Event Notification Report for May 19, 2010

POTENTIALLY TOXIC ATMOSPHERE IN AN ACCESS FACILIITY

"At 1315 hours personnel performing repairs to an air conditioning system inside the Access Facility (AF) reported a Freon leak from a valve packing failure. All personnel were evacuated from the building. Radiation protection personnel entered the building and atmospheric sampling commenced. Sample results indicated a potentially toxic atmosphere in portions of the AF, and at 1330 hours an Emergency Plan Unusual Event was declared on EAL HU7, 'Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Security.'

"The AF was locked down and plant access and egress have been halted pending the restoration of AF atmosphere. Required security compensatory measures are in place.

"The Freon completely discharged from the affected air conditioner through the leak. Actions to establish a habitable atmosphere inside the AF continue.

"Units 1 and 2 are unaffected by this event and continue to operate at full power."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MARK BRIDGES TO PETE SNYDER AT 1551 ON 5/19/2010 * * *

"A habitable atmosphere has been re-established and conditions no longer meet an emergency action level. The Unusual Event was terminated at 1438 CDT on 5/19/2010."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Cameron), IRD (Gott), NRR (Ruland), DHS (Vestal), and FEMA (Barden).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER

"On May 19, 2010 at 1620 CDT the agency [State of Texas] received a phone call from the licensee. The licensee stated that shutter on a fixed gauge had stuck at approximately 1700 CDT on May 18, 2010. The gauge houses a 50 milliCurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 source. The licensee stated that shutter failed in the open position, the normal operating position for the gauge, and that exposure rates in the area were normal. The gauge is located high above the ground, on the side of a water tank. The licensee stated that they had contacted the manufacturer and have scheduled a repair of the gauge within the next 30 days. The licensee stated that they were going to continue to use the gauge, as it was in its normal operating state. The agency reminded the licensee that their license specifically states that they are to take the gauge out of operation if it is in need of repair, and should they continue to use the gauge, they would need to request an exemption from the agency. The licensee agreed to request the exemption so that they would not be in violation of their license."

The gauge is a Ronan Gauge S/N 936GG.

Texas I - 8743

BOTH TRAINS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) INOPERABLE

"On 5/19/2010 at 1209 CDT, Unit 2 entered Mode 4 from Mode 5 and started realigning RHR from a shutdown cooling to an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) lineup. During this transition, the suction check valves for the RHR pump are tested for safety function closed per the In-service testing program . The valves are closed to provide train separation for the RHR trains and to prevent diversion of flow from suction sources.

"On 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT, both Unit 2 trains of RHR were declared inoperable due to the failure of the pump suction line check valve for each RHR pump (2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2) to meet In-Service Testing (IST) acceptance criteria. Technical Specification 3.5.2 Condition A was entered for inoperability of the one required ECCS train (RHR) in Mode 4 with Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cold leg temperatures above safety injection pump disable temperature.

"On 5/19/2010 at 1640 CDT, both RHR pit sump covers were opened to facilitate multiple entries into each sump while performing a revised test procedure to verify the operability of check valves 2RH-3-1 and 2RH-3-2. The pit sump covers are required to be closed in [Modes 1 through 4] for each operable RHR train. Since both trains of RHR were inoperable both covers were opened.

"On 5/19/2010 at 1947 CDT the pit sump cover was closed for one train of RHR.

"On 5/19/2010 at 2005 CDT the revised test procedure was approved and completed satisfactorily. The train of RHR with the pit sump cover closed was declared operable and Technical Specification 3.5.3 Condition A was exited. Both suction check valves passed the closed safety function and a loss of safety function did not occur as originally thought on 5/19/2010 at 1228 CDT.

"On 5/19/2010 from 1640 CDT to 1947 CDT both trains of RHR were inoperable due to both pit sump covers open on both RHR trains. The inoperability of both trains of RHR represents a condition that prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structure or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE (RETRACTION) FROM STEVEN INGALLS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1654 EDT ON 7/16/10 * * *

"The purpose of this report is to retract the ENS report made on May 20, 2010 at 0124 hours [ET] (ENS #45937) under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The pump suction line check valve for each Unit 2 RHR pump failed to meet acceptance criteria per the in-service testing program. A revised test was performed which demonstrated that the check valves could perform their safety function. The RHR pit covers were removed to facilitate this test. After test completion, it was identified that both trains of RHR were inoperable due to both pit covers being open. However, subsequent review has determined that the condition where pit covers were open did not impair the ability of the RHR system to meet its safety function. Also, there was not a loss of safety function due to the check valve testing issue. Thus, there was no safety system function failure of the RHR system.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R3DO (Dickson)