Event Notification Report for August 23, 2010

SHUTDOWN DUE TO PLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OUTAGE EXCEEDING ALLOWED TIME

"This is a 4 hour non-emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) notification due to a Technical Specification required shutdown. 2EDG-2 (Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator #2) is currently inoperable due to a planned outage which has exceeded the allowed 14 day time clock IAW [in accordance with] TS 3.8.1.1. This requires that Unit 2 be in at least Hot Standby within the next 6 hours and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours. Unit 2 is currently at 68% power and shutting down to comply with Technical Specifications."

The licensee notified the Arkansas Department of Health and the NRC Resident Inspector.

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO BOTH EDGS AND AN RHR LOOP INOPERABLE

"On 8/23/2010 at 0814 [hrs. CDT] with the unit in Mode 1, 100%, Control Room personnel were informed by a Maintenance Planner that each (A and B) Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG] was missing a u-bolt on the relief valve tail pipes on Auxiliary Lube Oil Keep Warm system. The System Engineer concluded that this could affect the seismic qualification of the EDGs. Both EDGs were declared inoperable as a result. In addition, 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was out of service for emergent work. This resulted in less than 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single ECCS train and entry into LCO 3.0.3 as required by TS 3.5.2, Condition C. A plant shutdown was commenced at 0907.

"At 0935, the Control Room was informed by Engineering that a calculation existed for continued operation of the EDGs with the u-bolt missing from the tailpipe of the relief valves on the Auxiliary Lube Oil Keep Warm system. Both EDGs were declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. The power reduction was stopped at 0940 with reactor power at 96%.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed."

LOSS OF ERDS CAPABILITY

"This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) regarding a loss of offsite communication capability in that Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station would not have been able to establish a connection with the NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) within one hour if the need had arisen. This condition was discovered at 0900 hours on August 23, 2010, and existed from approximately 1900 hours on August 20 until 1123 hours on August 23, 2010.

"Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station switched the plant telephone system from a digital system to a Voice Over IP system at approximately 1900 hours on August 20, 2010. This change resulted in eliminating the requirement to dial the number '9' prior to dialing an outside line. The plant process computer (PPC) modem function program contained the NRC modem number preceded by the number '9' and when the changeover occurred the '9' was not deleted in the PPC program. This would have resulted in an error message if an attempt to connect with the NRC had been made. Information Technology (IT) estimates that it would have taken two hours to reprogram and establish the ERDS connection to the NRC. The ERDS data on the PPC was available but would have to have been transmitted to the NRC by an alternate method. 10 CFR 50.72(a)(4) requires one hour to activate the ERDS after declaring an emergency class of alert, site area, or general emergency.

"This situation was recognized at 0900 hours on August 23, 2010 by IT personnel. The ERDS connection capability was restored to fully functional status at 1123 hours on August 23, 2010."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOSS OF LOAD TRIP SIGNAL ON ALL FOUR CHANNELS OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM

"On August 23, 2010, at approximately 2210 hours, with the Palisades unit at 100% power, the turbine protection relays, 305L and 305R, were identified as being inoperable due to a loss of electrical power from their 125 VDC power supply. On an actual turbine low auto stop oil pressure condition, 305L and 305R energize to generate a loss of load trip signal to all four channels of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). 305L provides input to RPS channels A and C. 305R provides input to RPS channels B and D. The RPS generates a reactor trip upon receipt of two (2) of four (4) loss of load trip signals. The loss of load trip is required by Technical Specification (TS) Limited Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 and was inoperable until 305L and 305R were reenergized on August 24, 2010, at approximately 0939 hours.

"The on-shift operations crew entered a TS 3.3.1 LCO, however, TS 3.0.3 LCO should have also been entered. TS 3.0.3 LCO was applicable due to all four (4) loss of load input signals to the RPS being inoperable. The eight (8) hour notification was not reported within the required time frame due to a misinterpretation of the event that has since been re-evaluated and determined to meet the eight hour immediate notification requirement.

"The safety significance of this event was minimal. Although required by TS, the loss of load trip function is not credited in the plant safety analysis.

"The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- BASIS WEIGHT GAUGE ABB MODEL TG-1(U-7) SHUTTER FAILED TO CLOSE

The following report was received via e-mail:

"The Minnesota Department of Health was notified on 8/24/2010 by a representative from Boise Cascade that a Basis Weight Gauge located at the Off Machine Coater Reel had a shutter failure. The shutter is designed to close after going off sheet; however it remained in the open position. When power was cut to the device the device failed closed (shutter did close).

"The gauge was taken out of service and repaired by ABB. The problem was determined to be shorted out wires in the device. The device has been repaired and placed back in service.

The source is 250 mCuries Kr-85, serial number K-1988E.

Event Report Number: MN100003