Event Notification Report for October 26, 2010

PACKAGE SURFACE CONTAMINATION IN EXCESS OF REPORTING LIMITS

The licensee reported receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than the reporting limits of 220 dpm per cm squared. The package contained returned material, Tc-99m (Technetium), that was being shipped back to the company from a nearby customer in Rodchester Hills, MI. A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 583 dpm per cm squared.

A survey inspection of the receiving area did not find any contamination and other survey results were inconclusive. The surface contamination appears to be Tc-99m. No personnel contamination resulted from the incident and the package is being stored in a secured area.

INVALID ACTUATION OF HIGH CONSEQUENCE LIMITING SAFEGUARDS AND SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEMS

"This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1).

"With Unit 1 at cold shutdown (about 105 degrees Fahrenheight and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 'A' train of the High Consequence Limiting Safeguards (HI CLS) system and Unit 1 'A' train of the Safety Injection (SI) system occurred at 23:56 during setup for 'H' Bus Logic Testing. Plant systems and components responding to the HI CLS and SI 'A' train signals started and functioned successfully as designed (with the exception of those systems and components procedurally rendered inoperable due to the RCS being below 350 degrees Fahrenheight and 450 psig). The HI CLS and SI 'A' trains were reset and the affected systems were restored to their pre-event configurations.

"Specific trains and systems that actuated for the 'A' train of HI CLS and SI are described below:
"- With the unit at cold shutdown, one high head pump was running (the two redundant pump controls were in the pull to lock position in compliance with Technical Specifications). The 'A' train High Head Safety Injection motor operated valves re-aligned such that the running high head pump provided flow to the RCS cold legs from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). During this time the pressurizer level increased from approximately 23 percent to about 42 percent.
"- Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump motor operated valves opened but no flow was delivered to the steam generators since the AFW pumps were in pull to lock.
"- The 'A' train containment isolation valves closed, isolating the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) heat exchanger. However, shutdown cooling was previously aligned to the 'B' train RHR and therefore shutdown cooling was uninterrupted. Containment isolation valves were later restored to a normal alignment.
"- One train of Auxiliary Ventilation actuated and was restored to normal after the Safety Injection signal was reset.
"- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) No. 1 started but did not load since its associated Emergency Bus remained energized by offsite power. The EDG was stopped and returned to automatic.

"An apparent cause evaluation is in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN

At approximately 1615 EDT on 10/26/10, a vehicle containing a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge, Model #3440, S/N 34482, with 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be was stolen at 1800 Alabama Ave, SE, DC. The RSO reported the theft to the DC Police who are on-scene.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

TWO MEDICAL EVENTS INVOLVING RECEIVED DOSE LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE

During an on-site NRC Inspection on 10/26/10, two (2) medical events were identified both involving a delivered dose less than the prescribed dose following implant of Palladium-103 seed for prostate therapy. Specific details as follows:

First Medical Event

Preplanning date: 08/26/09
Post planning date: 09/03/09
D-90 (dose received by 90% of the prostate volume): 72%
Underdose: 28%
Prescribed: Palladium-103, 156U consisting of 65 seeds, 2.4U/seed

Second Medical Event

Preplanning date: 12/08/09
Post planning date: 12/29/09
D-90 (dose received by 90% of the prostate volume): 64%
Underdose: 36%
Prescribed: Palladium-103, 173U consisting of 74 seeds, 2.4U/seed

Both underdoses are attributed to prostate swelling. The physician reviewing the results concluded that there was no adverse impact on either patient. The licensee will continue reviewing medical records to identify any additional occurrences of this nature.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

* * * RETRACTION FROM MIREL PALAMARU TO VINCE KLCO ON 1/25/11 AT 1829 EST * * *

Based on a post evaluation by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer and physicians, all delivered dose came within 20% of overall prescribed dose. Thus, this is not considered a medical event.

Notified the R3DO (Stone), and FSME (McIntosh).