Event Notification Report for September 16, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/15/2010 - 09/16/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
46255462574626146401
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46255
Rep Org: VOGTLE 3&4
Licensee: SOUTHERN COMPANY
Region: 1
City: State: GA
County:
License #: ESP-004
Agreement: Y
Docket: 52-011
NRC Notified By: JIM DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: SOUTHERN COMPANY
Region: 1
City: State: GA
County:
License #: ESP-004
Agreement: Y
Docket: 52-011
NRC Notified By: JIM DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/17/2010
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 10:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2010
Notification Time: 09:52 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 10:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
JAY HENSON (R2DO)
FAILURE TO PERFORM FFD KNOWLEDGE EXAMINATIONS FOR CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL
"SNC [Southern Nuclear Company] was informed on September 16, 2010 that the training records for a limited number of contractor employees, who are subject to the 10 CFR 26 subparts A through H, N and O requirements, did not include evidence of completion of the examination required by 10 CFR 26.29(b). The individuals had received training on the knowledge and abilities described in 10 CFR 26.29(a) but, due to personnel error, had not completed the testing required by 10 CFR 26.29(b) prior to being authorized to perform duties for which such examination is a prerequisite under 10 CFR 26. Authorization of the affected individuals to perform duties subject to 10 CFR 26 subparts A through H, N and O has been withdrawn until the required testing is completed in accordance with 10 CFR 26.29(b). Prior to discovery of this deficiency, enhancements to procedural guidance had been made to provide additional programmatic controls on subparts A through H, N and O required records. Since the procedural enhancements were implemented, required comprehensive examinations have been performed. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) as a discovered vulnerability of the FFD program."
The licensee has started testing the above mentioned personnel and expect full compliance by the beginning of next week. They will be notifying the Public Service Commission of Georgia and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"SNC [Southern Nuclear Company] was informed on September 16, 2010 that the training records for a limited number of contractor employees, who are subject to the 10 CFR 26 subparts A through H, N and O requirements, did not include evidence of completion of the examination required by 10 CFR 26.29(b). The individuals had received training on the knowledge and abilities described in 10 CFR 26.29(a) but, due to personnel error, had not completed the testing required by 10 CFR 26.29(b) prior to being authorized to perform duties for which such examination is a prerequisite under 10 CFR 26. Authorization of the affected individuals to perform duties subject to 10 CFR 26 subparts A through H, N and O has been withdrawn until the required testing is completed in accordance with 10 CFR 26.29(b). Prior to discovery of this deficiency, enhancements to procedural guidance had been made to provide additional programmatic controls on subparts A through H, N and O required records. Since the procedural enhancements were implemented, required comprehensive examinations have been performed. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) as a discovered vulnerability of the FFD program."
The licensee has started testing the above mentioned personnel and expect full compliance by the beginning of next week. They will be notifying the Public Service Commission of Georgia and the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46257
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: PATRICK State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0198-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC MATUS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: GRANITE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Region: 4
City: PATRICK State: NV
County:
License #: 00-11-0198-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ERIC MATUS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/17/2010
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2010
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
GREG SUBER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED WHEN STRUCK BY VEHICLE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"A nuclear gauge, Troxler Laboratories 4640 Thin Lift density gauge, Serial No. 1997, Nuclide CS-137, GBq 0.296, mCi 8, was damaged in a construction zone hit-and-run accident. The RSO for a construction company was carrying the thin lift gauge to his truck when he was struck by a female driver in a grey sedan. The RSO, who was approximately 10 feet inside the coned area of the construction control zone, was able to move his body at the last minute and did not sustain major injuries. The gauge was destroyed but the source remained intact in the damaged housing. The RSO and the Nevada Highway Patrol [NHP] conducted radiation surveys.
"NHP contacted Radiation Control Program 30 minutes after notified. The licensee reported to RCP within 3 hours.
