Event Notification Report for September 15, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/14/2010 - 09/15/2010
General Information
Event Number: 46403
Rep Org: VELAN INC
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 0
City: QUEBEC, CANADA State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR APOSTOLESCU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: FLOWSERVE
Region: 0
City: QUEBEC, CANADA State:
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: VICTOR APOSTOLESCU
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/08/2010
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2011
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
PART 21 GP VIA EMAIL
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
PART 21 REPORT - LIMITORQUE LIMIT SWITCH DEFECT
The following report was received via fax:
"During the performance testing of our valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 we found that the limit switch contacts proved to be defective. These tests took place in July 2010. Flowserve was advised and sent in replacement parts that were installed by their representatives. The valve-actuator assemblies were cycled and proper operation was assessed. These valves have been shipped to Dominion Virginia. At the time we considered the issue isolated and did not pursue an in-depth corrective action response from the Supplier.
"Later in September when testing three valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 and two valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-2-06, we found again that the limit switch contacts were defective, exhibiting similar problems as found earlier in July. These valves are still at our factory, awaiting the response and corrective action from Flowserve.
"The limit switch boxes (4 gear train limit switches, 16 sets of contacts) appear to be identical on the two types of actuators mentioned above.
"Upon closer examination, we determined that construction and installation elements appear poorly controlled, resulting in unexpected failure to operate due to the contact blade (called finger base by the Manufacturer) not returning to a position where it can make contact again. This was documented internally on a Velan internal deviation report on September 3, 2010.
"We advised Flowserve of our findings on September 15 and issued a formal Corrective Action Request (CAR 25500-73903) on September 16, 2010, with a deadline for responding that expired on October 26, 2010. After a number of follow-ups, we managed to make contact with responsible personnel at Flowserve on October 29. An evaluation report (electrical continuity test performed on sample switch assemblies cycled 2000 times) was submitted to our attention by Flowserve. However, we determined that the test did not answer all our concerns and requested Flowserve to provide additional information. Currently the supplier is engaged in retrieving the defective parts from our facilities and performing additional examinations and tests. The Manufacturer expects to have all necessary tests, examinations and evaluations completed on or before November 19, 2010.
"Based on functional testing performed at Velan we determined that we have no record of similar defects on valve-actuator assemblies produced prior to these events, we therefore believe that the root cause is relatively recent but there is no way to know until Flowserve analyzes and evaluates the deficiency.
"This type of defect has the potential to affect other valve manufacturers who may have installed Limitorque actuators equipped with this type of limit switch but we cannot say if such deviation could create a substantial safety hazard."
* * * UPDATE FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO DONALD NORWOOD VIA FACSIMILE AT 0804 EST ON 1/24/2011 * * *
On January 14, 2011, Velan received the final report from Flowserve concerning limit switches identified in this notification. Velan has accepted the conclusions in the report.
The following is a synopsis of those conclusions: It was determined that producing a bend in the contact finger cannot occur during normal cyclic operation of the rotor. It is highly likely that the cause of the bent finger assemblies was due to the use of a flat blade screwdriver. A flat blade screwdriver can also exert enough force to damage the cotter pin hole in the spring stud. Based on testing and evaluations of all returned Velan switches and switches from Flowserve stock, a design deficiency has not been identified. Properly set switches will perform their intended functions. A maintenance update will be issued by Flowserve to guide the industry on any recommendations during their regularly scheduled maintenance outages.
Notified R1DO (Newport), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Bloomer), and R4DO (O'Keefe). Notified Part 21 Group via E-mail. Notified NRR and NRO via facsimile.
* * * UPDATE AT 1528 ON 2/8/2011 FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Velan Inc. has issued the final report on this problem with no changes from the January 14, 2011 update.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Duncan), and R4DO (Clark). Notified Part 21 Group via E-mail.
The following report was received via fax:
"During the performance testing of our valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 we found that the limit switch contacts proved to be defective. These tests took place in July 2010. Flowserve was advised and sent in replacement parts that were installed by their representatives. The valve-actuator assemblies were cycled and proper operation was assessed. These valves have been shipped to Dominion Virginia. At the time we considered the issue isolated and did not pursue an in-depth corrective action response from the Supplier.
