Event Notification Report for September 22, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/21/2010 - 09/22/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
462664626846269462704627846283
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46266
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEY WARREN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEY WARREN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 08:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 10:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 08:26 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER HVAC UNIT OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC unit [was] taken out of service for maintenance on [the] unit. The maintenance to be performed includes replacing the evaporator coil, the fan and the expansion valve. This work will be performed with high priority around the clock until the work is completed. Equipment unavailability hours will be reported to and tracked by the TSC HVAC System Engineer. Compensatory measures for performing essential TSC functions during this maintenance period have been established. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable. The maintenance period is scheduled to last 13 to 16 hours, at which point the TSC HVAC [unit] will be restored to operable status."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC unit [was] taken out of service for maintenance on [the] unit. The maintenance to be performed includes replacing the evaporator coil, the fan and the expansion valve. This work will be performed with high priority around the clock until the work is completed. Equipment unavailability hours will be reported to and tracked by the TSC HVAC System Engineer. Compensatory measures for performing essential TSC functions during this maintenance period have been established. These measures include the relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC uninhabitable. The maintenance period is scheduled to last 13 to 16 hours, at which point the TSC HVAC [unit] will be restored to operable status."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46268
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE BORGER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE BORGER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2010
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A MINOR LUBE OIL LEAK
"At 0830 [EDT] on 09/22/2010, the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was determined to be inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system was entered at 0830 [EDT] on 09/22/2010.
"The leak on the 'A' filter could not be immediately corrected. The 'B' filter was placed in service and leak checked satisfactorily. The LCO 3.5.1 action statements were closed at 1454 [EDT] on 09/22/2010.
"This incident is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD FRY TO DONG PARK AT 1609 EST ON 11/18/10 * * *
"At 1501 on September 22, 2010, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported that the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. Subsequent investigation and evaluation determined that HPCI was capable of performing all of its safety functions with the identified oil leak. The operability determination was based on the following:
"Investigation of the leak identified that the installed filter housing cover o-ring was undersized and had to be inappropriately stretched to fit in the o-ring groove in the housing cover. The cover is torqued to 75 ft-lbs by four bolts on the outer diameter of the cover, enclosing the o-ring in a metal to metal connection. There is no concern for the o-ring to extrude from the cover under this configuration. The worst case that can be postulated as a result of the undersized o-ring is a leak in which the drops break into a small stream. This type of leak is expected to result in less than 10 gallons of oil loss during the system's 6 hour mission time. The vendor recommended oil reserve level is approximately 124 gallons. The lube oil sump has a 155 gallon capacity and the remaining oil (approximately 145 gallons) is sufficient to support operability. As a result, the worst case leakage is not expected to affect operability of HPCI or result in system failure during the HPCI mission time. Operations verifies oil level weekly and prior to any planned run."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Gray).
"At 0830 [EDT] on 09/22/2010, the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was determined to be inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system was entered at 0830 [EDT] on 09/22/2010.
"The leak on the 'A' filter could not be immediately corrected. The 'B' filter was placed in service and leak checked satisfactorily. The LCO 3.5.1 action statements were closed at 1454 [EDT] on 09/22/2010.
"This incident is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM RONALD FRY TO DONG PARK AT 1609 EST ON 11/18/10 * * *
"At 1501 on September 22, 2010, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported that the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was inoperable due to a minor lube oil leak on the 'A' supply filter. Subsequent investigation and evaluation determined that HPCI was capable of performing all of its safety functions with the identified oil leak. The operability determination was based on the following:
"Investigation of the leak identified that the installed filter housing cover o-ring was undersized and had to be inappropriately stretched to fit in the o-ring groove in the housing cover. The cover is torqued to 75 ft-lbs by four bolts on the outer diameter of the cover, enclosing the o-ring in a metal to metal connection. There is no concern for the o-ring to extrude from the cover under this configuration. The worst case that can be postulated as a result of the undersized o-ring is a leak in which the drops break into a small stream. This type of leak is expected to result in less than 10 gallons of oil loss during the system's 6 hour mission time. The vendor recommended oil reserve level is approximately 124 gallons. The lube oil sump has a 155 gallon capacity and the remaining oil (approximately 145 gallons) is sufficient to support operability. As a result, the worst case leakage is not expected to affect operability of HPCI or result in system failure during the HPCI mission time. Operations verifies oil level weekly and prior to any planned run."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (Gray).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46269
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHILIP PAUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHILIP PAUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 17:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 20:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 17:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SIRENS UNAVAILABLE DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER
"During a thunder storm that extended across southern Pennsylvania and northern Maryland, 21 emergency sirens lost power in York County Pennsylvania and 8 emergency sirens lost power in Harford County Maryland. Exelon is communicating to the appropriate utilities to make emergent repairs to restore these sirens."
