Event Notification Report for August 03, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/02/2010 - 08/03/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
4614446145461464614946213
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46144
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK GREER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MARK GREER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 14:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 14:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
UNIT 1 ENTERED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING EDG 102 INOPERABLE
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 entered a Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown due to unplanned inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG] 102 during planned maintenance on opposite division Liquid Poison pump 12. In accordance with TS 3.0.1, Limiting Condition for Operation [LCO] Applicability and TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System, normal orderly shutdown commenced at 1551 [EDT] which was within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 102 inoperable."
The unplanned inoperability of EDG 102 was caused by the failure of its lube oil circulating pump due to thermal overload. The licensee is pursuing restoration of EDG 102 and the Liquid Poison pump 12 in order to exit the LCO Action Statement.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROY GREEN TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/3/10 @ 2118 EDT * * *
"The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TS required shutdown was suspended at 1929 [EDT] upon restoration of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 to operable. With operability of EDG 102 restored, Liquid Poison Pump 11 was also made operable. Accordingly, the TS shutdown action for an inoperable liquid poison system was exited. The lowest power level reached was 92.5% of the licensed thermal power limit. Power ascension is in progress, and [the licensee expects] to be at rated power by 2200 [EDT]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco)
"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 entered a Technical Specification (TS) Required Shutdown due to unplanned inoperability of Emergency Diesel Generator [EDG] 102 during planned maintenance on opposite division Liquid Poison pump 12. In accordance with TS 3.0.1, Limiting Condition for Operation [LCO] Applicability and TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System, normal orderly shutdown commenced at 1551 [EDT] which was within one hour of declaring Emergency Diesel Generator 102 inoperable."
The unplanned inoperability of EDG 102 was caused by the failure of its lube oil circulating pump due to thermal overload. The licensee is pursuing restoration of EDG 102 and the Liquid Poison pump 12 in order to exit the LCO Action Statement.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROY GREEN TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/3/10 @ 2118 EDT * * *
"The Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TS required shutdown was suspended at 1929 [EDT] upon restoration of Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 102 to operable. With operability of EDG 102 restored, Liquid Poison Pump 11 was also made operable. Accordingly, the TS shutdown action for an inoperable liquid poison system was exited. The lowest power level reached was 92.5% of the licensed thermal power limit. Power ascension is in progress, and [the licensee expects] to be at rated power by 2200 [EDT]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (DeFrancisco)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46145
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 06:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 06:50 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
THOMAS BLOUNT (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE-FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A HIGH LEVEL WATER ALARM
"This is a one-hour report for the discovery of a condition that met an emergency action level (EAL) for a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) but was not determined classifiable until after conditions meeting the EAL level for the NOUE no longer existed. A detailed review of the conditions that existed at 0650 [EDT], on August 3, 2010 during a planned system drain down of the 2A loop of RHR to the northeast diagonal sump met the criteria for an NOUE: EAL HU1 - Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.
"Threshold Value 6 states: 'Exceeding Max Normal Operating Values specified in EOP 31EO-EOP-014-1(2) SC - Secondary Containment Control Table 5 Secondary Containment Operation Water Levels.'
"At 0650 [EDT] on August 3. 2010 the Hatch Unit 2 crew received a HIGH-HIGH-HIGH alarm which is the Max Normal Level described in 31EO-EOP-014-1(2). This occurred during a planned draindown evolution when a valve (2T45-F004) which is required to transfer water from the sump to radwaste failed to open. At 0656 [EDT] on August 3, 2010 the RHR drain valve (2E11- F069A) was closed discontinuing draining into the northeast diagonal sump. It is estimated that no more than 800 gallons of water was in the system and internal flooding was not a significant concern. However, despite the low safety significance, the EAL threshold criteria was technically met and therefore this report is being made.
"This event is a one hour report based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 Section 3.1.1 for a condition that met an EAL and the condition for the classification no longer existed at the time of discovery. A courtesy notification will be made to state and local agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a one-hour report for the discovery of a condition that met an emergency action level (EAL) for a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) but was not determined classifiable until after conditions meeting the EAL level for the NOUE no longer existed. A detailed review of the conditions that existed at 0650 [EDT], on August 3, 2010 during a planned system drain down of the 2A loop of RHR to the northeast diagonal sump met the criteria for an NOUE: EAL HU1 - Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.
"Threshold Value 6 states: 'Exceeding Max Normal Operating Values specified in EOP 31EO-EOP-014-1(2) SC - Secondary Containment Control Table 5 Secondary Containment Operation Water Levels.'
"At 0650 [EDT] on August 3. 2010 the Hatch Unit 2 crew received a HIGH-HIGH-HIGH alarm which is the Max Normal Level described in 31EO-EOP-014-1(2). This occurred during a planned draindown evolution when a valve (2T45-F004) which is required to transfer water from the sump to radwaste failed to open. At 0656 [EDT] on August 3, 2010 the RHR drain valve (2E11- F069A) was closed discontinuing draining into the northeast diagonal sump. It is estimated that no more than 800 gallons of water was in the system and internal flooding was not a significant concern. However, despite the low safety significance, the EAL threshold criteria was technically met and therefore this report is being made.
