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Event Notification Report for August 24, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/23/2010 - 08/24/2010

EVENT NUMBERS
46205462014620246203

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 46205
Rep Org: ARCELORMITTAL BURNS HARBOR
Licensee: ARCELORMITTAL BURNS HARBOR
Region: 3
City: BURNS HARBOR   State: IN
County:
License #: 13-32670-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SARVANIDIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/25/2010
Notification Time: 09:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 10:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
Event Text
LEVEL DETECTION GAUGE SHUTTER CONTROL ROD DISENGAGED

"After completion of casting operations at our #1 Slab Caster, a trained worker proceeded to the mould strand area to remove the Berthold Co-60 rod source from the mould and place it in proper storage. The source is 3.97 mCi and is used to measure mould level of liquid steel. After properly securing the source into its shielded source holder, the trained worker began transporting the holder to the storage cabinet. During transport, the holder fell over and hit the ground. When it hit the ground, the steel 'D' arm (for lifting the holder) structure on the outside of the holder was bent.

"Also, the device is designed such that the source insertion/removal rod is stored on the outside of the holder. It actually slides through openings on the 'D' arm and screws into the shutter door when in the closed position. After the fall, the threaded portion of the shutter door which receives the insertion rod broke. I immediately removed the rod and replaced it with a positive lock.

"During this event, the source rod and its shielding were not compromised and there was no exposure to employees. Also, we are making immediate modifications to the transporting device to prevent this from recurring."

The shutter was closed throughout this event.

* * * UPDATE AT 1339 EDT ON 8/26/10 FROM CHRIS SARVANIDIS TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following text provided by the ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor Radiation Safety Officer (RSO):

"Further investigation has revealed new information which we feel warrants a retraction of the reported event as a non-reportable event.

"Originally, we stated that the Co-60 source rod was removed from the mould and safely inside the holder (post-casting) when the holder fell over, however, it was actually not in the holder. The source rod had actually been properly installed in the mould (pre-casting), and the employee was actually returning the empty holder to the storage cabinet when the holder fell over.

"I also have three very important attachments. One is our Steel Producing department's preliminary investigation report which reveals more accurate facts of the event. The second is a quote from Berthold's Source and Device Registry document which can be interpreted as indicating that the insertion rod screwing into the shutter 'door' is not part of a safety design function of the device (see attached photo). The photo shows a positive lock installed on a separate portion of the shutter 'door' which serves as the actual safety locking function. The insertion rod screwed into the shutter 'door' serves merely as a storage location for the insertion rod when the device is not in use. Therefore, the damaged (de-threaded) opening on the shutter 'door' which receives the insertion rod is strictly for insertion rod storage only. Also, the insertion rod and its threading were not damaged in this event. The insertion rod itself is still able to be installed into its stored position (without being screwed-in) and can be used in operations if necessary. Lastly, we would have redundancy of insertion rods if necessary.

"Further, there was no loss of functionality to the source holder, Co-60 source rod, or shutter mechanism as a result of this event, and the shutter is still lockable. The device is fully functional and no safety features have been breached. Nonetheless, I have taken the device out of service and secured it in a location controlled by me as RSO. I've begun the process of having the manufacturer repair the device."

The above information was discussed with the NRC Region III staff prior to submittal as a retraction. Notified R3DO (Lara) and FSME (McIntosh).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 46201
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4     State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN MYERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/24/2010
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 08:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO EMERGENCY STATION SERVICE TRANSFORMER

"During planned maintenance on the Startup Station Service Transformer (SSST), an undervoltage condition occurred on the 69 kV offsite power supply to the Emergency Station Service Transformer (ESST). At the time of this event, utility personnel were isolating 161 kV offsite power to the SSST from the grid. As a result, the offsite power voltage to the ESST lowered below the level where the essential 4160 VAC buses are automatically prevented from loading on the ESST.

"From 0814 to 0816, BKR IFS and 1GS Auto Closure Not Permitted alarms were received when the system control operator was switching out the 161 kV line which supplies the SSST. ESST Secondary Winding voltage lowered to 4309 V and the 69 kV line voltage lowered to 69.4 kV. The nominal setpoint for the Closure not Permitted action is 4330 V. Actions were taken per the alarm response procedures.

