Event Notification Report for November 03, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/02/2010 - 11/03/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46391
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/03/2010
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2010
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 08:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION
10 CFR Section:
72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
SHER BAHADUR (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FUEL STORAGE TRANSFER CASK NEUTRON SHIELD PARTIAL DRAINDOWN
"At 0813 [CDT], the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Control Room (CR) received a report of a partial neutron water shield drain down on the Dry Fuel On-site Transfer Cask (TC). The TC, with a loaded Dry Storage Cask (DSC), was located in the Reactor Building (RB) Railroad Airlock area. Final preparations were being completed prior to transferring the DSC to Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) 2A. The RB and south side of the Administration Building were cleared of unnecessary personnel. No abnormally elevated RB area radiological readings were noted on CR indication. Local indication in the [Railroad] Airlock from portable radiation monitors indicated abnormally high readings due to the drain down. At 0819 [CDT], CNS entered Abnormal Procedure 5.1 RAD, Building Radiation Trouble. Surveys indicate the top of the TC had readings of about 130 mR/hr neutron at 30cm, which is above the normal readings of 2 mR/hr. Surveys of the bottom portion of the TC indicated a neutron dose rate of 10 mR/hr at 30cm. Actions per 5.1 RAD were subsequently performed. An emergency declaration was not required, because no confinement boundary was adversely affected and neutron levels did not meet a factor of 1,000 over normal levels. Since dose rates were no greater than noted above, and because neutron dose was being directed upward due to the shielding loss being in the upper portion of transfer cask, the Technical Support Center (TSC), which is located in the Administration Building, was determined to support habitability. Furthermore the TSC is provided with additional shielding for personnel protection during an event.
"This is being reported as a 24 hour report under 10 CFR 72.75(d) for an important to safety fuel storage equipment that failed to function as designed when required to prevent releases, prevent exposures in excess of regulatory limits, or mitigate the consequences of an accident and no redundant equipment was available or operable to perform the required safety function. The cause of the drain down is under investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0813 [CDT], the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) Control Room (CR) received a report of a partial neutron water shield drain down on the Dry Fuel On-site Transfer Cask (TC). The TC, with a loaded Dry Storage Cask (DSC), was located in the Reactor Building (RB) Railroad Airlock area. Final preparations were being completed prior to transferring the DSC to Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) 2A. The RB and south side of the Administration Building were cleared of unnecessary personnel. No abnormally elevated RB area radiological readings were noted on CR indication. Local indication in the [Railroad] Airlock from portable radiation monitors indicated abnormally high readings due to the drain down. At 0819 [CDT], CNS entered Abnormal Procedure 5.1 RAD, Building Radiation Trouble. Surveys indicate the top of the TC had readings of about 130 mR/hr neutron at 30cm, which is above the normal readings of 2 mR/hr. Surveys of the bottom portion of the TC indicated a neutron dose rate of 10 mR/hr at 30cm. Actions per 5.1 RAD were subsequently performed. An emergency declaration was not required, because no confinement boundary was adversely affected and neutron levels did not meet a factor of 1,000 over normal levels. Since dose rates were no greater than noted above, and because neutron dose was being directed upward due to the shielding loss being in the upper portion of transfer cask, the Technical Support Center (TSC), which is located in the Administration Building, was determined to support habitability. Furthermore the TSC is provided with additional shielding for personnel protection during an event.
"This is being reported as a 24 hour report under 10 CFR 72.75(d) for an important to safety fuel storage equipment that failed to function as designed when required to prevent releases, prevent exposures in excess of regulatory limits, or mitigate the consequences of an accident and no redundant equipment was available or operable to perform the required safety function. The cause of the drain down is under investigation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46387
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL STONE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHIL STONE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 11/03/2010
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 10:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2010
Notification Time: 12:09 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 10:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (RA)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
JOHN THORP (NRR)
ELMO COLLINS (RA)
BRUCE BOGER (NRR)
WILLIAM GOTT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO AN EXPLOSION IN THE PROTECTED AREA WHICH AFFECTS NORMAL OPERATIONS
On November 3, 2010 at 1021 CDT, operators attempted to start the Unit 2 startup feedpump to support a two hour maintenance run. The feeder breaker for the startup feedpump exploded causing an undervoltage condition on Auxiliary Bus 1H and Standby Bus 1H which resulted in an automatic reactor trip due to reactor coolant pump undervoltage. All control rods inserted into the core. At 1038 CDT, the site declared an UNUSUAL EVENT (HU-2) due to an explosion in the protected area which affects normal plant operations. The standby diesel generator (EDG-23) started and loaded to the 'C' train loads which sequenced properly. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as expected providing feedwater to the steam generators. The normal feedwater pumps were secured. Decay heat is being removed from Unit 2 using the normal steam dump valves to the main condenser. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The plant is stable and in MODE 3 with no challenges to reactor safety. There was no impact on Unit 1.
