Event Notification Report for October 01, 2010

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A TURBINE BUILDING EVACUATION

"At 0340 EDT on Friday, October 1, 2010, the turbine building was evacuated as a precaution while station employees investigated the presence of a chemical odor. The source of the odor was identified as paint fumes from planned outage activities and air samples confirmed that no safety hazard existed. Workers were returned to the building approximately 45 minutes later. An Event of Potential Public Interest was issued to outside agencies."

State and local agencies were notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

NON-FIXED RAD SURFACE CONTAMINATION GREATER THAN LIMITS

"[This report is being made] to report receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than reporting limits.

"The package was received today, October 1, 2010, at around 0811 CDT by the Amarillo Veterans Administration (VA) Health Care System, Amarillo, Texas.

"A wipe test performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 1300 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory limit of 220 dpm/cm2.

"The package was immediately bagged and secured within the VA nuclear medicine department where it will be stored for decay. Wipes were taken throughout the department with all readings being at background levels.

"The package contained 80 milliCuries of Tc-99m-labeled radiopharmaceuticals and was shipped from Panhandle Pharmacy, Amarillo, Texas. The vendor/shipper also serves as the delivery carrier. The VA nuclear medicine staff immediately notified the carrier before he left the nuclear medicine department and also contacted staff at Panhandle Pharmacy about the contaminated package at around 0825 CDT.

"We will notify our NRC Project Manager at NRC Region III of this event."

The VA facility RSO indicated that the VA staff offered to survey the carrier, but he declined.

The external exposure rate readings on the package were within limits: 0.4 mR/hr on contact.

The receiving facility was scanned for contamination. The results came back as reading background.

UNANALYZED CONDITION - APPENDIX R NON-COMPLIANCE ISSUE IDENTIFIED

"At 1325 EDT on October 1, 2010, an Appendix R non-compliance issue was identified associated with a potential loss of safety related 2400 VAC Bus 1C and 1D due to specifically sequenced fires affecting control cables and power cables routed in common fire areas but different raceways. An extent of condition corrective action identified that three 2400 VAC breakers 152-103 (Bus 1 C Service Water Pump P-7B), 152-205 (Bus 1D Service Water Pump P-7C), and 152-208 (Bus 1D Component Cooling Water Pump P-52B) all have control cables routed in the same fire areas as the associated power cables.

"There are three fire areas, the 1C switchgear room 116A (Fire Area 4), screen house room 136 (Fire Area 9), and component cooling water room 123 (Fire Area16) that contain both control cables and power cables for the associated breakers. The concern is that a fire could first damage the control cable(s), resulting in the opening of the control power fuses which would disable the control power and render the breaker protection circuitry nonfunctional. The 2400 VAC breakers fail-as-is on loss of control power. As such if the breakers were closed they would remain closed until manually opened. If the same fire then damaged the power cable(s) on the same breaker, the loss of the breaker protection circuitry would prevent the individual breaker from automatically opening and the clearing of the cable fault would propagate upstream to the next coordinated breaker which would result in the associated 2400 VAC bus feeder breaker opening and a loss of the entire bus.

"Breaker 152-103 has the issue of both control and power cables present in the screen house room 136 (Fire Area 9) which has potential to result in the loss of the 1C bus for a fire in the screen house. The Appendix R safe shutdown analysis credits both 1C and 1D busses remaining available for a fire in Fire Area 9 and credits 1D bus remaining available for a fire in Fire Area 4.

"Breaker 152-205 has the issue of both control and power cables present in the screen house room 136 (Fire Area 9) and in the 1C Switchgear room 116A (Fire Area 4) which has potential to result in the loss of 1C and 1D busses for a fire in the screen house or the 1C switchgear room. The Appendix R safe shutdown analysis credits both 1C and 1D busses remaining available for a fire in Fire Area 9 and credits 1D bus remaining available for a fire in Fire Area 4.

"Breaker 152-208 has the issue of both control and power cables present in the component cooling water room 123 (Fire Area 16) which has the potential to result in the loss of 1D bus for a fire in the component cooling water room. The Appendix R safe shutdown analysis credits both 1C and 1D busses remaining available for a fire in Fire Area 16.

"The 1C and 1D busses are relied on to provide power to safety related equipment. The busses are normally supplied by offsite power. In the event that offsite power is lost, power is supplied to the busses by the emergency diesel generators. Existing hourly fire tours of the 1C switchgear room, the screen house room, and the component cooling water room are credited as initial compensatory measures.

"As a compensatory measure, existing hourly fire tours of the 1C switchgear room, the screen house room, and the component cooling water room are credited.

"This is considered to be an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION REDUCED CAPABILITY

"This is an eight-hour non-emergency notification to the NRCOC for a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety function of a system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Unit 4 High Head Safety Injection (SI) system was at reduced capability from approximately 0951[hrs. EDT] to 1027 [hrs.]. This was due to an open flowpath from the High Head Safely Injection Pump discharge to the Unit 3 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and refueling cavity. This flow path was established during the execution of an Equipment Clearance Order for Unit 3 SI system when SI valves MOV-3-843A and MOV-3-843B were opened prior to closing SI lsolation Valve 3-867. This condition could have impacted the ability of the SI pumps to provide required flow to the RCS cold legs should the SI system have been required based on Engineering judgment. This condition was discovered at approximately 1005 [hrs.].

"Unit 3 is in Mode 6 for a planned refueling outage. Unit 4 is in Mode 1 at 100%"

Unit 3 and Unit 4 share a common High Head SI System discharge header. Unit 4 entered T.S. 3.0.3 from 0951[hrs.] to 1027 [hrs.] when SI Isolation Valve 3-867 was closed. The licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector.