Event Notification Report for October 02, 2010

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM PIPING LEAK

"Approximately five hours after Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 was shutdown at 0011 hours [EDT] to enter a scheduled refueling outage, an approximate 5 drops per minute leak was identified from a drain valve on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System inside containment. This leak is downstream of the two series RHR isolation valves on a pipe which connects to both trains of RHR. The actual location of the leak on the valve was not immediately evident. An evaluation was requested. At 1011 hours, the evaluation reported a 270 degree circumferential crack in the socket weld on the RHR side of the valve. Without reasonable assurance of RHR System operability, both trains of RHR were declared inoperable. Both trains of the RHR System are currently in service, along with three steam generators/condenser remaining available for decay heat removal. Actions to address this condition are being pursued.

"This is being reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to remove decay heat pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) since both trains of RHR were declared inoperable.

"Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100 percent power.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

T.S. Action 3.4.7 requires that efforts be immediately initiated to restore RHR as soon as possible.

UNANALYZED CONDITION WHEN FUEL PELLET BOATS BECAME STACKED

"At approximately 1330 hours on October 2, 2010 it was discovered that boats of fuel pellets had become stacked in a UO2 sintering furnace located in the GNF-A Fuel Manufacturing Operation. The furnace had been shutdown due to an apparent boat jam, which was detected by an overload sensor on the equipment that pushes boats into the furnace. This sensor is designated as an IROFS [Item Relied On For Safety] in the ISA [Integrated Safety Analysis] Summary. The stacked boat condition was discovered after process engineering removed two boats of fuel from the entrance of the furnace as part of the boat jam investigation. With these boats removed the stacked boats could be clearly seen and proper notifications were made to management.

"The sintering furnace process has independent controls on geometry, which limit the process to a single layer of boats, and moderation, which prevent water and other forms of moderator from entering the process. In this event, the geometry control was compromised however the moderation control remained intact. The stacked boat condition has been analyzed as a process upset condition and is demonstrated safe in a documented safety analysis.

"The IROFS that were intended to detect a misalignment of boats functioned properly during the event as the misalignment was detected. The IROFS mitigated the severity of the boat jam and the furnace operation was shutdown due to the misalignment. This event did not result in an unsafe condition, however the declared IROFS did not prevent the loss of geometry and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements.

"As a result, this event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1).

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT - Low Safety Significance - No unsafe conditions existed due to this event.

"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS - Safety equipment associated with the sintering furnace operation is functional.

"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS - The sintering furnace operation remains shutdown pending investigation and implementation of corrective actions."

System design is such that boats cannot overturn and no spillage of fuel pellets has occurred. The furnace will have to cooldown before repairs can be completed. Applicable State and Local agencies will be notified by the facility. Marvin Sykes of NRC Region 2 has been notified by the facility.