In accordance with Peach Bottom plant specific procedures because greater than 25% of sirens were unavailable, the licensee contacted the following: Pennsylvania and Maryland Emergency Management; Harford and Cecil counties in Maryland and Lancaster, Chester and York counties in Pennsylvania.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During a thunder storm that extended across southern Pennsylvania and northern Maryland, 21 emergency sirens lost power in York County Pennsylvania and 8 emergency sirens lost power in Harford County Maryland. Exelon is communicating to the appropriate utilities to make emergent repairs to restore these sirens."
In accordance with Peach Bottom plant specific procedures because greater than 25% of sirens were unavailable, the licensee contacted the following: Pennsylvania and Maryland Emergency Management; Harford and Cecil counties in Maryland and Lancaster, Chester and York counties in Pennsylvania.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46270
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEBBIE TRAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DEBBIE TRAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 22:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 21:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Notification Time: 22:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 21:54 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
LUIS REYES (R1)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
LUIS REYES (R1)
SAMSON LEE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A TRANSFORMER FIRE
"At 2132 [EDT] on 9/22/2010, [the licensee] received a breaker tripout associated with the intertie transformer. Switching was ongoing in the switchyard at the time. At 2135 [EDT], the MCR [Main Control Room] was notified that flames were present on the A intertie transformer. NOUE was declared at 2154 [EDT]. The state of Tennessee was notified at 2200 [EDT]. There have been no observable effects on other plant equipment or structures at this time. This occurrence does not affect safety related equipment.
"Flames were extinguished at 2154" [EDT].
The intertie transformer converts power between the 500 kV and 161 kV power lines. The transformer spilled an unknown quantity of oil into the gravel sump surrounding the transformer. The fire was extinguished by the onsite fire brigade and no offsite assistance was required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS TO KLCO ON 9/22/10 AT 2327 * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event based on the fire being extinguished and no further action is needed. The licensee is in the process of tagging out the failed transformer. Notified the R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lee), IRD (Marshall), DHS (Kettleson) and FEMA (O'Connell).
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS TO HUFFMAN ON 9/23/10 AT 0035 EDT * * *
The licensee plans to issue a media / press release concerning this event. Notified the R2DO (Hopper).
"At 2132 [EDT] on 9/22/2010, [the licensee] received a breaker tripout associated with the intertie transformer. Switching was ongoing in the switchyard at the time. At 2135 [EDT], the MCR [Main Control Room] was notified that flames were present on the A intertie transformer. NOUE was declared at 2154 [EDT]. The state of Tennessee was notified at 2200 [EDT]. There have been no observable effects on other plant equipment or structures at this time. This occurrence does not affect safety related equipment.
"Flames were extinguished at 2154" [EDT].
The intertie transformer converts power between the 500 kV and 161 kV power lines. The transformer spilled an unknown quantity of oil into the gravel sump surrounding the transformer. The fire was extinguished by the onsite fire brigade and no offsite assistance was required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS TO KLCO ON 9/22/10 AT 2327 * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event based on the fire being extinguished and no further action is needed. The licensee is in the process of tagging out the failed transformer. Notified the R2DO (Hopper), NRR EO (Lee), IRD (Marshall), DHS (Kettleson) and FEMA (O'Connell).
* * * UPDATE FROM TRAVIS TO HUFFMAN ON 9/23/10 AT 0035 EDT * * *
The licensee plans to issue a media / press release concerning this event. Notified the R2DO (Hopper).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46278
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: SPACE SCIENCE SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: ORLANDO State: FL
County:
License #: 140-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: SPACE SCIENCE SERVICES, INC.
Region: 1
City: ORLANDO State: FL
County:
License #: 140-2
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/24/2010
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2010
Notification Time: 17:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
DUNCAN WHITE (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHER OVEREXPOSURE
The following report was received via e-mail:
"During the last radiographic exposure on 9/22/10 the source did not fully retract. The workers did not do a survey and did not have their rate alarms turned on. They noticed that their dosimeters were off scale and discovered the problem. The film badges were processed on 9/24/10 by Landauer and found the assistant radiographer received 0.742 Rem and the lead [radiographer] received 114.4 Rem. Since they were both together this is questionable. Landauer reports the lead's badge shows an uneven surface reading which is an indication it has been damaged by dropping. Licensee calculations show 0.750 REM for both. The lead has been sent for a blood test. Licensee will send a written report. Florida is investigating."
The camera contained a 71 Ci Ir-192 source.
Florida report number: FL10-101
The following report was received via e-mail:
"During the last radiographic exposure on 9/22/10 the source did not fully retract. The workers did not do a survey and did not have their rate alarms turned on. They noticed that their dosimeters were off scale and discovered the problem. The film badges were processed on 9/24/10 by Landauer and found the assistant radiographer received 0.742 Rem and the lead [radiographer] received 114.4 Rem. Since they were both together this is questionable. Landauer reports the lead's badge shows an uneven surface reading which is an indication it has been damaged by dropping. Licensee calculations show 0.750 REM for both. The lead has been sent for a blood test. Licensee will send a written report. Florida is investigating."
