Event Notification Report for June 09, 2010

BATTERY ROOMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO POTENTIAL FLOODING

"At 1135 CDT, during a plant walkdown, it was observed that the battery room doors to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine building bottom gap seals were not in contact with their respective door thresholds. The gap was approximately 0.25 inches. It is necessary for each of the door seals to be in contact with the thresholds for the plant to be in the configuration assumed by the turbine building High Energy Line Break (HELB) flooding evaluation.

"An analysis was performed of the flood height that would be attained in the battery rooms during a postulated HELB induced flooding event. The result of this analysis was estimated to be a water depth above the limit to maintain operability of safety related components in the battery rooms. This critical flood height would be attained in approximately 30 minutes following a HELB which causes damage to cooling water piping.

"These postulated water levels could have potentially resulted in a loss of safety function for Unit 1 and Unit 2 components between 1135 and 1250 CDT.

"The condition was repaired and the battery rooms were declared operable at 1250 CDT."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO TOXIC GAS/CHEMICAL SPILL IN THE PROTECTED AREA

"Toxic gas in the Owner Controlled Area that adversely affects normal operations."

The licensee declared an Unusual Event under EAL HU3.1 at 1112 PDT. During sodium hydroxide (NaOH) transfer operations on site, a drain valve leak occurred in the condensate polisher buttress area. Onsite personnel responded and stopped the leak. There were no injuries to personnel, no equipment damage and no offsite assistance required.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM SIZEMORE TO CROUCH @ 1517 EDT ON 6/9/10 * * *

Responder access to area has been restored. Approximately 5 gallons of NaOH have been contained. NOUE exit criteria will be that normal access to the polisher buttress is restored.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Thorp) and R4DO (Powers).

* * * UPDATE FROM SIZEMORE TO CROUCH @ 1557 EDT ON 6/9/10 * * *

The licensee has terminated from the Unusual Event at 1241 PDT. Normal access to all plant areas has been restored.

Notified IRD (Gott), NRR EO (Thorp), R4DO (Powers), DHS (Kettles) and FEMA (O'Connel).

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE MISSING

The following information was obtained from the State of California via email:

"On June 8, 2010, [the licensee] contacted RHB-Brea [Radiation Health Branch] about a moisture density gauge (CPN MC-3 M39099120, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241) that was missing from their facility since approximately June 3, 2010. The facility was searched with no sign of the missing gauge and all operators were questioned and were instructed to search their residences for the gauge. None of the individuals could find the gauge, none of them could recall using the gauge recently and could not recall if they may have used or misplaced the gauge. A review of the gauge log indicated that gauge had been logged incorrectly and that two individuals were logging in the same gauge at the same day and times, preventing a proper accounting of the whereabouts of their gauge. [The licensee] was notified that a police report must be filed, a reward offered, and a written report must be provided to RHB within 30 days.

"At this time, the incorrect use of the gauge in/out log is the only root cause identified though it appears that other factors are likely to also be a potential root cause of this incident. While the investigation is ongoing, the licensee will be cited for failing to maintain control of the gauge and failing to properly log the use of their gauges. Further citations will be deferred until the 30-day report has been received or further infractions have been identified by RHB during our investigation. Also, corrective actions will be verified from the 30-day report or from our investigation. "

California Report: 5010-060810

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

PRESS RELEASE CONCERNING A CAUSTIC SPILL

"On June 9, 2010, at 10:32 PDT, a caustic spill occurred in the DCPP Unit 1 Turbine Building buttress area. On June 9, 2010, at 10:59 PDT the area was restricted for normal access with SCBAs required for entry into the area. On June 9, 2010, at 11:12 PDT an Unusual Event was declared for DCPP Unit 1. The DCPP Unit 1 reactor remains at full power. No safety related equipment has been impacted.

"The Unusual Event was declared based on EP G-1 Attachment 2 - 'HU3.1 Report or detection of toxic, corrosive asphyxiant or flammable gases that have entered or could enter the Owner Controlled Area in amounts that can adversely affect normal plant operations.'

"The spill amount was reported as 5 gallons.

"The spill was due to a ruptured delivery hose. The hose was isolated initially at the delivery truck and the tank being filled. Hose continued to drain due to residual caustic in the hose. It was reported as 'confined' on June 9, 2010 at 11:02 PDT.

"The spill was reported as 'contained' on June 9, 2010 at 11:44 PDT. Access to the immediate area of the spill is still restricted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO CLOSURE OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES

"At 0331 CDT on 6/9/10, the Unit 2 reactor automatically scrammed due to closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Operating Instruction 2-OI-99 section 8.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus B Transfer from Motor Generator to Alternate, was in progress for planned maintenance. The MSIVs closed during the RPS power transfer. The cause of the closure of the MSIVs is under investigation.

"All systems responded as expected to the reactor scram. Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) opened automatically as designed to limit the pressure transient. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached and all expected containment isolation and initiation signals were received. Reactor pressure control was established by manually operating one SRV then maintained using the Main Steam Line Drain Valves. RCIC and the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) were manually initiated to control reactor water level. The scram was reset, MSIVs were opened, and the Main Condenser was established as a heat sink. Reactor water level control was established with the Reactor Feedwater System and RCIC and HPCI were returned to standby readiness.

"At 0408 CDT on 6/9/10, a full scram signal was received when 2F Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) spiked momentarily followed by a spike on 2C IRM. The reactor was stable and operating in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. No ECCS or RCIC initiation set points were reached. No additional containment isolation signals or initiation set points were received. The cause of the 2C and 2F IRM spikes is under investigation.

"The scram event from critical is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The scram received at 0408 CST is reportable within 8 hours 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation,' and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

All rods fully inserted as a result of the first reactor scram. The plant is currently in a normal, post-trip electrical line-up. All SRVs did reseat. There was no impact to the other two units.

* * * UPDATE FROM BILL BAKER TO PETE SNYDER ON 6/10/10 AT 1749 EDT * * *

"Additional review of available data and inspection results revealed that Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) did not lift automatically during the scram. The only operations of SRVs were performed manually to control reactor pressure until the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were reopened. All other details described in the original event notification remain as stated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Nease).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HIGHER THAN EXPTECTED DOSE RATE

The following information was received from the State via e-mail:

"On July 16, 2010, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee that they had received notification from their dosimetry processor that an employee's badge had exceeded an annual exposure limit. The event was sent to the Nuclear Material Events Database on July 21, 2010. On July 23, 2010, the licensee reported that while conducting their investigation into the overexposure event, they found that an arrival survey conducted on June 9, 2010, exceeded the allowable limit for a type Yellow II package.

"The survey was on receipt of a package containing 494 milliCuries of Fluorine (F) - 18 and indicated that the package was reading 47 milliRem per hour at 1 meter. The dose rate on contact exceeded the measuring capabilities of their instrument. The Service Manager opened the package and found that a vial of F-18 had separated from its shielding. The vial was removed from the package by the Service Manager and taken to an appropriate storage location. A removable radioactive contamination survey was conducted on the package and found to be within the acceptable limits.

"The shipper has been notified of the event. This Agency will provide additional information as it is received."

Texas Incident #: I-8762