Event Notification Report for June 24, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/23/2010 - 06/24/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
460614604346044460454611046120
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46061
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: HOLLISTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: HOLLISTON State: MA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 10:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010
Notification Time: 10:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A FOUND RA-226 SOURCE
"[A] transfer station for waste disposal detected radioactive material contained in a roll-off container with other debris. [The] debris came from a house clean-out job in Newton Corners, MA. [The] transfer station called Holliston Fire Department who responded with survey instruments capable of identifying radioactive material (RAM). [The]RAM was identified as Ra-226 contained in a device that appeared to be from a WWII vintage aircraft.
"[The] Agency sent an inspector to verify description of RAM trash. [The] inspector confirmed the RAM is Ra-226 contained in an aircraft leveling device. [The] inspector placed the device in a plastic container and sealed [it] with radioactive warning tape. The external dose rate measured 0.1 mR/ hr. The plastic container was placed in secure storage awaiting disposition of RAM.
"[A] transfer station for waste disposal detected radioactive material contained in a roll-off container with other debris. [The] debris came from a house clean-out job in Newton Corners, MA. [The] transfer station called Holliston Fire Department who responded with survey instruments capable of identifying radioactive material (RAM). [The]RAM was identified as Ra-226 contained in a device that appeared to be from a WWII vintage aircraft.
"[The] Agency sent an inspector to verify description of RAM trash. [The] inspector confirmed the RAM is Ra-226 contained in an aircraft leveling device. [The] inspector placed the device in a plastic container and sealed [it] with radioactive warning tape. The external dose rate measured 0.1 mR/ hr. The plastic container was placed in secure storage awaiting disposition of RAM.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46043
Rep Org: EXELON NUCLEAR CORPORATE
Licensee: EXELON NUCLEAR CORPORATE
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: EXELON NUCLEAR CORPORATE
Region: 3
City: CHICAGO State: IL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICK SIMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/24/2010
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 09:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2010
Notification Time: 11:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 09:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
EXELON DRUG TESTING CONTRACTOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST
A contractor used by Exelon Corporate for drug testing at six Exelon nuclear sites tested positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual has been denied unescorted access to Exelon facilities. Contact HOO for details.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors at each site.
A contractor used by Exelon Corporate for drug testing at six Exelon nuclear sites tested positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual has been denied unescorted access to Exelon facilities. Contact HOO for details.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors at each site.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46044
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/24/2010
Notification Time: 12:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 09:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2010
Notification Time: 12:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 09:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/24/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
JULIO LARA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM DRUG/ALCOHOL TEST
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random drug/alcohol test. Unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the HOO for further details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random drug/alcohol test. Unescorted access has been suspended. Contact the HOO for further details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46045
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CURTIS CASTELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/24/2010
Notification Time: 21:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 14:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2010
Notification Time: 21:34 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 14:34 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
INSTRUMENT BUSES 3 AND 8 FAILED CAUSING CLOSURE OF RHR VALVES
"At 14:34 hours on June 24, 2010, with the unit in MODE 5, Cold Shutdown, with approximately 50% pressurizer level, during Refueling Outage 26, Instrument Buses 3 and 8 unexpectedly de-energized during performance of testing in accordance with procedure OST-163, 'Safety Injection Test and Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection.' The loss of Instrument Buses 3 and 8 occurred during the loss of power and Safety Injection testing of the 'A' Train.
"Instrument Buses 3 and 8 are normally powered from Inverter 'B' which is normally supplied by the Train 'B' DC Bus. During the test, it was noted that the power supply to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 had tripped. The cause of the failure of Inverter 'B' is not currently known. The failure of inverter 'B' caused the closure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger discharge valve (HCV-758) and the RHR Heat Exchanger bypass valve (FCV-605).
"Both trains of RHR continued to operate and reactor coolant system temperature remained in the range of approximately 93 to 96 degrees Fahrenheit. Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-020, 'Loss of Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling)' was entered. Power was restored to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 by use of the alternate power supply at 14:49 hours. Normal configuration of the RHR system was restored and AOP-020 was exited at 14:51 hours.
"Currently Instrument Buses 3 and 8 are being powered from the alternate power supply which causes the associated 'B' EDG to be inoperable due to the inoperability of the automatic load sequencer that starts the associated Service Water and Component Cooling Water pumps. The 'A' EDG is inoperable due to the need to complete required post-maintenance testing. Therefore, both EDGs are currently inoperable.
"Both EDGs are currently considered available and are aligned for automatic starting. Both EDGs would be expected to automatically supply their respective buses if a loss of offsite power were to occur. Manual action would be required to start the required loads on the 'B' Train due to the current alignment of the Instrument Buses 3 and 8 on the alternate power supply.
"It is expected that the 'B' EDG will be restored to operable status when Inverter 'B' is restored to operable status and realigned to supply Instrument Buses 3 and 8.