The camera contained a 71 Ci Ir-192 source.
Florida report number: FL10-101
Research Reactor
Event Number: 46283
Rep Org: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: MANHATTAN State: KS
County: RILEY
License #: R-88
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000188
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY GEUTHER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: MANHATTAN State: KS
County: RILEY
License #: R-88
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000188
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY GEUTHER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 09/27/2010
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 07:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2010
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2010
Event Time: 07:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY (RTR)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
CYNTHIA MONTGOMERY (RTR)
UNEXPECTED CHANGES IN RESTRICTED AREA DOSE RATES
On Wednesday morning, September 22, 2010, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) pulled some oil samples, housed in aluminum racks, out of the well groove around the reflector near the top of the reactor where the samples had been exposed to radiation for 8 hours and then allowed to decay for 12 hours. When the samples and sample holder were removed from the pool, three detectors alarmed: two were expected to alarm, and a third, the Control Room Evacuation Alarm, was not expected to alarm. The Control Room Evacuation Alarm has a conservative, audible, alarm set point of 2.5 mR/h which is well below the actual evacuation threshold of 100 mR/h. The Control Room Evacuation Alarm alerted the SRO that conditions were not normal. Within 30 seconds, the SRO placed the aluminum sample holder behind a lead shield and the oil samples behind a beta shield. According to facility procedures, the facility did not need to be evacuated because the easily visible Control Room Evacuation Alarm meter had not exceeded the evacuation threshold of 100 mR/h.
The SRO estimated his dose as being approximately 1 Rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) which is less than the 5 Rem/yr, Part 20 limit; and approximately 15 Rem extremity dose which is less than 50 Rem/yr Part 20 limit. Follow-up dosimetry reports indicated that the SRO only received 147 mRem deep dose and 148 mRem shallow dose.
No members of the public were in the vicinity at the time of the event.
The facility believes that the cause of the high radiation field was possibly due to a high level of impurities in the aluminum sample holder and not from the oil samples. However, the oil samples received greater than normal neutron exposure and shorter than normal decay before removal from the reactor pool. This particular experiment required that these samples decay for only 12 hours, whereas normally, a decay time of 2 to 5 days is required before the samples are removed from the pool. The Reactor Safeguards Committee has recommended that the facility perform irradiation tests on each of its sample holders to prevent unexpectedly high radioactivity from unknown impurities.
Kansas State University is making this report per their license requirements and Technical Specification 6.9.a.6, an observed inadequacy in the implementation of either administrative or procedural controls, such that the inadequacy has caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition in connection with the operations of the reactor.
The State of Kansas has been notified of this event.
On Wednesday morning, September 22, 2010, the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) pulled some oil samples, housed in aluminum racks, out of the well groove around the reflector near the top of the reactor where the samples had been exposed to radiation for 8 hours and then allowed to decay for 12 hours. When the samples and sample holder were removed from the pool, three detectors alarmed: two were expected to alarm, and a third, the Control Room Evacuation Alarm, was not expected to alarm. The Control Room Evacuation Alarm has a conservative, audible, alarm set point of 2.5 mR/h which is well below the actual evacuation threshold of 100 mR/h. The Control Room Evacuation Alarm alerted the SRO that conditions were not normal. Within 30 seconds, the SRO placed the aluminum sample holder behind a lead shield and the oil samples behind a beta shield. According to facility procedures, the facility did not need to be evacuated because the easily visible Control Room Evacuation Alarm meter had not exceeded the evacuation threshold of 100 mR/h.
The SRO estimated his dose as being approximately 1 Rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) which is less than the 5 Rem/yr, Part 20 limit; and approximately 15 Rem extremity dose which is less than 50 Rem/yr Part 20 limit. Follow-up dosimetry reports indicated that the SRO only received 147 mRem deep dose and 148 mRem shallow dose.
No members of the public were in the vicinity at the time of the event.
The facility believes that the cause of the high radiation field was possibly due to a high level of impurities in the aluminum sample holder and not from the oil samples. However, the oil samples received greater than normal neutron exposure and shorter than normal decay before removal from the reactor pool. This particular experiment required that these samples decay for only 12 hours, whereas normally, a decay time of 2 to 5 days is required before the samples are removed from the pool. The Reactor Safeguards Committee has recommended that the facility perform irradiation tests on each of its sample holders to prevent unexpectedly high radioactivity from unknown impurities.
Kansas State University is making this report per their license requirements and Technical Specification 6.9.a.6, an observed inadequacy in the implementation of either administrative or procedural controls, such that the inadequacy has caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition in connection with the operations of the reactor.
The State of Kansas has been notified of this event.