling system and the Reactor Water Cleanup system remained in service. At the time of this event, the plant was in the process of restoring motive power to MO-1909, Outboard Shutdown Cooling Isolation valve. Motive power had previously been isolated to the valve as part of a preplanned evolution of transferring the power supply to 'B' Reactor Protection System (RPS). Due to a failure to isolate the control power to MO-1909 when RPS power had been transferred, MO-1909 automatically closed when motive power had been restored due the existence of a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) signal that was initiated when 'B' RPS power had been transferred. The closure of MO-1909 resulted in the isolation of the common shutdown cooling pathway, and therefore prevented both the 'A' and the 'B' RHR systems from removing decay heat. Preliminary investigations into this event indicate that the failure to isolate control power to MO-1909 occurred due to an existing procedure deficiency for transferring RPS power supplies.

"As a result of the closure of MO-1909, Operations entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 149, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, and Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) 3.9.7 Condition A; Required RHR Shutdown Cooling Subsystem Inoperable and performed the required actions of the AOP and TS. At approximately 0547, shutdown cooling was restored when the 'C' RHR pump was placed in shutdown cooling. TS 3.9.7 and AOP 149 were subsequently exited at 0551. During the duration of this event adequate decay heat removal existed as part of the site's Shutdown Risk Management in that two loops of Fuel Pool Cooling were in-service and Feed and Bleed utilizing the Control Rod Drive pumps was available. Additionally, Reactor Water Cleanup was in service and remained in service for the duration of this event. Note that RHR shutdown cooling was considered available during this event due to the fact that there were no component failures associated with MO-1909 preventing it from being immediately re-opened.

"This event is being reported as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B).

"The [NRC] Resident Inspectors have been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSAGE TO INTENDED TREATMENT AREA

The following was received via e-mail:

"At approximately 11:00 am on November 10, 2010, the Minnesota Department of Health was notified of a medical event that occurred at Mayo Clinic. Mayo Clinic reports during a biliary LDR treatment using Iridium-192, the catheter and guide wire moved and the radioactive sources moved out of position approximately 7 cm distal to the treatment location (still in the bile duct). The oncologist noticed the guide wire had moved at approximately 10:30 am on November 10, 2010, at that point the RSO was notified. It was determined that the intended treatment site received only 1.24 Gy of the intended dose of 20.0 Gy, making this a reportable event.

"MDH will continue to investigate and will do an on-site visit during the week of November 15. More information to follow."


A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION IN LIEU OF WRITTEN LER - INVALID ACTUATION OF MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"Event: Invalid actuation of the 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump.

"Report Type: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1).

"Description: On November 10, 2010, the 'A' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) was started per plant operating procedures. When the 'A' MFP was started, there was a partial activation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System with the start of the 'B' MDAFW.

"The plant was in Mode 3 after completing refueling outage 16 during this event. Actual plant conditions and parameters did not exist that required an automatic start of the 'B' MDAFW pump. Therefore, this actuation is classified as invalid. The system started and functioned successfully.

"This invalid actuation was entered into the corrective action program as NCR-432566."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.