Event Notification Report for August 09, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/08/2010 - 08/09/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
4616546161461624616346160
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46165
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID NELSON MADSEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID NELSON MADSEN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2010
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2010
Notification Time: 13:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
4160 VAC CONTROL AND TRANSFER BREAKER SWITCH DEFECT
"On August 9, 2010 at 12:30 CDT, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that certain General Electric - Hitachi (GEH) Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches, contained a defect that would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of safety related 4160 VAC breakers at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), had the switches been installed as received. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.
"Specifically, GEH supplied 23 Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches under GEH part number Q16SB1EB4G75SSS1C142 to CNS. 14 of the 23 switches exhibited a failure to maintain the established contact logic when implementing the logic feature of these switches. This condition was discovered during pre-installation testing in support of a station modification of 4160 VAC breaker control. The defect would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of the essential affected 4160 VAC breakers. This would have prevented the transfer of the essential 4160 VAC switchgear from the normal station service transformer to either source of offsite power or the emergency diesel generators and the sequential loading of emergency core cooling system pumps in response to a design basis accident LOCA.
"All of the switches have been returned to GEH, and none were installed in the station. Therefore, the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. These switches were designed and supplied by GEH as a safety related part, specifically for CNS. NPPD is unaware as to if this specific switch design has been supplied to any other licensee. The condition is being reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). The Responsible [NPPD] Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on August 9, 2010 at 15:45 CDT- Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 9, 2010 at 12:30 CDT, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) completed a reportability determination which concluded that certain General Electric - Hitachi (GEH) Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches, contained a defect that would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of safety related 4160 VAC breakers at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), had the switches been installed as received. NPPD has concluded this condition is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.
"Specifically, GEH supplied 23 Type SB-1 Control and Transfer Switches under GEH part number Q16SB1EB4G75SSS1C142 to CNS. 14 of the 23 switches exhibited a failure to maintain the established contact logic when implementing the logic feature of these switches. This condition was discovered during pre-installation testing in support of a station modification of 4160 VAC breaker control. The defect would have prevented the remote and/or automatic opening and closing of the essential affected 4160 VAC breakers. This would have prevented the transfer of the essential 4160 VAC switchgear from the normal station service transformer to either source of offsite power or the emergency diesel generators and the sequential loading of emergency core cooling system pumps in response to a design basis accident LOCA.
"All of the switches have been returned to GEH, and none were installed in the station. Therefore, the condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73. These switches were designed and supplied by GEH as a safety related part, specifically for CNS. NPPD is unaware as to if this specific switch design has been supplied to any other licensee. The condition is being reported under 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i). The Responsible [NPPD] Corporate Officer has been notified of this condition per 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) on August 9, 2010 at 15:45 CDT- Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) written notification is due to the NRC within 30 days of this notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46161
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 07:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 07:42 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF FIREARM DURING X-RAY SCREENING
"At 0742 CDT on 08/09/2010, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) personnel discovered a hand gun in a personal bag being processed through an x-ray search machine in the Security Access Facility. Security personnel immediately established control of the weapon and the owner. The owner of the weapon is a permanent employee of PINGP. The owner has been determined to hold proper permits for the weapon.
"The Local Law Enforcement Agency and the Prairie Island Community Tribal Council was notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This notification is being conducted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to an outside government agency."
"At 0742 CDT on 08/09/2010, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) personnel discovered a hand gun in a personal bag being processed through an x-ray search machine in the Security Access Facility. Security personnel immediately established control of the weapon and the owner. The owner of the weapon is a permanent employee of PINGP. The owner has been determined to hold proper permits for the weapon.
"The Local Law Enforcement Agency and the Prairie Island Community Tribal Council was notified.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"This notification is being conducted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for notification to an outside government agency."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46162
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DARRELL LAPCINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 08:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 08:12 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING (AMERTAP) BALLS
"During the performance of TP-1539, Amertap Ball Check on 8/08/2010 at 1326 [CDT], it was discovered that [about] 1400 balls could have been lost to the environment [Mississippi River] via the External Circulating Water System from the 11 Amertap Ball System.
"The Xcel Energy Environmental Service informed the plant that reports were made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on 8/09/2010 at 0817 and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer on 8/09/2010 at 0812.
"The Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council was notified.
"The 11 Amertap Ball System is shutdown and will remain out of service until repairs are completed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During the performance of TP-1539, Amertap Ball Check on 8/08/2010 at 1326 [CDT], it was discovered that [about] 1400 balls could have been lost to the environment [Mississippi River] via the External Circulating Water System from the 11 Amertap Ball System.
"The Xcel Energy Environmental Service informed the plant that reports were made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on 8/09/2010 at 0817 and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer on 8/09/2010 at 0812.
"The Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council was notified.
"The 11 Amertap Ball System is shutdown and will remain out of service until repairs are completed."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46163
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD BOHANAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD BOHANAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 08:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 17:16 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 08:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 50 | Power Operation | 50 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT CONTAIN TWO REQUIRED OPERATOR MANUAL ACTIONS
"The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions provide manual actions to limit diesel loading. From the Tennessee Valley Authority's review of the design input calculation, 'Appendix R - Auxiliary Power System Alignments and Diesel Generator Loading,' it was determined that two 4 kV breakers (one in each of two fire scenarios) that should be tripped and/or tripped and isolated during a postulated Appendix R event were not part of the BFN Safe Shutdown Instructions. Without additional operator manual actions to trip and/or trip and isolate the affected breakers, spurious closure of the breakers could overload the credited emergency generator.
"Interim actions to trip and/or trip and isolate these breakers for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions are being put in place.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) - any event or condition that results in the condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. This event is also reportable within 60 days under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) - as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"This condition was self-identified. The condition has been documented in the BFN Corrective Action program as Service Request 228891. Unit 1, 2, and 3 remain at power and are not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions provide manual actions to limit diesel loading. From the Tennessee Valley Authority's review of the design input calculation, 'Appendix R - Auxiliary Power System Alignments and Diesel Generator Loading,' it was determined that two 4 kV breakers (one in each of two fire scenarios) that should be tripped and/or tripped and isolated during a postulated Appendix R event were not part of the BFN Safe Shutdown Instructions. Without additional operator manual actions to trip and/or trip and isolate the affected breakers, spurious closure of the breakers could overload the credited emergency generator.
"Interim actions to trip and/or trip and isolate these breakers for Appendix R Safe Shutdown Instructions are being put in place.
"This event is reportable within 8 hours under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A) - any event or condition that results in the condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. This event is also reportable within 60 days under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) - as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
"This condition was self-identified. The condition has been documented in the BFN Corrective Action program as Service Request 228891. Unit 1, 2, and 3 remain at power and are not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46160
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ASHTON PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ASHTON PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 04:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Notification Time: 04:23 [ET]
Event Date: 08/09/2010
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER DECLARED OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, 'Emergency Response Facilities', Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURWINKEL TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/9/10 AT 1438 EDT * * *
"The planned maintenance of the TSC HVAC was completed and the Technical Support Center was returned to functional status as of 8/9/10 at 1153 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R2DO (Bonser).
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1, 'Emergency Response Facilities', Action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to planned maintenance being performed on the TSC HVAC. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. A 10CFR50.54(q) evaluation has been performed for this planned maintenance activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM PAUL BURWINKEL TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/9/10 AT 1438 EDT * * *
"The planned maintenance of the TSC HVAC was completed and the Technical Support Center was returned to functional status as of 8/9/10 at 1153 EDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R2DO (Bonser).