Event Notification Report for July 23, 2010

FITNESS-FOR-DUTY REPORT INVOLVING A NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a presumptive positive based on a failure to report for a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL WHOLE BODY DOSE ABOVE REGULATORY LIMITS

The following report was received via fax from the State of Massachusetts:

"Licensee RSO, called to report that he received notification from the Corporate Office that a Landaur exposure report indicates one of his radiographer's whole body badge read in excess of 17,000 mrem for June of 2010. This person performs radiography operations using the x-ray vault. [The RSO] does not feel that the exposure is real, however, he is initiating an investigation. He stated it's more likely that the WB badge was left in the radiography vault inadvertently."

24 HOUR REPORT - DISCOVERY THAT WASTE WATER FILTER PRESS NOT CONFIGURED FOR PASSIVE DESIGN FEATURE

"Facility:

"Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt.% U-235) fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.

"Time and Date of Event:

"July 23, 2010, 1:27 p.m. EST

"It was reported to EH&S Management that on July 23, 2010, two filter plates (P1 and P2) in the Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) waste water system filter press were found to be missing pegs utilized in the 'peg-and-hole' passive design of feature SSC-IFBA-MISC-101. The press did not contain more than the allowed four filter press plates. Operations involving the filter press were immediately stopped and EH&S notified of the event by phone and the 'Redbook' reporting system. (Redbook Issue #16126.) The actual configuration remained bounded by the analysis evaluated in the criticality safety calculations and sub-critical margins were not compromised. There was no actual safety consequence to the workers, the public or the environment.

"Notification is made based on 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.' The potential for an inadvertent criticality event was evaluated in Criticality Safety Evaluation (CSE) CSE-14-C for Miscellaneous Operations in the Integrated Fuel Burnable Absorber Area and the applicable Integrated Safety Analysis for this system.

"The CSE evaluated scenario's addressing the installation of the incorrect number or type of filter plates which had the potential to lead to an inadvertent criticality event. These scenarios were determined to be not-credible. Certain safeguards were identified, including SSC-IFBA-MISC-101, to maintain the basic process design of the system. Failure to identify this sequence event was credible led to that event not being included in the ISA Summary and therefore no Items Relied on For Safety (IROFS) were designated for this accident sequence.

"Immediate Corrective Actions:

"As stated previously, the IFBA area Filter Press operation was shutdown and will remain so until appropriate analysis is completed and IROFS are properly selected and identified.

"Similar Filter Press operations in the Uranium Recovery and Recycle System were shutdown and will remain so until appropriate analysis is completed and IROFS are properly selected and identified.

"This event has been entered into the Facility Corrective Action Process CAPS#10-204-C012."

The licensee will inform the NRC Project Manager.

TEMPORARY OUTAGE OF PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM DUE TO A BOMB THREAT OFFSITE

"The Siren Control Panel at the Houston County Courthouse was unavailable due to a bomb threat [FNP-0-EIP-8.0, step 13.6.3] which caused a loss to the Public Prompt Notification System (i.e. Tone Alert Radio system and the Sirens) for greater than one hour. The bomb threat occurred at 0852 [07/23/10] and Houston County Courthouse evacuation was commenced. Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat and subsequent evacuation at approximately 0945 [07/23/10]. The bomb threat resulted in the Houston County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) and the Houston County Sheriff's dispatcher to be evacuated, which resulted in the Alert Notification System (ANS) activation consoles being inaccessible.

"The HCEMA office was evacuated at 0915 [07/23/10] and the Houston County Sheriff Dispatcher evacuated at 0925. When Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat, Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were dispatched to the local MET Tower console for ANS actuation (TAR's and Sirens) per approved plant procedures, if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were on station at the MET Tower ANS console at 0959 [07/23/10] with capability to activate the ANS console if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 [07/23/10].

"All clear from bomb threat given by Houston County Sheriff's Department and normal access was restored to the HCEMA office at 1100 [07/23/10]. At 1109 [07/23/10] HCEMA notified Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel that the HCEMA office was manned and the MET Tower ANS console manning was secured.

"During the time that the HCEMA office was unmanned, Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) was the notification point for HCEMA and that any decision to activate the ANS console could be made by HCEMA by direction of AEMA and then performed by Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel.

"The total length of time that the Alert Notification System was unavailable was 68 minutes. This was based on the bomb threat and evacuation time at 0852 [07/23/10] until Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 [07/23/10]."

The licensee notified Alabama and Georgia Emergency Management Agencies as well as Houston County and Early County Management Agencies.

The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.