Event Notification Report for August 17, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/16/2010 - 08/17/2010
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46182
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEON RAFNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEON RAFNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/17/2010
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2010
Notification Time: 13:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO POTENTIAL WIRING DISCREPANCY
"On August 16, 2010, at about 0100 PDT, SONGS Unit 2 Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2G002 was removed from service for planned maintenance. Train 'A' EDG is the Appendix R protected Train.
"At about 1545 the same day, Southern California Edison (SCE) discovered a potential wiring discrepancy in the electronic governor. At 0300 on August 17, 2010, SCE determined two wires on a fire isolation fuse were confirmed to be terminated differently than specified in plant drawings and that the discrepancy would prevent the fuse and associated fire isolation switch from performing its Appendix R fire isolation function for the Train 'A' EDG. In accordance with NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"While the incorrect wiring impacted the Appendix R qualifications of the Train 'A' EDG, it did not impact its other design functions and the EDG was capable to fulfill its safety function for all other Design Basis Events. Therefore, SCE considers the safety significance of the condition to be minimal.
"In accordance with LCS specification 3.7.113.1 Condition A, SCE will implement hourly Fire Watches for the impacted plant areas until such time that the wiring on the Unit 3 Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 is conformed to be correct or has taken actions to correct any wiring discrepancy. An evaluation will be conducted to determine the cause of this condition.
"At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were both at 100% power."
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report."
* * * RETRACTION FROM KELMENSON TO KLCO ON 9/14/10 @ 1528 [EDT]* * *
The licensee is retracting the event based on the following:
"Upon further investigation, SCE determined the suspected wiring discrepancy was only an issue with an elementary diagram that was used for circuit verification. SCE had already flagged this elementary diagram as requiring revision and a change to the diagram was pending and had not been released to the field. The fire isolation fuse was wired correctly."
"Consequently, SCE is retracting the 8-Hour Telephone Notification made to the NRC on August 17, 2010 (Event Log No. 46182)."
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of and will be provided with a copy of this retraction."
Notified the R4DO (Clark)
"On August 16, 2010, at about 0100 PDT, SONGS Unit 2 Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2G002 was removed from service for planned maintenance. Train 'A' EDG is the Appendix R protected Train.
"At about 1545 the same day, Southern California Edison (SCE) discovered a potential wiring discrepancy in the electronic governor. At 0300 on August 17, 2010, SCE determined two wires on a fire isolation fuse were confirmed to be terminated differently than specified in plant drawings and that the discrepancy would prevent the fuse and associated fire isolation switch from performing its Appendix R fire isolation function for the Train 'A' EDG. In accordance with NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"While the incorrect wiring impacted the Appendix R qualifications of the Train 'A' EDG, it did not impact its other design functions and the EDG was capable to fulfill its safety function for all other Design Basis Events. Therefore, SCE considers the safety significance of the condition to be minimal.
"In accordance with LCS specification 3.7.113.1 Condition A, SCE will implement hourly Fire Watches for the impacted plant areas until such time that the wiring on the Unit 3 Train 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator 3G002 is conformed to be correct or has taken actions to correct any wiring discrepancy. An evaluation will be conducted to determine the cause of this condition.
"At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 and Unit 3 were both at 100% power."
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report."
* * * RETRACTION FROM KELMENSON TO KLCO ON 9/14/10 @ 1528 [EDT]* * *
The licensee is retracting the event based on the following:
"Upon further investigation, SCE determined the suspected wiring discrepancy was only an issue with an elementary diagram that was used for circuit verification. SCE had already flagged this elementary diagram as requiring revision and a change to the diagram was pending and had not been released to the field. The fire isolation fuse was wired correctly."
"Consequently, SCE is retracting the 8-Hour Telephone Notification made to the NRC on August 17, 2010 (Event Log No. 46182)."
"The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of and will be provided with a copy of this retraction."
Notified the R4DO (Clark)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46183
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOEL HOWARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/17/2010
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 07:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2010
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 07:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
BINOY DESAI (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMPTY BEER CAN FOUND INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
"On August 17, 2010, an empty beer can was discovered in a recycle container inside the Protected Area (PA). The can has been removed from the PA. Further investigation as to how the can was introduced into the PA is in progress. No personnel fitness-for-duty issues related to the consumption of alcohol have been identified. The presence of alcohol with the PA is being reported in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(1)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 17, 2010, an empty beer can was discovered in a recycle container inside the Protected Area (PA). The can has been removed from the PA. Further investigation as to how the can was introduced into the PA is in progress. No personnel fitness-for-duty issues related to the consumption of alcohol have been identified. The presence of alcohol with the PA is being reported in accordance with 10CFR26.719(b)(1)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46184
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT STEFFES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: CURT STEFFES
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/17/2010
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 14:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2010
Notification Time: 16:54 [ET]
Event Date: 08/17/2010
Event Time: 14:14 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM INITIATED DUE TO RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP
"On August 17, 2010, at 1414 hours, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 2 due to rising reactor water level. The water level increase was caused by a trip of the 2B Recirculation Pump. Restoration of the 2B Recirculation Pump Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) on the 2B Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) was in progress at the time of the event. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation.
"Unit I was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
All control rods inserted on the scram. No ECCS initiations occurred. No safety or relief valves lifted. The unit is stable in Mode 3 at 926 psig and 530 degrees Fahrenheit. Pressure is being controlled on the turbine bypass system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.
"On August 17, 2010, at 1414 hours, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 2 due to rising reactor water level. The water level increase was caused by a trip of the 2B Recirculation Pump. Restoration of the 2B Recirculation Pump Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) on the 2B Adjustable Speed Drive (ASD) was in progress at the time of the event. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately minus 15 inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation.
"Unit I was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."
All control rods inserted on the scram. No ECCS initiations occurred. No safety or relief valves lifted. The unit is stable in Mode 3 at 926 psig and 530 degrees Fahrenheit. Pressure is being controlled on the turbine bypass system.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety.