Event Notification Report for October 20, 2010

PART 21 - CRACK INDICATIONS IN MARATHON CONTROL ROD BLADES

The following was received via facsimile:

"A recent inspection of near 'End-of-Life' Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6 has revealed crack indications. The CRB assemblies in question were manufactured in 1997. GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) continues to investigate the cause(s) of the crack indications. Once the cause of the crack indications is determined, GEH will evaluate the nuclear and mechanical lifetime limits of the Marathon Control Rod Blade design in light of the new inspection data, and make revised lifetime recommendations, if necessary.

"This 60-day interim notification, in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), is sent for all plants that are D lattice, BWR/2-4 or S lattice, BWR/6 plants. Since there have been no reported cracking occurrences in C lattice assemblies to date, these CRBs are tentatively eliminated from the investigation. C lattice, BWR/4-5 plants have been included on Attachment 2 for identification. Should the results of the investigation implicate the C lattice plants, the final resolution to this 10CFR Part 21 evaluation will include the C lattice plants."

The D lattice and S lattice plants in the US that are affected by this notification include Nine Mile Point, Unit 1; Millstone, Unit 1; Fitzpatrick; Pilgrim; Vermont Yankee; Grand Gulf; River Bend; Clinton; Oyster Creek; Dresden, Unit 2; Dresden, Unit 3; Peach Bottom, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Unit 3; Quad Cities, Unit 1; Quad Cities, Unit 2; Perry, Unit 1; Duane Arnold; Cooper; Monticello; Brunswick, Unit 1; Brunswick, Unit 2; Hatch, Unit 1; Hatch, Unit 2; Browns Ferry, Unit 1; Browns Ferry, Unit 2; and Browns Ferry, Unit 3.

* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO ERIC SIMPSON VIA FAX AT 1556 ON 12/1/2010 * * *

"In August 2010, GE Hitachi (GEH) performed the planned inspection of four near 'End-of-Life' CRBs at 'Plant O.' The inspection revealed crack indications on all four Control Rod Blades (CRBs). The observed cracks are much more numerous, and have more material distortion than previously observed. Further, the cracks occur at a much lower reported local B-10 depletion than previously observed, with cracking predominantly starting at approximately 40% local depletion, whereas previous inspections observed cracking only above 60% local depletion.

"The cracks at 'Plant O' are also more severe, in that they resulted in missing capsule tube fragments from two of the inspected CRBs. A lost parts analysis performed for 'Plant O' determined that there is no negative affect on plant performance due to the missing tube fragments.

"At this point in the investigation, no causal or contributing factors unique to the 'Plant O' CRBs, nor their operation, has been identified.

"Including the inspections at 'Plant O,' GEH has now completed the visual inspection of 97 irradiated Marathon CRBs, with 10 showing crack indications. As 'Plant O' is an S lattice design, all crack indications are still confined to D and S lattice applications, with no crack indications on C lattice designs. When considering only D and S lattice applications that are near 'End-of-Life' depletion limits, 10 of 23 control rod inspections have revealed crack indications."

Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R2DO (Shaeffer), R3DO (Ring), R4DO (Powers) and Part 21 Group.

* * * UPDATE FROM DALE PORTER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER VIA FACSIMILE AT 0934 EST ON 02/15/2001 * * *

"Subject: Part 21 Reportable Condition Notification: Design Life of D and S Lattice Marathon Control Blades

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) has completed its evaluation of the cracking of Marathon Control Rod Blades (CRB) at an international BWR/6. This issue was initially reported on October 20, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-327 (Reference 1). Additional information was provided on December 1, 2010 as GEH letter MFN 10-351 (Reference 2).

"GEH has determined that the design life, of D and S lattice Marathon Control Blades may be less than previously stated. The design life if not revised, could result in significant control blade cracking and could, if not corrected, create a substantial safety hazard and is considered a reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 21.21 (d). Marathon C lattice Control Blades are not affected by this condition. The information contained in this document informs the NRC of the conclusions and recommendations derived from GEH's investigation of this issue."

Notified R1DO (Ferdas), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Gaddy) and Part 21 Group.

LOOSE SURFACE CONTAMINATION FOUND ON OUTSIDE OF RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL PACKAGING

"The package was received today (October 20, 2010) at about 10:00 AM EDT by the VA Maryland Healthcare System, Baltimore, Maryland.

"A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of about 1800 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters.

"The package contained a unit dosage of around 12 milliCuries of Fluorine-18 labeled radiopharmaceuticals and was shipped from Cardinal Health, Baltimore, Maryland. The vendor/shipper also serves as the delivery carrier. The VA nuclear medicine staff immediately notified staff at Cardinal Health about the contaminated package around 10:30 AM EDT.

"As corrective actions, additional wipe samples were taken in the VA nuclear medicine department, and the indication was that the package was most likely inadvertently cross-contaminated by a technologist who had handled similar materials just before checking in the package. Specifically, a contaminated absorbant pad was identified near the check-in area. The healthcare system Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) indicated that additional area and personnel surveys were performed to ensure that residual contamination in the area was identified and addressed appropriately. Also, the RSO reinstructed the technologists involved in the incident on proper material handling techniques to avoid future cross-contamination of items and packages. Additional reinstruction of technologists is planned.

"As additional follow-up information, the RSO spoke to the pharmacy supervisor at Cardinal Health around 12:00 PM EDT and again at 1:30 PM EDT and learned that the driver and the vehicle were surveyed by the vendor and found to be free of contamination. Also, the vendor received no other reports of contaminated packages from other customers. This information supports a conclusion that the contamination was most likely from cross-contamination after package receipt.

"We will notify our NRC Project Manager at NRC Region III of this event."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

The following information was received via facsimile:

"On October 29, 2010, the licensee's RSO contacted DRH [Mississippi State Department of Health, Division of Radiological Health] about their inlet shutter/lock out device that would not close completely. The licensee had shutdown one of their Polymer lines for maintenance/turn around on October 20, 2010 and proceeded to the Disc Ring Reactor to lock out the rod source devices. The outlet rod source was retracted into the holder and shutter/lock out device was closed and locked. The inlet rod source was retracted into the holder but the shutter/lock out device would not close completely.

"On October 22, 2010, Berthold Technologies USA, LLC was contacted by the licensee to assess the problem and make repairs. On October 27, 2010, Berthold Technologies USA, LLC came to inspect and perform repairs on the insertion rod source. The maintenance technician fully retracted the source which allowed the shutter/gate to turn further, but not to the fully indicated closed position. The maintenance technician then verified the source was fully retracted by knowledge of the device and survey readings (12 inches from device 2.6 mR/hr at one end, average along length of device, 0.5 mR/hr). The device was then removed for further inspection and maintenance. The device was then locked in the off/closed position and remounted in its original location. Installation surveys were performed, but readings were not obtained as plant maintenance was being done in the area.

"The licensee was instructed by DRH to send in a written report describing the incidents leading up to the event that occurred on October 20, 2010, and any corrective actions or follow up performed. The requested report was received by [DRH] on November 5, 2010. DRH will notify NRC Operations and no other action is required by DRH."

This device contains 7.41mCi of Co-60. The source serial number is 1772-10-02. The shield serial number is 005217.

DRH considers the device to have been repaired successfully and fully operational at the present time.

Mississippi Incident Report Number: MS-10007