Event Notification Report for May 25, 2010

PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING FAILURE OF OIL-FILLED CAPACITOR

The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from Trentec dated July 6, 2010.

"Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:

"The basic component containing the defect is a Ronken oil filled capacitor with a rating of 70 micro Farad-660 VAC @ 60 Hz. The part number is P91D23706H05 with a 06-06 date code (manufactured in 2006). The capacitor is commercially dedicated by Trentec for use in safety related applications. The associated Trentec part number is 7T20701 with a 06-06 date code.

"Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:

"Trentec, Business Unit of Curtiss Wright Flow Control Corporation, 4600 East Tech Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45245

"Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:

"The defect pertains to 70 micro Farad capacitors that failed in the inverter circuitry for the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) for the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP). The failure of the capacitors was determined by an independent testing lab to be a manufacturing defect in which the internal spot-welded (no solder used) connection points on the capacitors were inadequate and resulted in poor/high resistance connection points which culminated in internal arcing at several of the connection points.

"The Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system for each unit consists of two motor driven pumps and one turbine driven pump. The TDAFWP UPS for each unit has an A and B section for system redundancy, with two 70 micro Farad capacitors used in each section. The capacitors currently installed in the Farley 1 TDAFWP UPS B section and Farley 2 TDAFWP UPS B section have the suspect date code (total of four).

"Given a loss of a TDAFWP UPS due to the capacitor failures, together with a single failure of one of the motor driven AFW pumps leaves the one remaining motor driven AFW pump to ensure the reactor coolant system is properly cooled via the steam generators during emergency conditions. However, two of the three AFW pumps are required to satisfy the flow demand for the most limiting associated design basis accidents and transients, i.e., feedwater line break, main steam line break, and loss of main feedwater. Accordingly, the flow demand is needed to mitigate the consequences of these events which can result in over pressurization of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and to prevent uncovering the reactor core and potential radiological releases. Additionally, credit for operation of the TDAFWP is needed for coping with a station blackout event during which the TDAFWP is the only source of AFW.

"The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:

"Farley Condition Report 2010107145 was written on May 25, 2010 to determine 10 CFR 21 reportability of the capacitor failures. Trentec Failure Evaluation Plan was written on 6/7/10. Trentec's capacitor evaluation and report was completed 6/30/10.

"In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:

"The Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitors with 06-06 date code have only been supplied to the Farley Plant on PO number QP070496 for a quantity of 8 each, shipped 5/11/2007 with Trentec tag number 7T20701.

"The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:

"Corrective actions have been scheduled for Farley Maintenance to replace the suspect 06-06 date code capacitors by July 30, 2010.

"Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

"Perform a failure analysis of any recently failed Trentec qualified Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitor to determine proper corrective action. Replace any Trentec qualified Ronken 70 micro Farad capacitor with a date code of 06-06. They should also be removed from stock to prevent their future use.

"In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred"

"Not applicable."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE

"Kentucky Department for Public Health Protection and Safety was notified on May 25, 2010, by the RSO for Hinkle Contracting Corporation that a radiological incident involving an accidental crushing of a density gauge occurred at Georgetown Municipal Airport 6206 Paris Pike, Georgetown, KY. Gauge was identified by [the RSO] as a Troxler 4640B Thin Layer Density Gauge. Troxler Gauge containing 9 milliCuries of Cs-137 had been crushed when an asphalt roller struck it. Based upon exposure rate measurements, visual verification, and review of Troxler 4640B specification data, it was determined by the [State of Kentucky] Radiation Health Branch that the radiation source had not been compromised."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FAILED LEAK TEST ON CS-137 SOURCE

The licensee gave verbal notification on 25 May 2010 of a leak tested Cs-137 (249.2 microcuries) source that failed. The vial source contained a removable amount of 0.287691 uCi. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control received a written report on 26 May 2010 from the licensee that the source has been taken out of service and identified. Previous leak test was fine, daily surveys have not shown any contamination to other hot lab surfaces or staff. The licensee will return damaged source to manufacturer. No further action will be taken on this incident.

The location of the incident is 1110 Lee Blvd Lehigh Acres, FL 33972.

The sealed source is a NASI, model # MED3550, serial # 12574.

Incident Report # FL10-069

60-DAY OPTIONAL REPORT FOR INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"At 1314 hours [EDT] on May 25, 2010, with the unit defueled during Refueling Outage 26, an inadvertent Safety Injection (SI) Signal occurred. The signal was received when Safeguards Train 'A' breaker DP-A-20 was closed during the performance of procedure PIC-020, 'Time Delay Relay Calibration Safeguards Train 'A'.' The SI Signal resulted in a containment phase 'A' isolation, containment ventilation isolation, control room ventilation transfer to emergency pressurization mode, and Radiation Monitors R-11 and R-12 (Containment Vessel Airborne Particulate and Gas Monitors) isolation. Emergency Bus 1 and Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' were under clearance, including the Train 'A' sequencer. Therefore, automatic loading of the 'A' Train Sequencer did not occur and no actual injection into the reactor vessel occurred. The affected systems actuated as expected.

"The cause of the inadvertent SI Signal resulted from SI Initiation Latching Relay SIA1 when power was restored to Safeguards Rack 51. Subsequent investigation determined the SIA1 relay was in an unexpected position (i.e., latched). The SIA1 relay likely became inadvertently latched while performing cable pulls in Safeguards Rack 51 for work associated with Water Cooled Condensing Unit 1A.

"Corrective actions include a revision to a procedure to address additional steps to require reset of SI Initiation Latching Relays SIA1 and SIA2 after cleaning and lubrication and development of a planning tool to better assess the risk associated with work being performed [on] plant equipment. In addition, a procedure will be developed for Operations to manually reset safeguards SI Initiation Latching Relays SIA1 and SIA2 prior to restoring system power. These actions are expected to be completed before or on December 16, 2010."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP

"During a normal plant power increase following a refueling outage on Unit 2, a reactor trip occurred at approximately 32% power. This reactor trip was the result of a turbine trip. The cause of the turbine trip is unknown at this time, however, a lock out trip occurred on the only running main feed water pump (21 main feedwater pump) at the time of the turbine and reactor trip. An investigation is ongoing.

"The reactor trip first actuated indication was a turbine trip. An automatic start of both Auxiliary Feed Water pumps occurred following the trip.

"The operating crew responded to the reactor trip utilizing emergency operating procedures for reactor trip and reactor trip recovery and transitioned into a normal shutdown procedure.

"All rods inserted as expected and all other systems operated as expected with the exception of a positive displacement charging pump that lifted a relief that failed to reclose."

The positive displacement pump relief valve stuck open and the pump was shut down which isolated the relief valve. Decay heat was initially being removed to the main condenser however, steam leak by was causing a plant cooldown therefore the Main Steam Isolation Valves were shut. Decay heat is being removed using the steam generator atmospheric relief valves. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.