Event Notification Report for May 17, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/16/2010 - 05/17/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45931
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KASTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB KASTNER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/17/2010
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 10:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2010
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 10:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 17 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"System Affected: RPS actuation and reactor trip. Actuation Initiation Signals: AFW auto initiation. Cause: Low level 'C' steam generator. Effect of event on Plant: Reactor and turbine trip. Actions taken or Planned: Standard post trip actions. Additional information: Plant stabilized at NOP/NOT."
The licensee experienced a feedwater transient which initiated the event. All safety systems are available. All control rods fully inserted. The electrical lineup is normal. The decay heat path is through the condenser steam dumps. There were no relief valve or safety valve lifted during the transient. Primary plant temperature is 555 degrees Fahrenheit, and primary plant pressure is 2250 psig. The licensee is investigating the cause of the feed transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Waterford Dispatch, and the State Department of Environmental Protection,
"System Affected: RPS actuation and reactor trip. Actuation Initiation Signals: AFW auto initiation. Cause: Low level 'C' steam generator. Effect of event on Plant: Reactor and turbine trip. Actions taken or Planned: Standard post trip actions. Additional information: Plant stabilized at NOP/NOT."
The licensee experienced a feedwater transient which initiated the event. All safety systems are available. All control rods fully inserted. The electrical lineup is normal. The decay heat path is through the condenser steam dumps. There were no relief valve or safety valve lifted during the transient. Primary plant temperature is 555 degrees Fahrenheit, and primary plant pressure is 2250 psig. The licensee is investigating the cause of the feed transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Waterford Dispatch, and the State Department of Environmental Protection,
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45932
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: PB AMERICAS INC.
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3976-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: PB AMERICAS INC.
Region: 1
City: TAMPA State: FL
County:
License #: 3976-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/17/2010
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2010
Notification Time: 10:20 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
MARIE MILLER (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
ILTAB (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGES
"[The State of Florida] received a report from the company's RSO at 0945 that three soil moisture density gauges and cases were stolen. [A] Conex box at [the] site was locked and broken into. All three gauges were chained and locked to [the] interior of [the] Conex box. All three locks were broken. [The] cases were locked with the gauges inside when stored. [The] owner still has keys to the cases and gauges. [The] licensee will offer a reward. Local police have been notified and [the] licensee is currently awaiting their arrival."
All three stolen gauges were Troxler Model 3430, Serial Numbers 31318, 25778, and 19575. Each gauge contained a 40 mCi AmBe source and a 8 mCi Cs-137 source.
FL:10-067
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
"[The State of Florida] received a report from the company's RSO at 0945 that three soil moisture density gauges and cases were stolen. [A] Conex box at [the] site was locked and broken into. All three gauges were chained and locked to [the] interior of [the] Conex box. All three locks were broken. [The] cases were locked with the gauges inside when stored. [The] owner still has keys to the cases and gauges. [The] licensee will offer a reward. Local police have been notified and [the] licensee is currently awaiting their arrival."
All three stolen gauges were Troxler Model 3430, Serial Numbers 31318, 25778, and 19575. Each gauge contained a 40 mCi AmBe source and a 8 mCi Cs-137 source.
FL:10-067
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46070
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/06/2010
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2010
Notification Time: 11:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/17/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60 DAY REPORT - INVALID ACTUATION OF HPCI AND RCIC SYSTEMS
"Invalid Primary Containment And Vessel Isolation Control System (PCIS) signal results in partial actuation of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components:
"The following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) systems. NUREG-1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"On May 17, 2010, during the Refueling Outage 28 ECCS test control room personnel identified the reactor vessel level was lowering. Valves HPCI-15 and 16 automatically isolated due to an invalid high steam flow isolation signal. The control room personnel immediately started both control rod drive (CRD) pumps as required by procedure. It was determined that the lowering of reactor vessel level was due to water flowing down the HPCI system and RCIC system turbine steam supply lines. The RCIC-15 valve was manually isolated terminating the event. At this time one CRD pump was secured. Acceptable water level in the reactor vessel was maintained throughout the event. The condition has been entered into the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Corrective Action Program for evaluation and implementation of corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
"The high steam flow isolation signal is considered invalid because: 1) At the time of the event, the unit mode switch was in a mode where PCIS was not required; 2) No steam was being generated; and 3) The water flow past differential pressure instrument generated a false high steam flow signal.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that as a result of an invalid initiation signal resulted in the actuation of one or more of the systems listed in paragraph 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Invalid Primary Containment And Vessel Isolation Control System (PCIS) signal results in partial actuation of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components:
"The following information is provided as a sixty (60) day telephone notification to the NRC in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of the submittal of a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation coolant (RCIC) systems. NUREG-1022, Revision 2, identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"On May 17, 2010, during the Refueling Outage 28 ECCS test control room personnel identified the reactor vessel level was lowering. Valves HPCI-15 and 16 automatically isolated due to an invalid high steam flow isolation signal. The control room personnel immediately started both control rod drive (CRD) pumps as required by procedure. It was determined that the lowering of reactor vessel level was due to water flowing down the HPCI system and RCIC system turbine steam supply lines. The RCIC-15 valve was manually isolated terminating the event. At this time one CRD pump was secured. Acceptable water level in the reactor vessel was maintained throughout the event. The condition has been entered into the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Corrective Action Program for evaluation and implementation of corrective actions to preclude recurrence.
"The high steam flow isolation signal is considered invalid because: 1) At the time of the event, the unit mode switch was in a mode where PCIS was not required; 2) No steam was being generated; and 3) The water flow past differential pressure instrument generated a false high steam flow signal.
"The event is being reported in accordance with 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event or condition that as a result of an invalid initiation signal resulted in the actuation of one or more of the systems listed in paragraph 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(B)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.