At 1240 CDT the licensee terminated the UNUSUAL EVENT.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker explosion and if the other standby diesel generator (EDG-21) should have started due to the undervoltage condition.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TAPLETT TO KLCO ON 11/3/10 AT 1530 EDT * * *
"A News Release is being planned so this condition is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"During the electrical fault condition, some Train A components stopped running although no Train A low voltage ESF actuation occurred, The reason for this occurrence is not fully understood,
"The breaker malfunction did not result in a fire."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified: R4DO (Spitzberg); NRR (Thorp); R4RA (Collins); NRR (Boger); IRD (Gott) DHS (Hill); FEMA (Hollis)
* * * UPDATE FROM HARRISON TO SNYDER ON 11/4/10 AT 1920 EDT * * *
The licensee called to correct an editorial error in the original report above. The second sentence of the original report above should refer to Auxiliary Bus 2H and Standby Bus 2H since this is a Unit 2 issue.
Notified: R4DO (Spitzberg).
On November 3, 2010 at 1021 CDT, operators attempted to start the Unit 2 startup feedpump to support a two hour maintenance run. The feeder breaker for the startup feedpump exploded causing an undervoltage condition on Auxiliary Bus 1H and Standby Bus 1H which resulted in an automatic reactor trip due to reactor coolant pump undervoltage. All control rods inserted into the core. At 1038 CDT, the site declared an UNUSUAL EVENT (HU-2) due to an explosion in the protected area which affects normal plant operations. The standby diesel generator (EDG-23) started and loaded to the 'C' train loads which sequenced properly. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as expected providing feedwater to the steam generators. The normal feedwater pumps were secured. Decay heat is being removed from Unit 2 using the normal steam dump valves to the main condenser. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The plant is stable and in MODE 3 with no challenges to reactor safety. There was no impact on Unit 1.
At 1240 CDT the licensee terminated the UNUSUAL EVENT.
The licensee is investigating the cause of the breaker explosion and if the other standby diesel generator (EDG-21) should have started due to the undervoltage condition.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TAPLETT TO KLCO ON 11/3/10 AT 1530 EDT * * *
"A News Release is being planned so this condition is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).
"During the electrical fault condition, some Train A components stopped running although no Train A low voltage ESF actuation occurred, The reason for this occurrence is not fully understood,
"The breaker malfunction did not result in a fire."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified: R4DO (Spitzberg); NRR (Thorp); R4RA (Collins); NRR (Boger); IRD (Gott) DHS (Hill); FEMA (Hollis)
* * * UPDATE FROM HARRISON TO SNYDER ON 11/4/10 AT 1920 EDT * * *
The licensee called to correct an editorial error in the original report above. The second sentence of the original report above should refer to Auxiliary Bus 2H and Standby Bus 2H since this is a Unit 2 issue.
Notified: R4DO (Spitzberg).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46388
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK EGHIGIAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK EGHIGIAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/03/2010
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 12:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2010
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2010
Event Time: 12:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SPDS AND ERDS REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On 11/3/10 at 1235 EDT Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Follow-up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored."
* * * UPDATE TO PETE SNYDER FROM MARK EGHIGIAN AT 1414 EDT ON 11/6/2010 * * *
"Update to event # 46388: on 11/6/2010 at 1000 EDT, regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply.
"Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. All emergency assessment capabilities have been restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Giessner).
"On 11/3/10 at 1235 EDT Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) were removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS vital bus power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, the majority of the Control Room indications remain available to the plant staff, and will be used for emergency response, if needed. Information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems, if needed. The plant is currently in Mode 5, and will remain in Mode 5, for the duration of the SPDS and ERDS unavailability. Since the unavailability will last greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Follow-up notification will be made when SPDS and ERDS have been restored."
* * * UPDATE TO PETE SNYDER FROM MARK EGHIGIAN AT 1414 EDT ON 11/6/2010 * * *
"Update to event # 46388: on 11/6/2010 at 1000 EDT, regarding SPDS and ERDS system removed from service to support planned outage on the UPS vital power supply.
"Planned work which resulted in the removal from service of the SPDS and ERDS has been completed. All emergency assessment capabilities have been restored."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Giessner).