Event Notification Report for September 29, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/28/2010 - 09/29/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
462934629446289462904629146287
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 46293
Rep Org: DEL VALLE GROUP
Licensee: CRMI
Region: 1
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: 52-25430-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARMELO CALDERON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: CRMI
Region: 1
City: SAN JUAN State: PR
County:
License #: 52-25430-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CARMELO CALDERON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/30/2010
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2010
Notification Time: 14:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 09:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
ILTAB VIA EMAIL
LOST/STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGE
An employee returning from a job site in Bayamon, Puerto Rico, stopped overnight at his home in San Lorenzo with a licensed moisture density gauge in the back of his truck. On the next day, while traveling to the next job site in Miramar, San Juan, the employee noticed that the moisture density gauge was missing from the truck bed. The driver retraced his steps, but was unable to locate the gauge and was not able to determine whether it had fallen off of the back of the truck or was stolen overnight.
The San Lorenzo Police Department has been notified. The police report number is 2010606705020.
The Puerto Rico Department of Health has been notified. A press release is planned to assist in recovering the moisture density gauge.
The gauge is a Seaman Model C200, S/N L508, which contains a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be source.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
An employee returning from a job site in Bayamon, Puerto Rico, stopped overnight at his home in San Lorenzo with a licensed moisture density gauge in the back of his truck. On the next day, while traveling to the next job site in Miramar, San Juan, the employee noticed that the moisture density gauge was missing from the truck bed. The driver retraced his steps, but was unable to locate the gauge and was not able to determine whether it had fallen off of the back of the truck or was stolen overnight.
The San Lorenzo Police Department has been notified. The police report number is 2010606705020.
The Puerto Rico Department of Health has been notified. A press release is planned to assist in recovering the moisture density gauge.
The gauge is a Seaman Model C200, S/N L508, which contains a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be source.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46294
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAIGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: PAIGE KEMP
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/30/2010
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2010
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 14:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DISCOVERY OF MICROTHERM INSULATION IN CONTAINMENT WHICH COULD IMPACT SUMP STRAINER PERFORMANCE
"On September 12, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 entered a scheduled refueling outage. During the outage while performing reviews for a design change, it was determined that some uncontrolled plant drawings indicated that Microtherm insulation may have been installed on some piping locations inside the containment. The Microtherm insulation impacts the new containment sump strainers installed to address NRC GSI-191 requirements. It was subsequently confirmed via walk downs that the Unit 1 containment contained some Microtherm insulation.
"Based on conflicting information on the possible installation of Microtherm inside Unit 2 containment and the identification of Microtherm insulation on Unit 1, a conservative decision was made to shutdown Unit 2 on September 29, and the Unit was cooled down to Mode 5 to allow a detailed inspection to be performed. The areas where the Microtherm insulation was potentially installed could not be inspected with the Unit at power.
"Subsequent inspections have confirmed that the Microtherm insulation was installed in some areas of the Unit 2 containment. These locations include the reactor vessel nozzles and reactor coolant pump casings. Plans are being developed to remove this insulation on both units.
"The overall impact of the Microtherm insulation on the containment sump operation is being evaluated by engineering."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.
"On September 12, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 entered a scheduled refueling outage. During the outage while performing reviews for a design change, it was determined that some uncontrolled plant drawings indicated that Microtherm insulation may have been installed on some piping locations inside the containment. The Microtherm insulation impacts the new containment sump strainers installed to address NRC GSI-191 requirements. It was subsequently confirmed via walk downs that the Unit 1 containment contained some Microtherm insulation.
"Based on conflicting information on the possible installation of Microtherm inside Unit 2 containment and the identification of Microtherm insulation on Unit 1, a conservative decision was made to shutdown Unit 2 on September 29, and the Unit was cooled down to Mode 5 to allow a detailed inspection to be performed. The areas where the Microtherm insulation was potentially installed could not be inspected with the Unit at power.
"Subsequent inspections have confirmed that the Microtherm insulation was installed in some areas of the Unit 2 containment. These locations include the reactor vessel nozzles and reactor coolant pump casings. Plans are being developed to remove this insulation on both units.
"The overall impact of the Microtherm insulation on the containment sump operation is being evaluated by engineering."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Louisa County Administrator.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46289
Rep Org: DRESSER MASONEILAN
Licensee: DRESSER MASONEILAN
Region: 1
City: AVON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRANK WHEELRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: DRESSER MASONEILAN
Region: 1
City: AVON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: FRANK WHEELRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH CERTAIN REGULATOR MODEL 77N-40 AIR REGULATORS
Dresser Masoneilan initiated a 10 CFR Part 21 investigation because of the failure of three (3) Air Regulators (model number 77N-40) at the PSE&G Salem Station within three months of being installed. Upon testing and evaluation, Dresser Masoneilan concluded that the internal O-ring used for pressure isolation in the Air Regulators were damaged during factory assembly contributing to the failure of the units to regulate pressure. Dresser Masoneilan has developed a corrective action plan and an in-service test method and acceptance criteria to determine if a unit is experiencing pressure loss due to the issue. Due to the volume, age and distribution of these models, Dresser Masoneilan is issuing a general notice to all utilities.
Contact Bill Comeau of Dresser Masoneilan at (508) 941-5477 with any questions concerning this notification.
