Event Notification Report for May 28, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/27/2010 - 05/28/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
45967459634596045961
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45967
Rep Org: NUCLETRON CORPORATION
Licensee: NUCLETRON CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: MARTINSBURG State: WV
County:
License #: 1928772-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA BENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: NUCLETRON CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: MARTINSBURG State: WV
County:
License #: 1928772-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DEBRA BENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 06/01/2010
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2010
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
LANCE ENGLISH (ILTA)
POTENTIALLY LOST SOURCE
On the afternoon of May 28, 2010, Nucletron Corporation (Columbia, Maryland) received a call from 21st Oncology Katin Radiation (Martinsburg, West Virginia) who received a phone call from QSA Global (Burlington, Massachusetts) saying they received a call from a GM plant located in the Martinsburg, West Virginia general area. The GM plant had mistakenly received a properly shielded radiation source from a common carrier. Because of an exception in the shipping paperwork, the shielded source was supposed to be shipped back to Katin Radiation.
The device is a Microselectron HDR Brachytherapy Afterloader: serial number #31836. The source is IR-192, 4.69 Ci, serial number D36C-1703.
The common carrier is investigating the driver's routing and logistics during the day of the event in order to track the source.
* * * UPDATE FROM DEBRA BENSEN TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/1/10 AT 1759 EDT * * *
Notified by the licensee that the source was located at a GM plant in the Martinsburg, West Virginia area. The common carrier picked up the source and delivered it to Katin Radiation at 1632 EDT. The source packaging was inspected and showed no evidence of damage or tampering.
Notified the R1DO (Dentel), FSME (Camper), and ILTAB (English).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Category 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 2" is different than the calculated value "Category 3"
On the afternoon of May 28, 2010, Nucletron Corporation (Columbia, Maryland) received a call from 21st Oncology Katin Radiation (Martinsburg, West Virginia) who received a phone call from QSA Global (Burlington, Massachusetts) saying they received a call from a GM plant located in the Martinsburg, West Virginia general area. The GM plant had mistakenly received a properly shielded radiation source from a common carrier. Because of an exception in the shipping paperwork, the shielded source was supposed to be shipped back to Katin Radiation.
The device is a Microselectron HDR Brachytherapy Afterloader: serial number #31836. The source is IR-192, 4.69 Ci, serial number D36C-1703.
The common carrier is investigating the driver's routing and logistics during the day of the event in order to track the source.
* * * UPDATE FROM DEBRA BENSEN TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/1/10 AT 1759 EDT * * *
Notified by the licensee that the source was located at a GM plant in the Martinsburg, West Virginia area. The common carrier picked up the source and delivered it to Katin Radiation at 1632 EDT. The source packaging was inspected and showed no evidence of damage or tampering.
Notified the R1DO (Dentel), FSME (Camper), and ILTAB (English).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Category 3 event.
Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 2" is different than the calculated value "Category 3"
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45963
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER GRAPES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: CHRISTOPHER GRAPES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 09:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 09:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL
A non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
A non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45960
Facility: NORTH ANNA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN SCOTT
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 03:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 00:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 03:43 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 00:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP
"A Unit-2 reactor trip was initiated by a loss of the Unit-2 'B' station service bus. The loss of the 'B' station service bus caused a reactor trip due to the loss of flow on one-of-three loops due to the loss of the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump. The Auxiliary Feed Water system actuated as expected due to the reactor trip. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 using the appropriate emergency procedure.
"During the transient, the 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer de-energized and the Unit-2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator was previously tagged out for planned maintenance. This resulted in the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus being de-energized. The alternate AC diesel generator has been placed in service and is providing power to the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus. The automatic tap changer for the 'C' reserve station service transformer did not work in automatic and had to be manually adjusted to control voltage. Unit-2 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump remains in service.
"All control rods fully inserted on the trip and no relief valves lifted or safety valves lifted in either the primary or secondary systems. The turbine drive and 'B' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pumps automatically started and injected into the 'A' and 'B' steam generators on a low level signal. The 'A' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pump failed to start due to the loss of the 'H' emergency bus. The 'C' steam generator is being controlled with main feed water though the 'C' main feed regulating valve bypass valve. Decay heat removal is via the condenser steam dumps.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1707 EDT ON 5/28/10 * * *
"EN#45960 reported the RPS Actuation (50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)) and AFW System Actuation (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The event occurred at 0003 EDT on May 28, 2010. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered at 0004 hours on May 28, 2010, for inoperable offsite power sources with the 2H emergency diesel generator (EDG) being inoperable per TS 3.8.1. M.
"Update: At the time of the event, the station was experiencing a severe lightning storm. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was returned to auto standby at 0558 hours. At approximately 0942 hours, RCS cooldown to Mode 4 was started on Unit 2. Mode 4 was entered at 1245 hours. The 'A' and 'B' RCPs remain secured in Mode 4. Following repairs and post maintenance testing the 'C' reserve station service transformer (RSST) was declared operable at 1324 hours. This restored two (2) qualified offsite circuits for Unit 1 and one (1) qualified offsite circuit for Unit 2. TS 3.0.3 was cleared at this time on Unit 2. The 'B' RSST remains out of service (OOS) pending repairs and testing. The Unit 2 'B' station service bus remains OOS.
