Event Notification Report for May 21, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/20/2010 - 05/21/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
459494594245943459444595446014
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45949
Rep Org: NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Region: 4
City: WILLISTON State: ND
County: WILLIAM
License #: 33-46901-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN HARMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: WEATHERFORD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Region: 4
City: WILLISTON State: ND
County: WILLIAM
License #: 33-46901-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN HARMAN
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/24/2010
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2010
Notification Time: 12:05 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 13:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- CALIBRATION SOURCE NOT RETURNED TO ITS STORAGE HOLDER
The following information was received by e-mail:
"About 0930 Weatherford International, LTD. (ND Lic # 33-45901-01) reported that at about 1500, May 21, 2010, in Williston, Williams County, ND, a well logging tool was [returned to] the truck with the calibration source still in the tool. The calibration source is Cs-137, strength about 55.5 GBq. This error was discovered about 1500, May 21, 2010. The source, when in the tool is highly collimated, restricting significant potential dose to a limited volume. The dosimeter badges for those working in the vicinity of the truck and those in an adjacent office have been sent in to Landauer for analysis. Drawings and estimated doses will be forwarded to NRC as soon as received from Weatherford.
"ND Incident #: ND10003"
* * * UPDATE FROM NORTH DAKOTA (HARMAN) TO HUFFMAN (VIA E-MAIL) ON 6/15/10 * * *
The information below is a summary of a report provided from Weatherford to the State of North Dakota.
"On May 21, 2010, a 1.5 Ci [55.5 GBq] Cs-137 source was placed into a logging tool for calibrations. After calibrations were complete, the tool containing the source was placed into a logging truck and left for approximately 24 hours, potentially exposing two Well Logging Supervisors, one District Manager and one Well Logging Assistant.
"On May 22, 2010 at approximately 1400 (MDT), one of the Well Logging Supervisors, while trying to perform after [job] calibrations for the job which he had returned, noted high gamma ray background readings and, using a survey meter, began searching the area looking for a reason why the background readings were higher than normal. At approximately 1600 (MDT), he began searching the shop and noted that the readings as he approached logging truck were extremely high. He and the Well Logging Assistant removed the density logging tool from the wireline unit and found that the density source was still in the tool. At this point, the 1.5 Ci Cs-137 source had been in the tool loaded on logging truck for 24 hours.
"The facility employs twelve individuals, of which eight were not present at the facility during the period of 1600 on May 21, 2010 and 1600 May 22, 2010. On May 24, 2010, the dosimeters for the [two Well Logging Supervisors, the Well Logging Assistant,] one spare located in the office, one control and an employee's dosimeter, which was left on the desk, were sent to Landauer for analysis. It should be noted that one of the Well Logging Supervisors was not wearing his dosimeter during the incident.
"The incident was reconstructed and surveys were taken to aid in identifying the possibility of excess exposure to the District Manager and the Well Logging Supervisor that were not wearing dosimeters.
"The incident investigation uncovered many procedural issues including failure to document the removal of radioactive material (RAM) from storage (i.e., utilization records), failure to properly secure storage areas, failure to properly return RAM to storage and failure to establish a radiation area during calibration procedures. Because of not following proper procedures, [personnel actions were taken for one of the individuals involved]. [In addition], written corrective action has been given to one of the Well Logging Supervisors for not wearing a dosimeter while on duty and failure to notify management of an improperly secured storage area. All facility employees have been given a verbal corrective action on radiation procedures.
"Although there were many procedural violations, after analysis of the dosimeters and incident reconstruction surveys, Weatherford has no reason to believe an overexposure incident has taken place. "
Based on event reconstruction and available dosimeter readings, it is believed that none of the four employees exposed by this event received in excess of 18 mRem total effective dose equivalent.
R4DO (Powers) and FSME EO (Watson) notified.
The following information was received by e-mail:
"About 0930 Weatherford International, LTD. (ND Lic # 33-45901-01) reported that at about 1500, May 21, 2010, in Williston, Williams County, ND, a well logging tool was [returned to] the truck with the calibration source still in the tool. The calibration source is Cs-137, strength about 55.5 GBq. This error was discovered about 1500, May 21, 2010. The source, when in the tool is highly collimated, restricting significant potential dose to a limited volume. The dosimeter badges for those working in the vicinity of the truck and those in an adjacent office have been sent in to Landauer for analysis. Drawings and estimated doses will be forwarded to NRC as soon as received from Weatherford.