"Later in September when testing three valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-00 and two valves equipped with Limitorque SMB-2-06, we found again that the limit switch contacts were defective, exhibiting similar problems as found earlier in July. These valves are still at our factory, awaiting the response and corrective action from Flowserve.
"The limit switch boxes (4 gear train limit switches, 16 sets of contacts) appear to be identical on the two types of actuators mentioned above.
"Upon closer examination, we determined that construction and installation elements appear poorly controlled, resulting in unexpected failure to operate due to the contact blade (called finger base by the Manufacturer) not returning to a position where it can make contact again. This was documented internally on a Velan internal deviation report on September 3, 2010.
"We advised Flowserve of our findings on September 15 and issued a formal Corrective Action Request (CAR 25500-73903) on September 16, 2010, with a deadline for responding that expired on October 26, 2010. After a number of follow-ups, we managed to make contact with responsible personnel at Flowserve on October 29. An evaluation report (electrical continuity test performed on sample switch assemblies cycled 2000 times) was submitted to our attention by Flowserve. However, we determined that the test did not answer all our concerns and requested Flowserve to provide additional information. Currently the supplier is engaged in retrieving the defective parts from our facilities and performing additional examinations and tests. The Manufacturer expects to have all necessary tests, examinations and evaluations completed on or before November 19, 2010.
"Based on functional testing performed at Velan we determined that we have no record of similar defects on valve-actuator assemblies produced prior to these events, we therefore believe that the root cause is relatively recent but there is no way to know until Flowserve analyzes and evaluates the deficiency.
"This type of defect has the potential to affect other valve manufacturers who may have installed Limitorque actuators equipped with this type of limit switch but we cannot say if such deviation could create a substantial safety hazard."
* * * UPDATE FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO DONALD NORWOOD VIA FACSIMILE AT 0804 EST ON 1/24/2011 * * *
On January 14, 2011, Velan received the final report from Flowserve concerning limit switches identified in this notification. Velan has accepted the conclusions in the report.
The following is a synopsis of those conclusions: It was determined that producing a bend in the contact finger cannot occur during normal cyclic operation of the rotor. It is highly likely that the cause of the bent finger assemblies was due to the use of a flat blade screwdriver. A flat blade screwdriver can also exert enough force to damage the cotter pin hole in the spring stud. Based on testing and evaluations of all returned Velan switches and switches from Flowserve stock, a design deficiency has not been identified. Properly set switches will perform their intended functions. A maintenance update will be issued by Flowserve to guide the industry on any recommendations during their regularly scheduled maintenance outages.
Notified R1DO (Newport), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Bloomer), and R4DO (O'Keefe). Notified Part 21 Group via E-mail. Notified NRR and NRO via facsimile.
* * * UPDATE AT 1528 ON 2/8/2011 FROM VICTOR APOSTOLESCU TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Velan Inc. has issued the final report on this problem with no changes from the January 14, 2011 update.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy), R2DO (McCoy), R3DO (Duncan), and R4DO (Clark). Notified Part 21 Group via E-mail.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46253
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BETH JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BETH JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 09/15/2010
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 03:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2010
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 03:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"In preparation for quarterly valve testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection system was declared inoperable and the technical specification required actions were implemented. The system was available for on-line risk. During the testing, the inboard steam isolation valve was stroked closed and reopened and operated properly. The valve was reclosed to continue with valve testing. When an attempt was made to reopen the inboard isolation valve, the valve failed to indicate full open.
"The system remained inoperable due to the valve malfunction. Therefore, the condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Maintenance activities are currently in progress to restore the system to the operable status."
The licensee entered a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation per Technical Specification 3.5.1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT BRILEY TO BILL HUFFMAN 1302 EDT ON 10/8/10 * * *
"On September 15, 2010, the NRC Operation Center was notified of Event Number 46253 that described a failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inboard steam isolation valve to fully reopen using the Main Control Room (MCR) control switch.