"The 2H EDG previously reported OOS for scheduled maintenance is expected to be returned to service on Monday, May 31, 2010. The alternate AC diesel generator continues to supply power to the 2H emergency bus.
"Limiting action remains for one (1) offsite circuit for Unit 2 being inoperable along with the 2H EDG OOS."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag).
"A Unit-2 reactor trip was initiated by a loss of the Unit-2 'B' station service bus. The loss of the 'B' station service bus caused a reactor trip due to the loss of flow on one-of-three loops due to the loss of the 'B' Reactor Coolant Pump. The Auxiliary Feed Water system actuated as expected due to the reactor trip. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 using the appropriate emergency procedure.
"During the transient, the 'B' Reserve Station Service Transformer de-energized and the Unit-2 'H' Emergency Diesel Generator was previously tagged out for planned maintenance. This resulted in the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus being de-energized. The alternate AC diesel generator has been placed in service and is providing power to the Unit-2 'H' emergency bus. The automatic tap changer for the 'C' reserve station service transformer did not work in automatic and had to be manually adjusted to control voltage. Unit-2 'C' Reactor Coolant Pump remains in service.
"All control rods fully inserted on the trip and no relief valves lifted or safety valves lifted in either the primary or secondary systems. The turbine drive and 'B' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pumps automatically started and injected into the 'A' and 'B' steam generators on a low level signal. The 'A' motor driven Auxiliary Feed Water pump failed to start due to the loss of the 'H' emergency bus. The 'C' steam generator is being controlled with main feed water though the 'C' main feed regulating valve bypass valve. Decay heat removal is via the condenser steam dumps.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL WHALEN TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1707 EDT ON 5/28/10 * * *
"EN#45960 reported the RPS Actuation (50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)) and AFW System Actuation (50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The event occurred at 0003 EDT on May 28, 2010. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered at 0004 hours on May 28, 2010, for inoperable offsite power sources with the 2H emergency diesel generator (EDG) being inoperable per TS 3.8.1. M.
"Update: At the time of the event, the station was experiencing a severe lightning storm. The Auxiliary Feedwater System was returned to auto standby at 0558 hours. At approximately 0942 hours, RCS cooldown to Mode 4 was started on Unit 2. Mode 4 was entered at 1245 hours. The 'A' and 'B' RCPs remain secured in Mode 4. Following repairs and post maintenance testing the 'C' reserve station service transformer (RSST) was declared operable at 1324 hours. This restored two (2) qualified offsite circuits for Unit 1 and one (1) qualified offsite circuit for Unit 2. TS 3.0.3 was cleared at this time on Unit 2. The 'B' RSST remains out of service (OOS) pending repairs and testing. The Unit 2 'B' station service bus remains OOS.
"The 2H EDG previously reported OOS for scheduled maintenance is expected to be returned to service on Monday, May 31, 2010. The alternate AC diesel generator continues to supply power to the 2H emergency bus.
"Limiting action remains for one (1) offsite circuit for Unit 2 being inoperable along with the 2H EDG OOS."
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Haag).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45961
Rep Org: C&D TECHNOLOGIES INC
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES INC
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRIS TUFAROLO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: C&D TECHNOLOGIES INC
Region: 1
City: BLUE BELL State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KRIS TUFAROLO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/28/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/28/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
ROBERT HAAG (R2DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
POST CORROSION ON DCU BATTERIES
The following was received via fax:
C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) received a report from a non-domestic customer who is not a U.S. licensee concerning cracks in positive post seals in C&D 3DCU-9 batteries. As a precautionary measure, C&D has chosen to treat this customer's report in the same manner as if the report involved a defect claim by parties regarding matters subject to 10 CFR Part 21. This defect is believed to affect DCU product line batteries 3DCU-7, 2DCU-9, and 3DCU-9, manufactured in the period January 1993 through May 2008. These batteries are used in class 1E applications.
The facilities affected by this are DC Cook, Nine Mile Point, Grand Gulf, Susquehanna, Columbia, and Sequoyah.
The following was received via fax:
C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) received a report from a non-domestic customer who is not a U.S. licensee concerning cracks in positive post seals in C&D 3DCU-9 batteries. As a precautionary measure, C&D has chosen to treat this customer's report in the same manner as if the report involved a defect claim by parties regarding matters subject to 10 CFR Part 21. This defect is believed to affect DCU product line batteries 3DCU-7, 2DCU-9, and 3DCU-9, manufactured in the period January 1993 through May 2008. These batteries are used in class 1E applications.
The facilities affected by this are DC Cook, Nine Mile Point, Grand Gulf, Susquehanna, Columbia, and Sequoyah.