Event Notification Report for July 28, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/27/2010 - 07/28/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
4614246135461364613846133
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46142
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CHEVRON
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #: 0802-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CASS KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: CHEVRON
Region: 4
City: EL SEGUNDO State: CA
County: LOS ANGELES
License #: 0802-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CASS KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/30/2010
Notification Time: 20:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 15:27 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Notification Time: 20:44 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 15:27 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/03/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
MEXICO VIA FAX
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
ROBERT LEWIS (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
MEXICO VIA FAX
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL MISSING SOURCES
The following information was received by e-mail:
"Chevron left a voicemail message on 7/28/10, reporting two devices missing [to the Los Angeles County - Region 7- State of California-Health and Human Services Agency otherwise known as the 'Agency']. [The Agency and the licensee] exchanged voicemail messages until [the Agency] was able to talk with the [licensee Radiation Safety Officer] RSO on 7/30/10. [The devices] are Nitons, serial numbers U2779 & U 2778. Each contains 20 mCi Fe-55 and 10 mCi Cd-109. The reporting quantities (1,000X) are 100 mCi Fe-55, and 1 mCi for Cd-109; the Cd-109 is the source that makes this immediately reportable. The sources were last leak tested on November 5, 2007. The RSO looked for them again in May 2008 at the Chevron's 'storehouse,' where these devices were kept. [The storehouse] was moving and [personnel] said they didn't know where [the sources] were [located]. Subsequently, the storehouse said they had been sent back to Niton, as a trade-in for devices using X-ray instead of a radioactive source. Chevron asked Niton to send them a letter saying they had received the devices, but Niton said they had never received the devices. Chevron does have devices using X-ray. They continue to look for the devices, and will check their invoice to see if they had received any trade-in credit when they purchased the X-ray devices."
* * * UPDATE AT 1937 EDT ON 8/3/10 FROM CASS KAUFMAN TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"This is an update for the missing gauges previously reported on 7/30/10. The licensee found records of source exchange, which makes this a 30 day reporting event, and not an immediate reporting event as previously stated. The two gauges remain missing."
"This is a follow-up to our conversation a few minutes ago, & to clarify the reporting requirement. These missing gauges are still required to be reported, but within 30 days, rather than immediately. The sources that require reporting are cadmium 109. Now that we have information that the sources were exchanged in February 2006, the activity of Cd-109 is below 1 mCi (the current activity is about 0.85 mCi). So this is required to be reported within 30 days."
Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME (Lewis).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following information was received by e-mail:
"Chevron left a voicemail message on 7/28/10, reporting two devices missing [to the Los Angeles County - Region 7- State of California-Health and Human Services Agency otherwise known as the 'Agency']. [The Agency and the licensee] exchanged voicemail messages until [the Agency] was able to talk with the [licensee Radiation Safety Officer] RSO on 7/30/10. [The devices] are Nitons, serial numbers U2779 & U 2778. Each contains 20 mCi Fe-55 and 10 mCi Cd-109. The reporting quantities (1,000X) are 100 mCi Fe-55, and 1 mCi for Cd-109; the Cd-109 is the source that makes this immediately reportable. The sources were last leak tested on November 5, 2007. The RSO looked for them again in May 2008 at the Chevron's 'storehouse,' where these devices were kept. [The storehouse] was moving and [personnel] said they didn't know where [the sources] were [located]. Subsequently, the storehouse said they had been sent back to Niton, as a trade-in for devices using X-ray instead of a radioactive source. Chevron asked Niton to send them a letter saying they had received the devices, but Niton said they had never received the devices. Chevron does have devices using X-ray. They continue to look for the devices, and will check their invoice to see if they had received any trade-in credit when they purchased the X-ray devices."
* * * UPDATE AT 1937 EDT ON 8/3/10 FROM CASS KAUFMAN TO S. SANDIN VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided as an update:
"This is an update for the missing gauges previously reported on 7/30/10. The licensee found records of source exchange, which makes this a 30 day reporting event, and not an immediate reporting event as previously stated. The two gauges remain missing."
"This is a follow-up to our conversation a few minutes ago, & to clarify the reporting requirement. These missing gauges are still required to be reported, but within 30 days, rather than immediately. The sources that require reporting are cadmium 109. Now that we have information that the sources were exchanged in February 2006, the activity of Cd-109 is below 1 mCi (the current activity is about 0.85 mCi). So this is required to be reported within 30 days."