"At the time, it was not readily apparent that the system was capable of performing its intended safety function. Therefore, the condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Troubleshooting identified that a contact in the control switch circuit had malfunctioned. This contact is bypassed during an initiation signal. Therefore the valve would have opened fully in the event the HPCI system received an initiation signal.
"In light of these findings, the HPCI function was not impaired as a result of the contact malfunction and would have been capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, the notification associated with Event Number 46253 is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
R3DO (Dave Passehl) has been notified.
"In preparation for quarterly valve testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection system was declared inoperable and the technical specification required actions were implemented. The system was available for on-line risk. During the testing, the inboard steam isolation valve was stroked closed and reopened and operated properly. The valve was reclosed to continue with valve testing. When an attempt was made to reopen the inboard isolation valve, the valve failed to indicate full open.
"The system remained inoperable due to the valve malfunction. Therefore, the condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Maintenance activities are currently in progress to restore the system to the operable status."
The licensee entered a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation per Technical Specification 3.5.1.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT BRILEY TO BILL HUFFMAN 1302 EDT ON 10/8/10 * * *
"On September 15, 2010, the NRC Operation Center was notified of Event Number 46253 that described a failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inboard steam isolation valve to fully reopen using the Main Control Room (MCR) control switch.
"At the time, it was not readily apparent that the system was capable of performing its intended safety function. Therefore, the condition was reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"Troubleshooting identified that a contact in the control switch circuit had malfunctioned. This contact is bypassed during an initiation signal. Therefore the valve would have opened fully in the event the HPCI system received an initiation signal.
"In light of these findings, the HPCI function was not impaired as a result of the contact malfunction and would have been capable of performing its safety function. Therefore, the notification associated with Event Number 46253 is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
R3DO (Dave Passehl) has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46254
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: NATHAN SEID
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/15/2010
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Notification Time: 21:00 [ET]
Event Date: 09/15/2010
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN ANALYZERS OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO FAILED SURVEILLANCES
"At 1740 CDT, VA-81A, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was declared not functional due to failing surveillance test OP-ST-VA-0006, Containment Hydrogen Monitor Monthly Check. VA-81B, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was previously not functional due to performance of surveillance test IC-ST-VA-0033, 18 Month Channel Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Analyzer, VA-81B.
"This results in no Hydrogen Analyzers being available to monitor containment, which prevents being able to assess for potential loss of containment barrier for Emergency Action Level purposes via the containment hydrogen greater than 3% method.
"USAR [Updated Safety Analysis Report] section 9.10.2.5 allows for both Hydrogen Analyzers to be out of service for up to 72 hours. "
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM ERICK MATZKE TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1152 EDT ON 9/29/10 * * *
"Fort Calhoun Station had previously reported that the loss of both hydrogen monitors on September 15, 2010, constituted a major loss of emergency response assessment capability. Additional investigation has determined that other methods of assessment were available that would have provided sufficient indication to make the proper emergency classification. Therefore, this event is being retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notification was sent to R4DO (Thomas Farnholtz).
"At 1740 CDT, VA-81A, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was declared not functional due to failing surveillance test OP-ST-VA-0006, Containment Hydrogen Monitor Monthly Check. VA-81B, Hydrogen Analyzer Panel, was previously not functional due to performance of surveillance test IC-ST-VA-0033, 18 Month Channel Calibration of Containment Hydrogen Analyzer, VA-81B.
"This results in no Hydrogen Analyzers being available to monitor containment, which prevents being able to assess for potential loss of containment barrier for Emergency Action Level purposes via the containment hydrogen greater than 3% method.
"USAR [Updated Safety Analysis Report] section 9.10.2.5 allows for both Hydrogen Analyzers to be out of service for up to 72 hours. "
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM ERICK MATZKE TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1152 EDT ON 9/29/10 * * *
"Fort Calhoun Station had previously reported that the loss of both hydrogen monitors on September 15, 2010, constituted a major loss of emergency response assessment capability. Additional investigation has determined that other methods of assessment were available that would have provided sufficient indication to make the proper emergency classification. Therefore, this event is being retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notification was sent to R4DO (Thomas Farnholtz).