"ND Incident #: ND10003"
* * * UPDATE FROM NORTH DAKOTA (HARMAN) TO HUFFMAN (VIA E-MAIL) ON 6/15/10 * * *
The information below is a summary of a report provided from Weatherford to the State of North Dakota.
"On May 21, 2010, a 1.5 Ci [55.5 GBq] Cs-137 source was placed into a logging tool for calibrations. After calibrations were complete, the tool containing the source was placed into a logging truck and left for approximately 24 hours, potentially exposing two Well Logging Supervisors, one District Manager and one Well Logging Assistant.
"On May 22, 2010 at approximately 1400 (MDT), one of the Well Logging Supervisors, while trying to perform after [job] calibrations for the job which he had returned, noted high gamma ray background readings and, using a survey meter, began searching the area looking for a reason why the background readings were higher than normal. At approximately 1600 (MDT), he began searching the shop and noted that the readings as he approached logging truck were extremely high. He and the Well Logging Assistant removed the density logging tool from the wireline unit and found that the density source was still in the tool. At this point, the 1.5 Ci Cs-137 source had been in the tool loaded on logging truck for 24 hours.
"The facility employs twelve individuals, of which eight were not present at the facility during the period of 1600 on May 21, 2010 and 1600 May 22, 2010. On May 24, 2010, the dosimeters for the [two Well Logging Supervisors, the Well Logging Assistant,] one spare located in the office, one control and an employee's dosimeter, which was left on the desk, were sent to Landauer for analysis. It should be noted that one of the Well Logging Supervisors was not wearing his dosimeter during the incident.
"The incident was reconstructed and surveys were taken to aid in identifying the possibility of excess exposure to the District Manager and the Well Logging Supervisor that were not wearing dosimeters.
"The incident investigation uncovered many procedural issues including failure to document the removal of radioactive material (RAM) from storage (i.e., utilization records), failure to properly secure storage areas, failure to properly return RAM to storage and failure to establish a radiation area during calibration procedures. Because of not following proper procedures, [personnel actions were taken for one of the individuals involved]. [In addition], written corrective action has been given to one of the Well Logging Supervisors for not wearing a dosimeter while on duty and failure to notify management of an improperly secured storage area. All facility employees have been given a verbal corrective action on radiation procedures.
"Although there were many procedural violations, after analysis of the dosimeters and incident reconstruction surveys, Weatherford has no reason to believe an overexposure incident has taken place. "
Based on event reconstruction and available dosimeter readings, it is believed that none of the four employees exposed by this event received in excess of 18 mRem total effective dose equivalent.
R4DO (Powers) and FSME EO (Watson) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45942
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: DIAMOND SHAMROCK REFINING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: THREE RIVERS State: TX
County:
License #: 03699
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: DIAMOND SHAMROCK REFINING COMPANY
Region: 4
City: THREE RIVERS State: TX
County:
License #: 03699
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 12:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON RONAN GAUGE
The following report was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:
"On May 21, 2010, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that while conducting a routine inspection of a Ronan Engineering model SA1-F37 nuclear gauge, the shutter failed to close. The gauge was installed in 1991 and contained a 20 millicurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 Source. The licensee conducted a radiation survey in the area of the gauge and found the dose rates to be normal. Open is the normal operating condition for the gauge therefore there is no additional exposure risk to their workers. The vessel the gauge is associated with has been posted to warn workers hat the shutter is not functioning properly. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to schedule the repair. The licensee stated that the repair should be completed within the next 60 days."
Texas Incident Number I-8746
The following report was received from the State of Texas via e-mail:
"On May 21, 2010, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that while conducting a routine inspection of a Ronan Engineering model SA1-F37 nuclear gauge, the shutter failed to close. The gauge was installed in 1991 and contained a 20 millicurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 Source. The licensee conducted a radiation survey in the area of the gauge and found the dose rates to be normal. Open is the normal operating condition for the gauge therefore there is no additional exposure risk to their workers. The vessel the gauge is associated with has been posted to warn workers hat the shutter is not functioning properly. The licensee has contacted the manufacturer to schedule the repair. The licensee stated that the repair should be completed within the next 60 days."
Texas Incident Number I-8746
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45943
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEE KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEE KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 13:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 13:20 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4DO)
GREG PICK (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
"On May 19, 2010, at approximately 1730 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) was notified that scrap bushings from breakers in the Unit 2 switchyard had alarmed a radiation monitor at a metal recycling facility in Los Angeles County. The metal recycling vendor (Alpert and Alpert) shipped the bushings back to a Southern California Edison (SCE) facility in Orange County. On May 21, 2010, SONGS completed isotopic analysis of a sample of ceramic shards from six randomly selected bushings. The analysis confirms the presence of naturally occurring radionuclides (uranium and thorium series), but does not indicate the presence of licensed radioactive material.
