Event Notification Report for October 28, 2010

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IOWA LICENSEE LOST A STATIC ELIMINATOR

The Iowa Department of Public Health provided the following report via e-mail:

"The Iowa Department of Public Health was informed on 10/28/10 that Registrant number 3272-1-0403, Plasti-Paint, lost a Static Eliminator (SN: A2GV069)."

The radionuclide is a 0.01 Ci sealed source of Po-210. The Static Eliminator was manufactured by NRD, Inc, Model number: P-2021-8201. The cause of this loss was human error.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM TEST TANK SEISMIC ANALYSIS FAULTY

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function. As part of a recent NRC Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI), the seismic analysis of the Unit One and Unit Two Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) system test tanks was questioned. During the formal operability determination process initiated on 10/27/10, Engineering was verifying design data and calculations. During this review, on 10/28/10, Engineering determined that the historical calculation used the wrong formula in determining the test tank's natural frequency. The consequence is that if the test tank is filled with water, the possibility exists that the test tank could fall over or collapse during a seismic event and adversely affect adjacent safety-related items (i.e. SBLC). Calculations confirm that empty test tanks are seismically qualified.

"The SBLC test tanks on both units had been drained of water on 10/27/10 and thus both Unit One and Unit Two SBLC systems are fully operable at this time."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE LEAK FROM UNDERGROUND PIPING

"On October 28, 2010, at 1740 hours, the plant entered the Off-Normal Instruction for spills and unauthorized discharges. At 1751 hours, notification of a sodium hypochlorite spill was made to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Response Center. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. The sodium hypochlorite spill is believed to be the result of a leak in an underground piping supply line to the Emergency Service Water pump house. The leak is estimated to be approximately 130 gallons of a 12.5% Sodium Hypochlorite (Bleach) solution (80 gallons in a 24 hour period is the reportable quantity). The associated chlorination systems have been isolated, and current storage tank level is stable, indicating no more leakage in progress.

"Additionally, the Ohio EPA: State Emergency Response Commission, Perry Township Fire Department, Lake County Emergency Planning Committee, and the U.S. Coast Guard were notified in accordance with plant procedures. This event is also being reported in accordance with the Operating License, Appendix B, Environment Protection Plan, which states in part, 'Any occurrence of an unusual or important event that indicates or could result in significant environmental impact causally related to plant operation shall be recorded and reported to the NRC within 24 hours followed by a written report ..' Specifically, ' ..unanticipated or emergency discharge of waste water or chemical substances.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

DEFECT DISCOVERED IN TUBE STEEL THAT COULD BE USED IN VARIOUS SAFETY RELATED STRUCTUAL APPLICATIONS

"On October 28, 2010, Duke Energy completed a reportability determination which concluded that a defect associated with four inch by four inch tube steel with one-half inch wall thickness is reportable under Part 21. The tube steel was procured safety-related from Mackson, Inc. on May 26, 2010. Receipt of the material occurred on June 14, 2010. During construction of the Protected Service Water (PSW) ductbank elevated cable raceway, Craft reported a longitudinal crack in the tube steel, approximately four feet in length, adjacent to a raceway fabrication weld. The crack was located in the manufacturer's longitudinal seam weld in the tube steel. Follow-up investigation and laboratory evaluation revealed that the structural steel tubing in question contains surface breaking flaws located along the centerline of the seam weld which are attributable to lack of fusion that occurred during tubing manufacture. Additional testing of samples from the same heat of material indicated that the seam weld flaw depth varied with some localized areas reaching depths of at least 40 percent through the wall thickness prior to raceway fabrication welding. According to documents received from the supplier, during dedication, the supplier performed chemical, physical and 100 percent visual exam in accordance with their accepted dedication procedures for ASTM A500 for Grade B material. However, the supplied product did not conform to the requirements of ASTM A500 in that the longitudinal butt joint was not welded across its thickness (Reference ASTM A500, Section 6.2). Duke Energy will provide follow-up written notification within 30 days pursuant to Part 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"Initial Safety Significance: None. The defective tube steel utilized in the PSW structure was not placed into service. Tube steel sections of the same heat of material not used in pre-fabrication efforts were scrapped. Those installed were cut out or evaluated for acceptability by Engineering. The failure of this weld significantly impairs the structural properties of the hollow structural section. The generic implications associated with the potential to use these structural members in various nuclear safety-related applications at this site and at other stations results in a substantial safety hazard were it to remain uncorrected.

"Corrective Action(s):
1. Notified supplier, Mackson, Inc.
2. Re-worked all uses of the defective structural tube steel.
3. Developed additional, required testing for safety -related tube steel."

The supplier (Mackson, Inc) indicated to Oconee that no other nuclear power plants have received this type of tube steel from Mackson. Oconee also has concluded that the condition is confined to only one heat of the tubing used onsite. All the tube steel of this heat has been either disposed of, removed, or verified acceptable.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE "B" EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) PUMP

Text provided by the licensee. Quotations omitted for readability.

Report Type: This 60-day telephone notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).

Description: On October 28, 2010, during the performance of MST I0073, "Train 'B' 18 Month Manual Reactor Trip, Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic & Master Relay Test", two sequential errors resulted in the inappropriate activation of the 'B' ESW pump. During night shift on October 27/28th, the Master Relay Selector Switch was not returned to the required OFF position. This caused day shift to find one of the two general warning lights to be lit. During the troubleshooting for the light, a technician discovered the Master Relay Selector Switch out of the expected OFF position as required by the procedure. A technician moved the switch to the OFF position outside of procedural guidance, resulting in the partial activation of the Reactor Protection System, including the 'B' ESW pump.

The plant was in Mode 6 due to refueling outage 16 during the event. Actual plant conditions and parameters did not exist that required an automatic start of the 'B' ESW Pump. Therefore, this actuation is classified as invalid. The system started and functioned successfully.

This invalid actuation was entered into the corrective action program as NCR 430289.

Cause: Poor performance of task by the individual.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) OOS

"Beginning at approximately 0800 hours EDT on October 28, 2010, Perry Plant personnel will be taking the plant Integrated Computer System (ICS) out of service for planned maintenance. During the time ICS is out of service, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) will be unavailable. The computer outage is scheduled for six hours.

"In the event of an emergency, plant parameter data will be orally transmitted to the facilities through the Status Board Ring Down circuit with back-up [using] the Private Branch Exchange, Off-Premise Exchange, and various redundant intra-facility circuits throughout the emergency facilities. The dose assessment function will be maintained during the out of service time period by manual input of data into CADAP and, if required, by manual calculation. The ability to open and maintain an 'open line' using the Emergency Notification System will not be affected and will be the primary means of transferring plant data to the NRC as a contingency until the ERDS can be returned to service during the period of unavailability.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability. A follow-up notification will be made when the maintenance activities are completed and the equipment is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 1301 EDT ON 10/28/10 FROM GLENDON BURNHAM TO DONG PARK * * *

At 1100 EDT, the plant ICS has been returned to service and functioning normally.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski).