Event Notification Report for July 26, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/25/2010 - 07/26/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
46128461294613046220
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46128
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ED BURKETT
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 11:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 20:46 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 11:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
JONATHAN BARTLEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24-HOUR FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT
A licensed (not active) employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed (not active) employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46129
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL COSSEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL COSSEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 20:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 20:01 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 19 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM
"On 7/26/2010 at 2001 [hrs. CDT], Control Room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 19% reactor power. Unit 1 was in the process of coming off-line to support Main Generator repair. The generator breaker had just been opened and load transferred to condenser steam dumps when a loss of condenser vacuum occurred. The reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main condenser vacuum with reactor power above P-10 permissive. All systems functioned as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Main Steam Isolation valves were manually shut. All reactor coolant system parameters are as expected, with reactor coolant temperature being maintained by atmospheric steam dumps."
Currently, the plant is at normal operating temperature and pressure with the steam generators being fed by the main feed pumps. Feedwater is being supplied via the condenser and condensate storage tank. There were no lifts of safeties or reliefs during the transient. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical line-up with no effect on Unit 2. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The cause of the loss of vacuum is under investigation.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 7/26/2010 at 2001 [hrs. CDT], Control Room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip from approximately 19% reactor power. Unit 1 was in the process of coming off-line to support Main Generator repair. The generator breaker had just been opened and load transferred to condenser steam dumps when a loss of condenser vacuum occurred. The reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of main condenser vacuum with reactor power above P-10 permissive. All systems functioned as expected. All control rods fully inserted. Main Steam Isolation valves were manually shut. All reactor coolant system parameters are as expected, with reactor coolant temperature being maintained by atmospheric steam dumps."
Currently, the plant is at normal operating temperature and pressure with the steam generators being fed by the main feed pumps. Feedwater is being supplied via the condenser and condensate storage tank. There were no lifts of safeties or reliefs during the transient. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical line-up with no effect on Unit 2. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The cause of the loss of vacuum is under investigation.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46130
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTION SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 4
City: WILBURN State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-057603320
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAYLA AVERY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTION SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 4
City: WILBURN State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-057603320
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAYLA AVERY
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 07/27/2010
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 15:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2010
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 15:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/03/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
The following was received via email from the State of Arkansas:
"The following are the findings of the Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, concerning Event Number [AR] 07-10-01 involving a stuck radiography source in Wilburn, Arkansas at a pipeline location. The Department was contacted on July 26, 2010 and informed by the licensee that the incident occurred around 9:30 a.m. on the first shot. The camera involved was an Industrial Nuclear IR-100 (Serial Number 6961) that contained a 34 Curie Iridium-192 source (Model G-40T, Serial Number RC3103). [Source Production and Equipment Company] (SPEC) [- the vendor -] had been contacted and was expected to arrive at the location around 5:00 a.m. on July 27, 2010. In the meantime, the crew and both of the Assistant Radiation Safety Officers maintained constant surveillance.
"Health Physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health also went to the incident location. On arrival, it was discovered that the source was in an approximately 10 foot hole and it was indicated that the radiography crew had performed three cranks and then the source would not retract back into the shielded position. SPEC successfully retrieved the source. The source, camera and associated equipment are being transported to the SPEC facility in Louisiana for evaluation.
"It appears that this incident may have been caused by the failure of the locking mechanism of the camera. The licensee and SPEC [are] to supply the Department with a written report.
"The Department will provide updates as information is received."
This is Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program event number 07-10-01.
* * * UPDATE FROM KAYLA AVERY TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 0925 EDT ON 9/3/2010 * * *
The following report was received via e-mail from the State of Arkansas:
"A report received from SPEC states that the cause of the incident was a source misconnect and the source locking mechanism failing to function properly. The report also states that if the camera had been operating properly, the radiographer should not have been able to push the flag down and release the source. There was no evidence of damage to the drive cable connector or to the source assembly. The source was reloaded into the camera and returned to the licensee.