"This event is a one hour report based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 Section 3.1.1 for a condition that met an EAL and the condition for the classification no longer existed at the time of discovery. A courtesy notification will be made to state and local agencies."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46146
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DEDAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS DEDAS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 20:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Notification Time: 20:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 15:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL SAFETY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FAILURE OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATING FUNCTION
"On 8/3/10 South Texas Project Unit 2 was in a scheduled A Train work week with the following equipment inoperable for planned maintenance; Essential Cooling Water Pump, Essential Chiller, Component Cooling Water Pump, Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Diesel Generator (DG), High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump.
"At 0754 [CDT] on 8/3/10 the B train sequencer trouble alarm was received. The immediate operability determination was the sequencer remained operable. It was later identified during testing that the sequencer was inoperable. The B train sequencer was declared inoperable at 1506 [CDT] on 8/3/10. Due to loss of the automatic load sequencing support function, all associated train B safety equipment that is sequenced on the B train
14.16 kv bus during a Mode 1 Safety Injection (SI) was also declared inoperable.
"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the A and B train HHSI, LHSI, and CS pumps. All C train safety injection pumps remained operable. Pending a formal operability determination, this is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure of the accident mitigating function.
"This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The B train trouble alarm, an auto test feature, was discovered by operators during their rounds. The licensee entered their configuration risk management plan within the 1 hour as required. Currently, the licensee is working on completing the scheduled A train maintenance and restoring operability sometime in the morning. Also, a work package is under development to repair the faulty B train sequencer. The risk based time limit for restoring operability requires completion by 0449 [CDT] on 8/8/10.
Unit 1 is unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1638 EDT ON 08/26/2010 FROM JIM MORRIS TO S. SANDIN * * *
"The purpose of this update is to retract the notification made in ENS Report #46146 (August 3, 2010).
"Following the ENS notification, troubleshooting determined the cause of the Train B sequencer alarm to be the failure of an Output Mode I Actuation Timing Switch Module. An engineering evaluation of the event has been completed and determined that a failure of this module did not affect the ability of the ESF load sequencer to perform its design function. Therefore, the Train B sequencer and associated Train B ESF equipment remained technically operable during the time that Train A equipment was inoperable due to scheduled maintenance, and a condition reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) did not exist.
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R4DO (Walker).
"On 8/3/10 South Texas Project Unit 2 was in a scheduled A Train work week with the following equipment inoperable for planned maintenance; Essential Cooling Water Pump, Essential Chiller, Component Cooling Water Pump, Engineered Safety Function (ESF) Diesel Generator (DG), High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) pump, Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump, and Containment Spray (CS) pump.
"At 0754 [CDT] on 8/3/10 the B train sequencer trouble alarm was received. The immediate operability determination was the sequencer remained operable. It was later identified during testing that the sequencer was inoperable. The B train sequencer was declared inoperable at 1506 [CDT] on 8/3/10. Due to loss of the automatic load sequencing support function, all associated train B safety equipment that is sequenced on the B train
14.16 kv bus during a Mode 1 Safety Injection (SI) was also declared inoperable.
"This condition resulted in an inoperable condition on two out of three safety trains for the accident mitigating function including the A and B train HHSI, LHSI, and CS pumps. All C train safety injection pumps remained operable. Pending a formal operability determination, this is conservatively considered to be a safety system functional failure of the accident mitigating function.
"This was determined to be reportable within 8 hours as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The B train trouble alarm, an auto test feature, was discovered by operators during their rounds. The licensee entered their configuration risk management plan within the 1 hour as required. Currently, the licensee is working on completing the scheduled A train maintenance and restoring operability sometime in the morning. Also, a work package is under development to repair the faulty B train sequencer. The risk based time limit for restoring operability requires completion by 0449 [CDT] on 8/8/10.
Unit 1 is unaffected and continues to operate at 100% power.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1638 EDT ON 08/26/2010 FROM JIM MORRIS TO S. SANDIN * * *
"The purpose of this update is to retract the notification made in ENS Report #46146 (August 3, 2010).
"Following the ENS notification, troubleshooting determined the cause of the Train B sequencer alarm to be the failure of an Output Mode I Actuation Timing Switch Module. An engineering evaluation of the event has been completed and determined that a failure of this module did not affect the ability of the ESF load sequencer to perform its design function. Therefore, the Train B sequencer and associated Train B ESF equipment remained technically operable during the time that Train A equipment was inoperable due to scheduled maintenance, and a condition reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) did not exist.