Notified R4DO (Hagar) and FSME (Lewis).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46135
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/28/2010
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2010
Notification Time: 17:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 17:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
JOHN ROGGE (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A licensed operator was determined to have violated the licensee's Fitness for Duty Policy related to self-reporting a legal action. The employee's access to the Protected Area has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
A licensed operator was determined to have violated the licensee's Fitness for Duty Policy related to self-reporting a legal action. The employee's access to the Protected Area has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46136
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PRESTON LAWSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PRESTON LAWSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 07/28/2010
Notification Time: 19:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 14:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2010
Notification Time: 19:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 14:22 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
THREE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1422 CDT, while operating in MODE 1 at approximately 100% rated thermal power (RTP), Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) entered Technical Specification 3.7.5, 'Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,' Condition D for three AFW trains inoperable. The AFW pumps are equipped with recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. The recirculation line for each pump combines into a common header that flows to the condensate storage tank (CST). The common recirculation line transitions from safety-related to non-safety related at the AFW to CST pipe tunnel. During a review of the system design information, it was identified that a seismic event or tornado could result in damage to this portion of the recirculation line and thereby restrict or block the recirculation flow causing pump damage.
"TS 3.7.5, Required Action D.1, requires the immediate initiation of action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. The Note to Required Action D.1 specifies that LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. The plant remains in MODE 1 at approximately 100% RTP with activities that could lead to the need to maneuver the plant being suspended.
"WCGS personnel are developing an evaluation to support the OPERABILITY of the AFW trains with the reliance on compensatory measures as an interim action until final corrective action to resolve the condition are completed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1719 ON 9/27/2010 FROM MARCY BLOW TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Further evaluation by the Engineering Department determined that the capability of the AFW system was not reduced. The postulated condition is considered a design deficiency (nonconforming condition) to be corrected before considering the equipment fully qualified. The safety functions and the capability of the AFW system to mitigate a design basis event are not impaired. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz).
"At 1422 CDT, while operating in MODE 1 at approximately 100% rated thermal power (RTP), Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) entered Technical Specification 3.7.5, 'Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System,' Condition D for three AFW trains inoperable. The AFW pumps are equipped with recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. The recirculation line for each pump combines into a common header that flows to the condensate storage tank (CST). The common recirculation line transitions from safety-related to non-safety related at the AFW to CST pipe tunnel. During a review of the system design information, it was identified that a seismic event or tornado could result in damage to this portion of the recirculation line and thereby restrict or block the recirculation flow causing pump damage.
"TS 3.7.5, Required Action D.1, requires the immediate initiation of action to restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status. The Note to Required Action D.1 specifies that LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status. The plant remains in MODE 1 at approximately 100% RTP with activities that could lead to the need to maneuver the plant being suspended.
"WCGS personnel are developing an evaluation to support the OPERABILITY of the AFW trains with the reliance on compensatory measures as an interim action until final corrective action to resolve the condition are completed.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION AT 1719 ON 9/27/2010 FROM MARCY BLOW TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"Further evaluation by the Engineering Department determined that the capability of the AFW system was not reduced. The postulated condition is considered a design deficiency (nonconforming condition) to be corrected before considering the equipment fully qualified. The safety functions and the capability of the AFW system to mitigate a design basis event are not impaired. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) or 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R4DO (Farnholtz).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 46138
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: GERARD COUTURE
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 07/29/2010
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2010
Notification Time: 13:40 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/29/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
DENNIS DAMON (NMSS)
INCORPORATION OF 'INCREDIBLE' CRITICALITY SEQUENCES INTO INTEGRATED SAFETY ANALYSIS
"This notification is being made based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.'
