Event Notification Report for July 02, 2010

INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ACTUATION FROM A LOSS OF POWER TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) 3A

"This 60 day telephone notification is being made in-lieu of a written report under the requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.

"On May 12, 2010, at 1232 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), with Unit 3 operating at 100 percent thermal power the electrical power to the 3A RPS was interrupted during the transfer of the 3A 480V shutdown board from its alternate supply to its normal power supply. During the transfer, the normal breaker did not close for several seconds. This resulted in the interruption of power to the 3A shutdown board which caused the 3A RPS to de-energize, resulting in a half scram and the actuation of PCIS logic Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8, and the initiation of Trains B and C of Standby Gas Treatment, and the initiation of Train A Control Room Emergency Ventilation.

"Plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and the associated system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, or high area temperature) did not exist; therefore, the actuation was invalid.

"The affected equipment responded as designed. On May 12, 2010, by approximately 1342 hours CDT, Unit 3 operations personnel restored the 3A RPS power and realigned affected equipment as appropriate.

"There were no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. The event was entered into the corrective actions program as PER 229613.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

"On July 2, 2010 it was discovered during the morning walk-through that one exit sign containing 7.5 curies of H-3 [tritium] was stolen. The licensee searched the trash cans and talked with janitorial staff. The sign was not found. A police report was filed with the Alexandria Police Department."

Virginia Event Number: VA-10-06

The sign was manufactured by Isolite, model 2040-50B. The sign contained 7.5 Ci at the time of manufacture however, the date of manufacture and thus the current sign activity is not known.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

FIRE INVOLVING TWO CHEMICAL DETECTION DEVICES CONTAINING NICKEL-63

An electrical fire consumed a wooden building at Ft. Bragg, NC which housed two chemical detection devices. The first device was an Advanced Chemical Detection Alarm (M22) which contained 20 milliCuries of Ni-63 and the second device was an Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) which contained 10 milliCuries of Ni-63. The SSDR numbers for these devices are NR0155-D-125-S and NR0155-D-103-S, respectively. The building was destroyed and the area is covered with a foot of ash. The fire department has not been able to find the devices, and they do not know the configuration of the material. The area is secured and the base RSO is sampling the area for loose surface contamination material.


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source