"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R4DO (Walker).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46149
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: PENNIMAN AND BROWNE
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: MD-05-039-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: PENNIMAN AND BROWNE
Region: 1
City: BALTIMORE State: MD
County:
License #: MD-05-039-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/05/2010
Notification Time: 08:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2010
Notification Time: 08:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
ITAB VIA E-MAIL
ANNE DEFRANCISCO (R1DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
ITAB VIA E-MAIL
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE
A representative from the State of Maryland Radiological Health Program reported the theft of a Troxler moisture density gauge. The Troxler gauge (Model 3440, Serial Number 21688, with 40 mCi of Am-241/Be and 8 mCi Cs-137) was stolen on 8/3/10 from a truck parked overnight at the home of a Penniman and Browne employee. Both company and State representatives have searched for the gauge in areas nearby the location of the theft without success. The theft has been reported to the Howard County Sheriff and the State plans to issue a press release on the incident. The State noted that the storage of the Troxler in a truck at the employee's home was not authorized.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
A representative from the State of Maryland Radiological Health Program reported the theft of a Troxler moisture density gauge. The Troxler gauge (Model 3440, Serial Number 21688, with 40 mCi of Am-241/Be and 8 mCi Cs-137) was stolen on 8/3/10 from a truck parked overnight at the home of a Penniman and Browne employee. Both company and State representatives have searched for the gauge in areas nearby the location of the theft without success. The theft has been reported to the Howard County Sheriff and the State plans to issue a press release on the incident. The State noted that the storage of the Troxler in a truck at the employee's home was not authorized.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46213
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 4
City: GRAND JUNCTION State: CO
County:
License #: N/A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 08/30/2010
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2010
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 08/03/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 08/30/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL FOUND IN SCRAP SHIPMENT
"On August 3, 2010, the Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] received a phone call from the Utah Division of Radiation Control. A steel mill in Utah was returning a shipment of scrap metal to Colorado due to the portal monitor indicating radioactive material present in the shipment The shipment origin was Van Gundy Ampco at 1018 S. 5th Street, Grand Junction, Colorado (a scrap metal company, not a radioactive materials licensee).
"On August 12, 2010, the DOT paperwork was faxed from Utah to the Department. The DOT special permit indicated the material was a railcar with a side which scanned at 22 [micro]R/hr (background = 0.005 mrem/hr).
"On August 19, 2010, the railcar was returned to Van Gundy Ampco in Grand Junction. The Department made the determination using an IdentiFinder that the material was an oilfield pump contaminated with Ir-192 with a dose rate of 0.34 mrem/hr. The pump was isolated from public and workers with barrier tape.
"On August 25, 2010, Protechnics (license CO-545-01) agreed to take possession of the pump to decay in storage. Protechnics is licensed for Ir-192, so no provisional license will need to be issued to Van Gundy Ampco or Protechnics. On August 27, 2010, Protechnics took possession of the oilfield pump. Personnel from Protechnics cleaned an oily residue out from the oilfield pump. The pump at this point scanned as indistinguishable from background and was released for unrestricted disposal. The oily rags and materials used to decontaminate the pump were taken to the Protechnics site in Fruita, Colorado for decay in storage.
"The source of the Ir-192 is unknown as the oilfield pump was in a railcar full of scrap metal and the pump bore no identifying marks. Therefore, no Notice of Violation has been issued in regards to this incident. Additionally, the public dose in regards to this incident is also unknown as it is not known how long the pump was in public and the route the pump took from the oilfield to the scrap yard.
"This incident is considered closed."
Colorado Incident I10-11
"On August 3, 2010, the Department [Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment] received a phone call from the Utah Division of Radiation Control. A steel mill in Utah was returning a shipment of scrap metal to Colorado due to the portal monitor indicating radioactive material present in the shipment The shipment origin was Van Gundy Ampco at 1018 S. 5th Street, Grand Junction, Colorado (a scrap metal company, not a radioactive materials licensee).
"On August 12, 2010, the DOT paperwork was faxed from Utah to the Department. The DOT special permit indicated the material was a railcar with a side which scanned at 22 [micro]R/hr (background = 0.005 mrem/hr).
"On August 19, 2010, the railcar was returned to Van Gundy Ampco in Grand Junction. The Department made the determination using an IdentiFinder that the material was an oilfield pump contaminated with Ir-192 with a dose rate of 0.34 mrem/hr. The pump was isolated from public and workers with barrier tape.
"On August 25, 2010, Protechnics (license CO-545-01) agreed to take possession of the pump to decay in storage. Protechnics is licensed for Ir-192, so no provisional license will need to be issued to Van Gundy Ampco or Protechnics. On August 27, 2010, Protechnics took possession of the oilfield pump. Personnel from Protechnics cleaned an oily residue out from the oilfield pump. The pump at this point scanned as indistinguishable from background and was released for unrestricted disposal. The oily rags and materials used to decontaminate the pump were taken to the Protechnics site in Fruita, Colorado for decay in storage.
"The source of the Ir-192 is unknown as the oilfield pump was in a railcar full of scrap metal and the pump bore no identifying marks. Therefore, no Notice of Violation has been issued in regards to this incident. Additionally, the public dose in regards to this incident is also unknown as it is not known how long the pump was in public and the route the pump took from the oilfield to the scrap yard.
"This incident is considered closed."
Colorado Incident I10-11