Event Notification Report for October 24, 2010

SHUTTER FOUND PARTIALLY STUCK OPEN ON A FIXED NUCLEAR GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On October 25, 2010, the licensee reported that while making preparations to perform plant maintenance, the shutter on a Ohmart Corporation model SH-F2-45 nuclear gauge containing 60 milliCuries (original activity) of Cesium (Cs)-137 was found to be stuck in a partially opened position. The licensee stated that they are going to shield the source to reduce the dose rate to below 2 millirem/hour, remove it form the vessel, and lock it in their Radioactive Material storage building. No significant exposure has occurred due to this event. The licensee has contacted the manufacture for repairs or replacement of the gauge. The cause for the event is under investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received IAW SA 300."

Texas Incident #: I-8795

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER TRUCK IN ROLLOVER ACCIDENT

A radiographer from Quality Inspection and Testing, Inc was involved in a single vehicle accident 18 miles west of Vernal, Utah on highway 40. According to witnesses, the truck rolled numerous times. The state police arrived, secured the highway, contacted state radiation control, and surveyed the area. The results of the survey indicated no spread of contamination or radiation levels above background. The SPEC Model 150 radiography camera S/N 1195 containing 40 Curies of Ir-192 was undamaged and placed into the custody of another representative of Quality Inspection and Testing Inc., who arrived on the scene at the request of the state. The driver survived the accident.

The radiography company is a Louisiana licensee with reciprocity in the State of Utah.

Utah Incident Number: 100005

'A' TRAIN RHR INOPERABLE DUE TO TEMPERATURE SWITCH FAILURE ON 'A' CONTROL ROOM CHILLER

"On 10/24/2010, while in Mode 5 in natural circulation cooling and no fuel movement in progress, the 'A' Control Room Chiller (AK400) tripped apparently due to an equipment failure of a temperature switch. This system was providing cooling for the Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System (SACS) room coolers. This caused the 'A' train of SACS and 'A' Train of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) to be administratively declared inoperable with the remaining train out of service for maintenance. As a result of the inoperable systems, the ability to remove residual heat could have been prevented. The 'A' RHR train, the alternate 'C' RHR train and the 'A' SACS Loop remained continuously available. No personnel were injured."

The licensee is in Technical Specification 3.9.11.1 Shutdown Cooling and 3.8.1.2 for SACS inoperable. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) are available but inoperable as a result of SACS being inoperable. Offsite power is not affected and plant risk remains 'Green'. There were no significant events on-going at the time of the event. The licensee is bench testing a replacement switch at this time, and the chiller has been returned to service. The licensee is maintaining natural circulation and ensuring the availability of redundant RHR once a shift.

The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloyways Township have been notified.

* * * RETRACTION FROM J.R. TRAUTVETTER TO J. KNOKE AT 1015 EST ON 12/17/10 * * *

Licensee is retracting this event based on the following:

"Hope Creek Technical Specification 3.9.11 action statement (a) for no OPERABLE RHR loops is to demonstrate the operability of at least one alternate method of decay heat removal within one hour and once per 24 hours thereafter. Prior to and throughout the event, decay heat, removal was maintained via the Fuel Pooling Cooling system through the available heat exchangers with core circulation maintained by natural circulation. Use of the Fuel Pool Cooling for decay heat removal is recognized in station procedures as an alternate method of decay heat removal in technical specification action statement (TSAS) 3.9.11. This retraction is to clarify that the inoperable systems did not prevent the ability to remove residual heat. The outage risk assessment remained Green throughout the period that both RHR loops were inoperable.

"There was no loss of safety function, and therefore, the event is not reportable as an event that prevents the fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B)."

Notified the R1DO (Daniel Holody)

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE TRIP RESULTING FROM A LOW CONDENSER VACUUM

"At 1641 EDT 10/24/10, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown following an automatic scram due to a main turbine trip, caused by a loss of [condenser] vacuum. The scram was uncomplicated, Control Rod 10-35 did not fully insert on scram and was manually inserted from position 38. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 137 inches, and as expected, HPCI, RCIC. & SRVs did not actuate. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the CRD [Control Rod Drive] and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected.

"The loss of condenser vacuum is under investigation.

"All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and EDG's [Emergency Diesel Generators] were operable, and no safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.

"Decay heat is being removed through the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser."

Electrical offsite power lineups are normal. Reactor pressure is 882 psig and reactor temperature is 515 degrees F (NOP and NOT). The reactor is stable in mode 3.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.