"The Technical Specifications (TS) Action Statement currently in effect for loss of Inverter 'B' (TS 3.8.8 Condition A) requires initiation of action to restore AC instrument bus sources to OPERABLE status immediately. The actions to restore Inverter 'B' were initiated immediately and are continuing.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1408 ON 6/27/2010 FROM ASHLEY VALONE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This is a follow-up notification to Event Notification EN #46045 regarding Instrument Buses 3 and 8 that unexpectedly de-energized during performance of testing in accordance with procedure OST-163, 'Safety Injection Test and Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection.'
"Power was restored to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 by use of the normal power supply at 08:03 hours on June 27, 2010. Inverter 'B' has been realigned to supply Instrument Buses 3 and 8. The restoration of inverter 'B' has returned the associated 'B' EDG to operable status at 11:09 hours with the return of the automatic load sequencer that starts the associated Service Water and Component Cooling Water pumps. The 'A' EDG continues to be inoperable due to the need to complete required post-maintenance testing. Currently 'A' EDG is considered available and aligned for automatic starting.
"The Technical Specifications (TS) Action Statement for loss of Inverter 'B' (TS 3.8.8 Condition A) that requires initiation of action to restore AC instrument bus sources to OPERABLE status immediately was exited at 11:09 hours on June 27, 2010. TS Action Statement for loss of 'B' EDG (TS 3.8.2 Condition B) that requires initiation of action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status immediately was also exited at 11:09 hours on June 27, 2010."
The licensee is still investigating the cause of the failure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer).
"At 14:34 hours on June 24, 2010, with the unit in MODE 5, Cold Shutdown, with approximately 50% pressurizer level, during Refueling Outage 26, Instrument Buses 3 and 8 unexpectedly de-energized during performance of testing in accordance with procedure OST-163, 'Safety Injection Test and Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection.' The loss of Instrument Buses 3 and 8 occurred during the loss of power and Safety Injection testing of the 'A' Train.
"Instrument Buses 3 and 8 are normally powered from Inverter 'B' which is normally supplied by the Train 'B' DC Bus. During the test, it was noted that the power supply to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 had tripped. The cause of the failure of Inverter 'B' is not currently known. The failure of inverter 'B' caused the closure of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger discharge valve (HCV-758) and the RHR Heat Exchanger bypass valve (FCV-605).
"Both trains of RHR continued to operate and reactor coolant system temperature remained in the range of approximately 93 to 96 degrees Fahrenheit. Abnormal Operating Procedure AOP-020, 'Loss of Residual Heat Removal (Shutdown Cooling)' was entered. Power was restored to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 by use of the alternate power supply at 14:49 hours. Normal configuration of the RHR system was restored and AOP-020 was exited at 14:51 hours.
"Currently Instrument Buses 3 and 8 are being powered from the alternate power supply which causes the associated 'B' EDG to be inoperable due to the inoperability of the automatic load sequencer that starts the associated Service Water and Component Cooling Water pumps. The 'A' EDG is inoperable due to the need to complete required post-maintenance testing. Therefore, both EDGs are currently inoperable.
"Both EDGs are currently considered available and are aligned for automatic starting. Both EDGs would be expected to automatically supply their respective buses if a loss of offsite power were to occur. Manual action would be required to start the required loads on the 'B' Train due to the current alignment of the Instrument Buses 3 and 8 on the alternate power supply.
"It is expected that the 'B' EDG will be restored to operable status when Inverter 'B' is restored to operable status and realigned to supply Instrument Buses 3 and 8.
"The Technical Specifications (TS) Action Statement currently in effect for loss of Inverter 'B' (TS 3.8.8 Condition A) requires initiation of action to restore AC instrument bus sources to OPERABLE status immediately. The actions to restore Inverter 'B' were initiated immediately and are continuing.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1408 ON 6/27/2010 FROM ASHLEY VALONE TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This is a follow-up notification to Event Notification EN #46045 regarding Instrument Buses 3 and 8 that unexpectedly de-energized during performance of testing in accordance with procedure OST-163, 'Safety Injection Test and Emergency Diesel Generator Auto Start on Loss of Power and Safety Injection.'
"Power was restored to Instrument Buses 3 and 8 by use of the normal power supply at 08:03 hours on June 27, 2010. Inverter 'B' has been realigned to supply Instrument Buses 3 and 8. The restoration of inverter 'B' has returned the associated 'B' EDG to operable status at 11:09 hours with the return of the automatic load sequencer that starts the associated Service Water and Component Cooling Water pumps. The 'A' EDG continues to be inoperable due to the need to complete required post-maintenance testing. Currently 'A' EDG is considered available and aligned for automatic starting.
"The Technical Specifications (TS) Action Statement for loss of Inverter 'B' (TS 3.8.8 Condition A) that requires initiation of action to restore AC instrument bus sources to OPERABLE status immediately was exited at 11:09 hours on June 27, 2010. TS Action Statement for loss of 'B' EDG (TS 3.8.2 Condition B) that requires initiation of action to restore required DG to OPERABLE status immediately was also exited at 11:09 hours on June 27, 2010."