"On May 21, 2010, at approximately 1320 PDT, SONGS confirmed that on May 19, 2010, the metal recycling vendor had called the Brea branch of the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (Andrew Taylor) to obtain a special permit authorizing the return shipment to SCE. SONGS is, therefore, reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event related to the health and safety of the public for which notification to another government agency has been made.
"At the time of this report, both Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at 100 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report. "
"On May 19, 2010, at approximately 1730 PDT, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) was notified that scrap bushings from breakers in the Unit 2 switchyard had alarmed a radiation monitor at a metal recycling facility in Los Angeles County. The metal recycling vendor (Alpert and Alpert) shipped the bushings back to a Southern California Edison (SCE) facility in Orange County. On May 21, 2010, SONGS completed isotopic analysis of a sample of ceramic shards from six randomly selected bushings. The analysis confirms the presence of naturally occurring radionuclides (uranium and thorium series), but does not indicate the presence of licensed radioactive material.
"On May 21, 2010, at approximately 1320 PDT, SONGS confirmed that on May 19, 2010, the metal recycling vendor had called the Brea branch of the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch (Andrew Taylor) to obtain a special permit authorizing the return shipment to SCE. SONGS is, therefore, reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event related to the health and safety of the public for which notification to another government agency has been made.
"At the time of this report, both Unit 2 and Unit 3 were operating at 100 percent power.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this occurrence and will be provided with a copy of this report. "
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45944
Facility: WATTS BAR
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES DANIEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: WES DANIEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 19:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 22:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 19:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP
"At 1937 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip due to a turbine trip. This caused an automatic AFW Pump start from P-4 coincident with Lo Tave signal. The cause of the turbine trip has not yet been identified, and is under investigation.
"The plant is stable and is being maintained in Mode 3, at normal operating pressure and temperature, with steam generator and pressurizer levels normal.
"Plant systems responded to return the plant to a stable condition without complication, and all systems performed as expected with one exception:
"The 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Backpressure Control Valve failed closed, but the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump provided sufficient feedwater so that all Steam Generators were provided sufficient feedwater to maintain cooling and normal steam generator level.
"Plans for plant restart are pending awaiting the cause investigation.
"All control rods inserted into the core. Plant decay heat removal is through the steam dumps to the main condenser. Offsite power is available and lined up to plant system loads.
"Watts Bar [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"At 1937 Eastern Daylight Saving Time (EDT), Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 experienced a reactor trip due to a turbine trip. This caused an automatic AFW Pump start from P-4 coincident with Lo Tave signal. The cause of the turbine trip has not yet been identified, and is under investigation.
"The plant is stable and is being maintained in Mode 3, at normal operating pressure and temperature, with steam generator and pressurizer levels normal.
"Plant systems responded to return the plant to a stable condition without complication, and all systems performed as expected with one exception:
"The 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Backpressure Control Valve failed closed, but the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump provided sufficient feedwater so that all Steam Generators were provided sufficient feedwater to maintain cooling and normal steam generator level.
"Plans for plant restart are pending awaiting the cause investigation.
"All control rods inserted into the core. Plant decay heat removal is through the steam dumps to the main condenser. Offsite power is available and lined up to plant system loads.
"Watts Bar [NRC] Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45954
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: MIDLAND State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: MIDLAND State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE FOUND IN SCRAP METAL
The following information was received by fax:
"On Friday May 21, 2010 radiation detectors alarmed due to a device containing 200 mCi of Americium [Am]-241 detected at the ATI [Allegheny Technologies Incorporated] Midland [Pennsylvania] facility prior to a charge being loaded into the furnace. On Monday May 24, 2010 an employee from Allegheny Raw Materials (ARM) saw part of a radiation symbol in the off-loaded metal scrap and contacted AHP [Applied Health Physics] when they got high radiation level readings. The scrap metal had passed thru two sets of radiation detection monitors prior to being detected by a rail detection system. When AHP responded, production was stopped at ATI (which uses an electric arc furnace), and AHP checked the three charge buckets, and other areas. The Am-241 gauge was reading about 150 mR/hr on contact. The manufacturer of the device is NDC systems, serial # 295. The device was sold to Magla Corp (NC) [in] January of 1976.