"The damaged gauge has been leak tested and is stored at the licensee's facility pending instruction from Troxler on shipping for disposal."
The State of Nevada has not yet assigned a state event number.
The following information was received via facsimile:
"A nuclear gauge, Troxler Laboratories 4640 Thin Lift density gauge, Serial No. 1997, Nuclide CS-137, GBq 0.296, mCi 8, was damaged in a construction zone hit-and-run accident. The RSO for a construction company was carrying the thin lift gauge to his truck when he was struck by a female driver in a grey sedan. The RSO, who was approximately 10 feet inside the coned area of the construction control zone, was able to move his body at the last minute and did not sustain major injuries. The gauge was destroyed but the source remained intact in the damaged housing. The RSO and the Nevada Highway Patrol [NHP] conducted radiation surveys.
"NHP contacted Radiation Control Program 30 minutes after notified. The licensee reported to RCP within 3 hours.
"The damaged gauge has been leak tested and is stored at the licensee's facility pending instruction from Troxler on shipping for disposal."
The State of Nevada has not yet assigned a state event number.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46261
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/20/2010
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 13:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2010
Notification Time: 17:26 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 13:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER IDENTIFIED
"This is a late eight hour report submitted under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), 'Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.'
"During walk downs for the Fire Penetration Seal Project on September 16, 2010 at 1343 [hrs. CDT], a degraded fire barrier was identified in the wall between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sides of the Electrical Piping Area. The wall is listed as an Appendix R wall between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. The wall separates safety related redundant cables.
"There is an approximately one inch gap filled with loose fitting foam from the top of the wall to the concrete ceiling above it. In one place the foam has a gap approximately one inch wide. This has been identified as a missing fire barrier such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking.
"A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure on 9/16/10. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event."
The fire watch remains in place.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/15/2010 AT 1328 EST FROM STEPHEN SEILHYMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on September 20, 2010 for a degraded fire barrier between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barrier maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been informed."
Notified the R3DO (Cameron).
"This is a late eight hour report submitted under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii), 'Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition.'
"During walk downs for the Fire Penetration Seal Project on September 16, 2010 at 1343 [hrs. CDT], a degraded fire barrier was identified in the wall between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 sides of the Electrical Piping Area. The wall is listed as an Appendix R wall between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. The wall separates safety related redundant cables.
"There is an approximately one inch gap filled with loose fitting foam from the top of the wall to the concrete ceiling above it. In one place the foam has a gap approximately one inch wide. This has been identified as a missing fire barrier such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking.
"A fire watch was established as a compensatory measure on 9/16/10. The discovery of this non-compliance is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event."
The fire watch remains in place.
* * * RETRACTION ON 11/15/2010 AT 1328 EST FROM STEPHEN SEILHYMER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was conservatively reported on September 20, 2010 for a degraded fire barrier between Fire Area (FA) 29 and FA 30. Subsequent engineering analysis determined that the degraded fire barrier maintained the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and plant safety was not significantly degraded. The 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) report is retracted.
"The NRC Resident [Inspector] has been informed."
Notified the R3DO (Cameron).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46401
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KURT MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: QUALTECH NP
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KURT MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/08/2010
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2010
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GROUP
PART 21 REPORT - UPS MOTHERBOARD FAILED PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from QualTech NP dated November 8, 2010.
"This letter provides notification per regulation 10 CFR Part21 concerning the discovery through testing and evaluation of (4) four UPS System motherboards that reported to have failed pre-service inspection prior to installation into a UPS system at Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 TDAFWP UPS 'B' Section. Trentec (now known as QualTech NP) provided these safety related motherboards for installation on a UPS system manufactured by (OEM) Dependable Power System.
"The (4) four questionable motherboards were returned to QualTech NP for testing and evaluation to determine operability of their safety function including fit, form and function for use within the UPS System. Southern Nuclear Condition Report, CR2010109013, states 'Motherboard (DPS 20050061, SN 354, Trentec Tag # 7T55201 SN01) with different valued resistors and or different locations than original motherboard...'