Dresser Masoneilan initiated a 10 CFR Part 21 investigation because of the failure of three (3) Air Regulators (model number 77N-40) at the PSE&G Salem Station within three months of being installed. Upon testing and evaluation, Dresser Masoneilan concluded that the internal O-ring used for pressure isolation in the Air Regulators were damaged during factory assembly contributing to the failure of the units to regulate pressure. Dresser Masoneilan has developed a corrective action plan and an in-service test method and acceptance criteria to determine if a unit is experiencing pressure loss due to the issue. Due to the volume, age and distribution of these models, Dresser Masoneilan is issuing a general notice to all utilities.
Contact Bill Comeau of Dresser Masoneilan at (508) 941-5477 with any questions concerning this notification.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46290
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK CHRISTOPHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK CHRISTOPHER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 15:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 20:04 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 15:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HVAC EMERGENCY DAMPER FAILED QUARTERLY TEST
"During quarterly testing of the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC System, Emergency Damper MD-1 failed to fully close when the system was placed into the Emergency mode of operation. This damper being not fully closed allows outside air to bypass the filter train and renders the Emergency mode of operation unavailable.
"At 1725 the Emergency Damper MD-1 was failed to the closed position which makes the Emergency mode of the TSC HVAC system available.
"Troubleshooting and restoration of Emergency Damper MD-1 will continue on dayshift 9/30/2010."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During quarterly testing of the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC System, Emergency Damper MD-1 failed to fully close when the system was placed into the Emergency mode of operation. This damper being not fully closed allows outside air to bypass the filter train and renders the Emergency mode of operation unavailable.
"At 1725 the Emergency Damper MD-1 was failed to the closed position which makes the Emergency mode of the TSC HVAC system available.
"Troubleshooting and restoration of Emergency Damper MD-1 will continue on dayshift 9/30/2010."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46291
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSIAL WELL SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City: MEADVILLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: UNIVERSIAL WELL SERVICES, INC
Region: 1
City: MEADVILLE State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 21:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 07:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
KEVIN HSUEH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE HOUSING ON DENSITOMETER DETACHED FROM EQUIPMENT
The following information was sent from the commonwealth via fax:
"Excessive equipment vibration while the licensee was working at a job site caused the source housing of the Berthold LB8010 densitometer (Ser. No. 10049) to dislodge itself from the base plate, and detach from the equipment it was mounted to. The source housing was not damaged, the shutter is fully functional, and current survey readings similarly match past surveys; approximately 200 microroentgen per hour (uR/h) being the highest reading at 1 meter, with the shutter was closed and beam pointed toward the ground. The SS&D sheet on this densitometer notes a [maximum] 50 milliCuries (mCi) of Cs-137 source. Exact current activity on this unit to be determined.
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Excessive vibration during use, and [perhaps] a design problem with how the source housing is bolted to a mounting plate.
"ACTIONS: To prevent this from happening in the future, the clamps will be switched out on all the licensee's inline densitometers. In the meantime, the device is being sent back to Berthold to be remounted using a new version clamp. They will try to send whatever they can of the old clamp that failed to Berthold so it can be inspected.
"PaDEP/BRP [state] will be performing an inspection of the device and equipment, as well as interviewing those involved with the source housing recovery for additional details.
"The licensee will also be providing a full report with their findings and corrective actions."
PA Event Report No: PA100023
The following information was sent from the commonwealth via fax:
"Excessive equipment vibration while the licensee was working at a job site caused the source housing of the Berthold LB8010 densitometer (Ser. No. 10049) to dislodge itself from the base plate, and detach from the equipment it was mounted to. The source housing was not damaged, the shutter is fully functional, and current survey readings similarly match past surveys; approximately 200 microroentgen per hour (uR/h) being the highest reading at 1 meter, with the shutter was closed and beam pointed toward the ground. The SS&D sheet on this densitometer notes a [maximum] 50 milliCuries (mCi) of Cs-137 source. Exact current activity on this unit to be determined.
"CAUSE OF THE EVENT: Excessive vibration during use, and [perhaps] a design problem with how the source housing is bolted to a mounting plate.
"ACTIONS: To prevent this from happening in the future, the clamps will be switched out on all the licensee's inline densitometers. In the meantime, the device is being sent back to Berthold to be remounted using a new version clamp. They will try to send whatever they can of the old clamp that failed to Berthold so it can be inspected.
"PaDEP/BRP [state] will be performing an inspection of the device and equipment, as well as interviewing those involved with the source housing recovery for additional details.
"The licensee will also be providing a full report with their findings and corrective actions."
PA Event Report No: PA100023
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46287
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANYI
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 10:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 10:43 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2010
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 84 | Power Operation | 84 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE CAPABILITY
"On September 29, 2010, at 1024 EDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to pre-planned maintenance on the Unit 1 Control Room ventilation system. This maintenance renders the control room envelope out of service for a portion of the maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service later today.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1547 ON 9/29/2010 FROM DAVID LANYI TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *
"The maintenance has been completed and the Control Room Ventilation System has been declared operable. The TSC has been deemed to be fully functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The R2DO (Lesser) has been notified.
"On September 29, 2010, at 1024 EDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to pre-planned maintenance on the Unit 1 Control Room ventilation system. This maintenance renders the control room envelope out of service for a portion of the maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service later today.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE AT 1547 ON 9/29/2010 FROM DAVID LANYI TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *
"The maintenance has been completed and the Control Room Ventilation System has been declared operable. The TSC has been deemed to be fully functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The R2DO (Lesser) has been notified.