"The device [is] onsite and has been wrapped in lead by AHP. AHP and ATI have labeled the device with a 'caution radioactive material' sign and stored it in a secured room with two chains and two locks."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA100007
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received by fax:
"On Friday May 21, 2010 radiation detectors alarmed due to a device containing 200 mCi of Americium [Am]-241 detected at the ATI [Allegheny Technologies Incorporated] Midland [Pennsylvania] facility prior to a charge being loaded into the furnace. On Monday May 24, 2010 an employee from Allegheny Raw Materials (ARM) saw part of a radiation symbol in the off-loaded metal scrap and contacted AHP [Applied Health Physics] when they got high radiation level readings. The scrap metal had passed thru two sets of radiation detection monitors prior to being detected by a rail detection system. When AHP responded, production was stopped at ATI (which uses an electric arc furnace), and AHP checked the three charge buckets, and other areas. The Am-241 gauge was reading about 150 mR/hr on contact. The manufacturer of the device is NDC systems, serial # 295. The device was sold to Magla Corp (NC) [in] January of 1976.
"The device [is] onsite and has been wrapped in lead by AHP. AHP and ATI have labeled the device with a 'caution radioactive material' sign and stored it in a secured room with two chains and two locks."
Pennsylvania Event Report ID No: PA100007
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
General Information or Other
Event Number: 46014
Rep Org: TYCO ELECTRONICS
Licensee: TYCO ELECTRONICS
Region: 1
City: ASHEVILLE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT DAUBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: TYCO ELECTRONICS
Region: 1
City: ASHEVILLE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT DAUBERT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 06/16/2010
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2010
Notification Time: 15:30 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/16/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
PART 21 E-MAIL GROUP
TYCO ELECTRONIC RELAY RECALL
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from Tyco electronics:
"During normal assembly processing of nuclear E7000 relays, Tyco Electronics experienced an issue with a component. A retainer ring on the spindle assembly was found to have a hydrogen embrittlement issue that may fracture at some point in this products' life cycle. Further investigation revealed this condition is limited to one specific lot of retainer rings.
"Tyco purged this lot of retainer rings from their inventory and all 'work in process'. Tyco is able to account for all the retainer rings in this lot. Tyco's records indicate that some relays shipped to the [facilities listed below] were made using this specific retainer ring lot.
"Because the retainer ring did not meet stated requirements, Tyco is recalling the specific relays for replacement. Note that only the specific lot numbers listed [below] are affected by this recall. All other lots should function as intended.
"Item supplied are E7000 relays with serial numbers beginning with 1019. Certificates of Conformance stating exact relay description and serial numbers were sent to affected customers with Tyco's June 16, 2010 notification.
Tyco sold this safety-related item for specified and unspecified applications to the customers listed below:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Jenkinsville, SC 3 Relays
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Indian Point Energy Center Buchanan, NY 2 Relays
Exelon Generation Company/Braidwood Braidwood, IL 2 Relays
Trentec Curtis-Wright Flow Control Cincinnati, OH 1 Relay
Ergytech Houston, TX 1 Relay
Entergy Operations Inc. (Arkansas) Russellville, AR 1 Relay
The information below is a summary of a report received via facsimile from Tyco electronics:
"During normal assembly processing of nuclear E7000 relays, Tyco Electronics experienced an issue with a component. A retainer ring on the spindle assembly was found to have a hydrogen embrittlement issue that may fracture at some point in this products' life cycle. Further investigation revealed this condition is limited to one specific lot of retainer rings.
"Tyco purged this lot of retainer rings from their inventory and all 'work in process'. Tyco is able to account for all the retainer rings in this lot. Tyco's records indicate that some relays shipped to the [facilities listed below] were made using this specific retainer ring lot.
"Because the retainer ring did not meet stated requirements, Tyco is recalling the specific relays for replacement. Note that only the specific lot numbers listed [below] are affected by this recall. All other lots should function as intended.
"Item supplied are E7000 relays with serial numbers beginning with 1019. Certificates of Conformance stating exact relay description and serial numbers were sent to affected customers with Tyco's June 16, 2010 notification.
Tyco sold this safety-related item for specified and unspecified applications to the customers listed below:
South Carolina Electric & Gas Jenkinsville, SC 3 Relays
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Indian Point Energy Center Buchanan, NY 2 Relays
Exelon Generation Company/Braidwood Braidwood, IL 2 Relays
Trentec Curtis-Wright Flow Control Cincinnati, OH 1 Relay
Ergytech Houston, TX 1 Relay
Entergy Operations Inc. (Arkansas) Russellville, AR 1 Relay