Event Notification Report for August 25, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/24/2010 - 08/25/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46204
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON GRANT
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DON GRANT
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 08:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2010
Event Time: 08:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 08:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2010
Event Time: 08:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SEVERAL DISPLAY SYSTEMS DUE TO PLANNED COMPUTER MODIFICATIONS
"At 0845 hours EDT, on August 25, 2010, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer system was removed from service to perform a planned modification of the ERFIS. This modification will remove obsolete software and hardware related to the Emergency Response Data System, which has been replaced by an upgraded system. The expected duration of ERFIS inoperability is approximately 3 hours. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above-described functions. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS Computer system is inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remained available to assess plant conditions, make notifications, and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional message will be provided when the ERFIS is restored. It should also be noted that during the period of ERFIS inoperability, it is likely that the system could be restored within one hour to support Emergency Response Facility activation. This report is provided to conservatively cover the possibility that restoration within one hour may not be able to be accomplished if facility activation were to occur.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM DON GRANT TO JOE O'HARA AT 1454 ON 8/25/10 * * *
"At 1430, the ERFIS system was returned to service."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified the R2DO(Franke)
"At 0845 hours EDT, on August 25, 2010, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) computer system was removed from service to perform a planned modification of the ERFIS. This modification will remove obsolete software and hardware related to the Emergency Response Data System, which has been replaced by an upgraded system. The expected duration of ERFIS inoperability is approximately 3 hours. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Meteorological Data link system, and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above-described functions. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS Computer system is inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remained available to assess plant conditions, make notifications, and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional message will be provided when the ERFIS is restored. It should also be noted that during the period of ERFIS inoperability, it is likely that the system could be restored within one hour to support Emergency Response Facility activation. This report is provided to conservatively cover the possibility that restoration within one hour may not be able to be accomplished if facility activation were to occur.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM DON GRANT TO JOE O'HARA AT 1454 ON 8/25/10 * * *
"At 1430, the ERFIS system was returned to service."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified the R2DO(Franke)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46206
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STAN PAUL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: STAN PAUL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2010
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2010
Event Time: 08:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - RELEASE OF HYDROGEN GAS IN EXCESS OF THE REPORTABLE QUANTITY OF TEN POUNDS
"On August 25, 2010 [the licensee] made a notification to] the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department in accordance with 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification of Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material. [The licensee made the notification] due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds via the designed system release path. The release occurred when restoration of a system vacuum pump following planned maintenance resulted in higher than normal system makeup rates. Combustible gas sampling of equipment areas confirmed that the excess hydrogen gas had been released to the environment via a remote roof vent designed to continuously exhaust [hydrogen] removed from the seal oil system by the vacuum pump. The release of hydrogen gas was secured when the vacuum pump was removed from service. The estimated quantity of hydrogen gas released was approximately twenty pounds. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified."
The licensee is investigating the cause of the excessive makeup rate.
"On August 25, 2010 [the licensee] made a notification to] the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection and the Plymouth Massachusetts Fire Department in accordance with 310CMR40.300, Massachusetts Contingency Plan Notification of Oil and Hazardous Material; Identification and Listing of Oil and Hazardous Material. [The licensee made the notification] due to a release of hydrogen gas to the environment exceeding the reportable quantity of ten pounds via the designed system release path. The release occurred when restoration of a system vacuum pump following planned maintenance resulted in higher than normal system makeup rates. Combustible gas sampling of equipment areas confirmed that the excess hydrogen gas had been released to the environment via a remote roof vent designed to continuously exhaust [hydrogen] removed from the seal oil system by the vacuum pump. The release of hydrogen gas was secured when the vacuum pump was removed from service. The estimated quantity of hydrogen gas released was approximately twenty pounds. This event posed no danger to the health and safety of plant personnel or members of the general public.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector is on-site and has been notified."
The licensee is investigating the cause of the excessive makeup rate.