"The ESST was declared inoperable as the automatic closure of the supply breakers to the 4160 V essential buses was precluded. With the SSST already inoperable, LCO 3.8.1 Condition C (two offsite circuits inoperable) was entered for the ESST inoperability. Required action C.1 directs declaring required features inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable within 12 hours of discovery; and required action C.2 directs restoring one offsite circuit to operable status within 24 hours.

"At 0816, the system control operator placed the 69 kV capacitor bank in service, restoring the 69 kV line voltage to 71.5 kV and ESST Secondary Winding voltage to 4461 V.

"At 0846, the ESST was declared Operable following restoration of supply voltage, and meeting acceptance criteria of SR 3.8.1.1, and exited the above LCO required actions for the ESST. The plant remains in LCO 3.8.1, Condition A for the SSST inoperability for planned maintenance.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Per the discussion in NUREG 1022, both offsite electrical power and onsite power are considered to be separate functions by GDC 17. Per the GDC, the offsite sources must be capable of automatically connecting to the essential buses within a few seconds. Due to the automatic transfer to the ESST being prevented, the auto transfer function described in the GDC was prevented. The lowest voltage recorded by the system control operator was 69.4 kV, corresponding to 4309 V on the essential 4160 V buses. The 69 kV line voltage was promptly restored, and the Closure not Permitted alarms cleared. The ESST could have been manually aligned to the essential buses during this event. "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 46202
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVE GEEVER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/24/2010
Notification Time: 17:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 09:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS

"At 0922 hours [CDT] on August 24, 2010, it was identified that offsite telecommunications capability was lost (including ENS, HPN, and ERDS) for Quad Cities Station when a fiber optic phone cable was cut during offsite work activities.

"A commercial communication link with the NRC Operations Center was re-established at 1105 hours when site offsite telecommunications were re-routed through the Exelon network to an available commercial system.

"A follow-up notification will be provided when normal offsite telecommunications have been reestablished.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of communications capability.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE GEEVER TO JOE O'HARA AT 1925 EDT ON 8/24/10 * * *

"ERDS has been restored as of 1815 CDT."

Notified R3DO(Riemer)


!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46203
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3     State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES MURAIDA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/24/2010
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2010
Event Time: 11:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/19/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER PLACED IN A LINE-UP THAT MAY HAVE PREVENTED ITS SAFETY FUNCTION

"At 1140 [CDT] on August 24th, Unit 2 received Essential Service Water (SX) discharge header pressure low and SX strainer delta pressure high alarms indicative of high flow. At the time, a 2B SX ASME surveillance was in progress which involved field operations by Equipment Operators (EO's). At the time of the event, SX discharge header pressure dropped to 65 psig, less than the 89 psig necessary for operability. The Control Room responded by directing the EO's to restore SX discharge header pressure, which was promptly restored.

"The 2B SX ASME surveillance sets initial conditions prior to data collection. The surveillance has the total SX flow be adjusted to 24000 gpm via the U2 Component Cooling Water (CC) heat exchanger outlet throttle valve, 2SX007. The subject flow was intended to be measured via an installed ultrasonic flow gauge 2FE-SX147. The EO's, instead used the U2 CC heat exchanger flow gauge 2FE-SX031. As a result, in an attempt to achieve 24000 gpm through the U2 CC heat exchanger, total SX flow exceeded the 24000 gpm since the U2 CC heat exchanger is but one of many loads the 2B SX pump is serving.

"For the 5 minutes described above, the SX system was in a lineup that may have prevented it to fulfill its safety function and placed Unit 2 in a potentially unanalyzed condition. This condition is still being evaluated."

Site Engineering has determined no runout conditions existed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JOE KLEVORN TO VINCE KLCO ON 10/19/2011 AT 1626 EDT* * *

"The evaluation of the condition has been completed. Based on Essential Service Water (SX) system flow model runs performed, the conditions that existed at the time of the low SX header pressure would have resulted in low flow supplied to multiple safety related components. However, the safety function to provide necessary cooling to required safety-related safe shutdown equipment would have been met under design basis conditions with the auto-start of the 2A SX pump. Therefore, this did not result in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function or in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, ENS notification 46203 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Daley).