"Westinghouse Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) staff evaluated the compliance posture concerning the extent of condition for an open Notice of Violation (NOV) 70-1151/2009-201-01, and evaluation of the information provided in the 'Summary of the June 28, 2010, Public meeting to discuss the use of Design Features to meet the performance requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 70, Subpart H,' (ML101950377). This evaluation identified a contradiction between the guidance and [the] approved SNM-1107 License and procedures. Therefore, criticality events evaluated as incredible in accordance with procedure NCS-010 'Categorizing Potential Criticality Scenarios and Criticality Safety Significant Controls' are no longer deemed in compliance with 10 CFR Part 70. Following the NCS-010 methodology allowed for an incredibility conclusion 'based on crediting passive engineered controls or passive design features.' When the logic demonstrated that the passive control or design feature absolutely prevented the scenario from leading to a criticality, the scenario was categorized as incredible; the control was designated as a Safety Significant Control (SSC) in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). SSCs are subject to Management Measures required by the SNM-1107 License to ensure they are available and reliable to perform their intended function. However, failure to identify these accident sequences as credible led to these sequences not being included in the ISA Summary, and therefore Items Relied on For Safety (IROFS) were not designated for these sequences.
"Immediate Corrective Actions: A governing policy was issued as an interim compensatory measure to identify all current Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineered SSCs as IROFS. A currently in place NCS Facility Walk-through Assessment process, procedure RA-316, is also designated as an Administrative IROFS as a verification activity of the engineered controls.
"Interim controls are being established on modifications pertaining to Criticality Safety Related SSCs to ensure no situation occurs where a modification may require NRC pre-approval.
"This event has been entered into the Facility Corrective Action Process CAPS #10-210-C002."
"This notification is being made based on 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61.'
"Westinghouse Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) staff evaluated the compliance posture concerning the extent of condition for an open Notice of Violation (NOV) 70-1151/2009-201-01, and evaluation of the information provided in the 'Summary of the June 28, 2010, Public meeting to discuss the use of Design Features to meet the performance requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations part 70, Subpart H,' (ML101950377). This evaluation identified a contradiction between the guidance and [the] approved SNM-1107 License and procedures. Therefore, criticality events evaluated as incredible in accordance with procedure NCS-010 'Categorizing Potential Criticality Scenarios and Criticality Safety Significant Controls' are no longer deemed in compliance with 10 CFR Part 70. Following the NCS-010 methodology allowed for an incredibility conclusion 'based on crediting passive engineered controls or passive design features.' When the logic demonstrated that the passive control or design feature absolutely prevented the scenario from leading to a criticality, the scenario was categorized as incredible; the control was designated as a Safety Significant Control (SSC) in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). SSCs are subject to Management Measures required by the SNM-1107 License to ensure they are available and reliable to perform their intended function. However, failure to identify these accident sequences as credible led to these sequences not being included in the ISA Summary, and therefore Items Relied on For Safety (IROFS) were not designated for these sequences.
"Immediate Corrective Actions: A governing policy was issued as an interim compensatory measure to identify all current Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineered SSCs as IROFS. A currently in place NCS Facility Walk-through Assessment process, procedure RA-316, is also designated as an Administrative IROFS as a verification activity of the engineered controls.
"Interim controls are being established on modifications pertaining to Criticality Safety Related SSCs to ensure no situation occurs where a modification may require NRC pre-approval.
"This event has been entered into the Facility Corrective Action Process CAPS #10-210-C002."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46133
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RONALD KELMENSON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: RONALD KELMENSON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 07/28/2010
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 09:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2010
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/28/2010
Event Time: 09:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF A SULFURIC ACID SPILL
"On Wednesday, July 28, 2010, at about 0945 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) determined that a spill of a total of about 110 gallons of sulfuric acid had occurred from two different locations earlier in the same day. All the acid was contained within the chemical berms around the acid transfer pumps in the Unit 3 intake area at the 9 foot level and the 30 foot level caustic berm. No acid was released to the environment.
"At 1050 PDT, SCE initiated notification to the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health (Report # 10-063463), the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) (Report # 10-4518) and the National Response Center (Report # 949176). Notifications were completed by 1100 PDT.
"SCE is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). "
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On Wednesday, July 28, 2010, at about 0945 PDT, Southern California Edison (SCE) determined that a spill of a total of about 110 gallons of sulfuric acid had occurred from two different locations earlier in the same day. All the acid was contained within the chemical berms around the acid transfer pumps in the Unit 3 intake area at the 9 foot level and the 30 foot level caustic berm. No acid was released to the environment.
"At 1050 PDT, SCE initiated notification to the San Diego County Department of Environmental Health (Report # 10-063463), the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) (Report # 10-4518) and the National Response Center (Report # 949176). Notifications were completed by 1100 PDT.
"SCE is making this notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). "
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.