"QualTech NP developed a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev.1) to evaluate the returned motherboards for fit, form and function. The plan involves visual inspection verification - QualTech NP compared the returned boards to DPS BOM lists to identify any differences; and functional performance verification - the functionality of the items were verified by performance testing as factory Go/No Go board tests using a UPS system to the parameters defined in the existing referenced dedication plans.
"Visual inspection of the motherboards found one resistor installed in the wrong location. Performance testing of motherboards found the resistor installed in the wrong location affected the safety function of the UPS system.
"The motherboard with the resistor installed in the wrong location failed to operate during performance testing. The motherboard was reworked by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who removed the resistor in question and re-installed it in the correct location. The repaired motherboard was performance tested and found acceptable for safety function for use within the UPS system.
"QuaITech NP has reviewed its customer project / PO files and has determined the dedicated UPS system (2) and these motherboards with Date Code 2007 have only been provided to Southern Nuclear-Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 (total quantity- 4). Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 has two (2) motherboards in service. QualTech NP has addressed the dedication and testing of motherboards by the developing a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev. 1). Southern Nuclear has reviewed and approved this new plan.
"QuaITech NP's conclusion is that the resistor in the wrong location on the motherboard caused the UPS system not to operate during performance testing and established the equipment would not perform its intended safety function. After rework, relocation of the resistor, and retesting the UPS system became operable and was performing its safety related function. QualTech NP has completed testing, evaluation, and repair of motherboards, no further action is required."
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from QualTech NP dated November 8, 2010.
"This letter provides notification per regulation 10 CFR Part21 concerning the discovery through testing and evaluation of (4) four UPS System motherboards that reported to have failed pre-service inspection prior to installation into a UPS system at Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 TDAFWP UPS 'B' Section. Trentec (now known as QualTech NP) provided these safety related motherboards for installation on a UPS system manufactured by (OEM) Dependable Power System.
"The (4) four questionable motherboards were returned to QualTech NP for testing and evaluation to determine operability of their safety function including fit, form and function for use within the UPS System. Southern Nuclear Condition Report, CR2010109013, states 'Motherboard (DPS 20050061, SN 354, Trentec Tag # 7T55201 SN01) with different valued resistors and or different locations than original motherboard...'
"QualTech NP developed a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev.1) to evaluate the returned motherboards for fit, form and function. The plan involves visual inspection verification - QualTech NP compared the returned boards to DPS BOM lists to identify any differences; and functional performance verification - the functionality of the items were verified by performance testing as factory Go/No Go board tests using a UPS system to the parameters defined in the existing referenced dedication plans.
"Visual inspection of the motherboards found one resistor installed in the wrong location. Performance testing of motherboards found the resistor installed in the wrong location affected the safety function of the UPS system.
"The motherboard with the resistor installed in the wrong location failed to operate during performance testing. The motherboard was reworked by original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who removed the resistor in question and re-installed it in the correct location. The repaired motherboard was performance tested and found acceptable for safety function for use within the UPS system.
"QuaITech NP has reviewed its customer project / PO files and has determined the dedicated UPS system (2) and these motherboards with Date Code 2007 have only been provided to Southern Nuclear-Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 (total quantity- 4). Southern Nuclear- Farley Station Unit 1 & 2 has two (2) motherboards in service. QualTech NP has addressed the dedication and testing of motherboards by the developing a new dedication plan (DPS2010.0 Rev. 1). Southern Nuclear has reviewed and approved this new plan.
"QuaITech NP's conclusion is that the resistor in the wrong location on the motherboard caused the UPS system not to operate during performance testing and established the equipment would not perform its intended safety function. After rework, relocation of the resistor, and retesting the UPS system became operable and was performing its safety related function. QualTech NP has completed testing, evaluation, and repair of motherboards, no further action is required."