"The Arkansas Department of Health considers this incident to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME (McIntosh).
The following was received via email from the State of Arkansas:
"The following are the findings of the Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, concerning Event Number [AR] 07-10-01 involving a stuck radiography source in Wilburn, Arkansas at a pipeline location. The Department was contacted on July 26, 2010 and informed by the licensee that the incident occurred around 9:30 a.m. on the first shot. The camera involved was an Industrial Nuclear IR-100 (Serial Number 6961) that contained a 34 Curie Iridium-192 source (Model G-40T, Serial Number RC3103). [Source Production and Equipment Company] (SPEC) [- the vendor -] had been contacted and was expected to arrive at the location around 5:00 a.m. on July 27, 2010. In the meantime, the crew and both of the Assistant Radiation Safety Officers maintained constant surveillance.
"Health Physicists from the Arkansas Department of Health also went to the incident location. On arrival, it was discovered that the source was in an approximately 10 foot hole and it was indicated that the radiography crew had performed three cranks and then the source would not retract back into the shielded position. SPEC successfully retrieved the source. The source, camera and associated equipment are being transported to the SPEC facility in Louisiana for evaluation.
"It appears that this incident may have been caused by the failure of the locking mechanism of the camera. The licensee and SPEC [are] to supply the Department with a written report.
"The Department will provide updates as information is received."
This is Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program event number 07-10-01.
* * * UPDATE FROM KAYLA AVERY TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 0925 EDT ON 9/3/2010 * * *
The following report was received via e-mail from the State of Arkansas:
"A report received from SPEC states that the cause of the incident was a source misconnect and the source locking mechanism failing to function properly. The report also states that if the camera had been operating properly, the radiographer should not have been able to push the flag down and release the source. There was no evidence of damage to the drive cable connector or to the source assembly. The source was reloaded into the camera and returned to the licensee.
"The Arkansas Department of Health considers this incident to be closed."
Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME (McIntosh).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46220
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JEFF WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 09/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:42 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2010
Event Time: 18:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION IN LIEU OF A WRITTEN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT OF INVALID ACTUATION
"On July 26, 2010, at 1819 hours [CDT], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Run), the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) restarted after being secured. The DGCWP provides the Emergency Service Water to the 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room area cooler and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) water pump/Low Pressure Core Spray [LPCS] pump room area cooler.
"The apparent cause of the restart was the momentary interruption of the DGCWP run logic. The Division 1 DGCWP was in operation to support cooling of the Unit 1 RCIC/LPCS pump room area (run logic satisfied). When the Operator placed the Division 1 DGCWP control switch to the normal-after-stop position, the DGCWP feed breaker opened. The Operator reset the DGCWP feed breaker trip by returning the control switch to the normal-after-stop position and, because the run logic for the DGCWP was still satisfied [due to elevated room temperatures], the DGCWP restarted.
"This invalid start signal from the Division 1 DGCWP breaker being reset resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DGCWP. The Division 1 DGCWP responded satisfactorily.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), which states that in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center with 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On July 26, 2010, at 1819 hours [CDT], with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Run), the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) restarted after being secured. The DGCWP provides the Emergency Service Water to the 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump room area cooler and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) water pump/Low Pressure Core Spray [LPCS] pump room area cooler.
"The apparent cause of the restart was the momentary interruption of the DGCWP run logic. The Division 1 DGCWP was in operation to support cooling of the Unit 1 RCIC/LPCS pump room area (run logic satisfied). When the Operator placed the Division 1 DGCWP control switch to the normal-after-stop position, the DGCWP feed breaker opened. The Operator reset the DGCWP feed breaker trip by returning the control switch to the normal-after-stop position and, because the run logic for the DGCWP was still satisfied [due to elevated room temperatures], the DGCWP restarted.
"This invalid start signal from the Division 1 DGCWP breaker being reset resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DGCWP. The Division 1 DGCWP responded satisfactorily.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), which states that in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10CFR73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center with 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.