The licensee is still investigating the cause of the failure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Shaeffer).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 46110
Rep Org: GLOBAL X-RAY AND TESTING
Licensee: GLOBAL X-RAY AND TESTING
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: 17-29308-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: GLOBAL X-RAY AND TESTING
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: 17-29308-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM JOHNSTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/20/2010
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 23:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2010
Notification Time: 15:09 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 23:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
FAILURE TO RETRACT RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE TO SHIELDED POSITION
The licensee was performing radiography at the South Timbalier 55 site in the Gulf of Mexico, under an NRC license, when the source failed to retract to the shielded position. They were using a SPEC-150 camera (serial #860) with a 58 Ci Ir-192 source (serial #RC1106).
The RSO went to the site and retrieved the source. During the retrieval, there were no overexposures to personnel. The camera was returned to the manufacturer who determined that the pig tail connector failed. The device was repaired by the manufacturer and returned to service.
The licensee was performing radiography at the South Timbalier 55 site in the Gulf of Mexico, under an NRC license, when the source failed to retract to the shielded position. They were using a SPEC-150 camera (serial #860) with a 58 Ci Ir-192 source (serial #RC1106).
The RSO went to the site and retrieved the source. During the retrieval, there were no overexposures to personnel. The camera was returned to the manufacturer who determined that the pig tail connector failed. The device was repaired by the manufacturer and returned to service.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46120
Facility: HUMBOLDT BAY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JORDAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] GE-1
NRC Notified By: BRANDON JORDAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/23/2010
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2010
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
ILTAB via email
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
ILTAB via email
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned |
CALIBRATION SOURCE DISCOVERED MISSING DURING INVENTORY
"This is a 30-day notification to inform the NRC of missing licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii).
"On June 24, 2010, while conducting the quarterly inventory of radioactive sources in accordance with Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 Radiation Control Procedure RCP-6D, 'INVENTORY AND CONTROLS FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES,' it was discovered that source number 498 was missing from the count room. This source is for the calibration of gamma detectors, but had not been used for that purpose this year. The source is a filter, mixed gamma source with an activity of 1.025 microCi as of July 1, 2008. The radionuclide mix of the source is as follows:
Gammas/second Activity (Ci) 10 CPR 20 Appendix C (Ci)
Am-241 7.02e+02 5.20e-08 1.00e-09
Cd-109 9.80e+02 7.12e-07 1.00e-06
Co-57 5.10e+02 1.61e-08 1.00e-04
Ce-139 7.10e+02 2.39e-08 1.00e-04
Hg-203 1.61e+03 5.63e-08 1.00e-04
Sn-113 1.01e+03 4.19e-08 1.00e-04
Cs-137 6.29e+02 2.00e-08 1.00e-05
Y-88 2.42e+03 6.99e-08 1.00e-05
Co-60 1.18e+03 3.18e-08 1.00e-06
"The above radionuclide composition yields an aggregate quantity of missing licensed material of 53 times the quantity specified in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C, which exceeds which exceeds the 30-day reporting criterion of 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C. An extensive search has not been successful in locating the source to date, and thus PG&E is making this 30-day notification in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii).
"PG&E is continuing to investigate the cause of this event using the Technical Review Group (TRG) process and will provide a written report within 30-days in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(a)."
This material was last accounted for on 4/8/10. The licensee informed NRC Region IV staff.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"This is a 30-day notification to inform the NRC of missing licensed material in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201 (a)(1)(ii).
"On June 24, 2010, while conducting the quarterly inventory of radioactive sources in accordance with Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) Unit 3 Radiation Control Procedure RCP-6D, 'INVENTORY AND CONTROLS FOR RADIOACTIVE SOURCES,' it was discovered that source number 498 was missing from the count room. This source is for the calibration of gamma detectors, but had not been used for that purpose this year. The source is a filter, mixed gamma source with an activity of 1.025 microCi as of July 1, 2008. The radionuclide mix of the source is as follows:
Gammas/second Activity (Ci) 10 CPR 20 Appendix C (Ci)
Am-241 7.02e+02 5.20e-08 1.00e-09
Cd-109 9.80e+02 7.12e-07 1.00e-06
Co-57 5.10e+02 1.61e-08 1.00e-04
Ce-139 7.10e+02 2.39e-08 1.00e-04
Hg-203 1.61e+03 5.63e-08 1.00e-04
Sn-113 1.01e+03 4.19e-08 1.00e-04
Cs-137 6.29e+02 2.00e-08 1.00e-05
Y-88 2.42e+03 6.99e-08 1.00e-05
Co-60 1.18e+03 3.18e-08 1.00e-06
"The above radionuclide composition yields an aggregate quantity of missing licensed material of 53 times the quantity specified in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C, which exceeds which exceeds the 30-day reporting criterion of 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C. An extensive search has not been successful in locating the source to date, and thus PG&E is making this 30-day notification in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii).
"PG&E is continuing to investigate the cause of this event using the Technical Review Group (TRG) process and will provide a written report within 30-days in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20.2201(b)(1)(a)."
This material was last accounted for on 4/8/10. The licensee informed NRC Region IV staff.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source