Event Notification Report for May 14, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/13/2010 - 05/14/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
45928459294593045955
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45928
Rep Org: OK DEQ RAD MANAGEMENT
Licensee: AMERICAN AIRLINES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: AMERICAN AIRLINES
Region: 4
City: TULSA State: OK
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BRODERICK
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 16:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 16:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
VIVIAN CAMPBELL (R4DO)
KEITH McCONNELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TRITIUM EXIT SIGN
The following was received from the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:
"On May 14, 2010, Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) received telephone notification from American Airlines Maintenance and Engineering Center (AA) that they had lost one (1) tritium (H-3) radioluminescent exit sign containing a maximum total of 3.5 Ci of H-3. At this time, no further information is available; however, updates will be made to NMED as ODEQ receives updates from AA."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
The following was received from the State of Oklahoma via e-mail:
"On May 14, 2010, Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ) received telephone notification from American Airlines Maintenance and Engineering Center (AA) that they had lost one (1) tritium (H-3) radioluminescent exit sign containing a maximum total of 3.5 Ci of H-3. At this time, no further information is available; however, updates will be made to NMED as ODEQ receives updates from AA."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www.pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45929
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HAAF
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS HAAF
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/14/2010
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2010
Notification Time: 17:56 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER NONFUNCTIONAL
"At 1530 on May 14th, 2010, Three Mile Islands Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation, filtration and climate control system was identified as nonfunctional. Site emergency implementation procedures provide direction for performance of TSC functions in alternate locations. This failure affects the ability of the TSC ventilation to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. This condition is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GOLDMAN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1934 ON 5/18/10 * * *
The TSC ventilation system has been repaired and is fully functional as of 1100 on May 15, 2010.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R1DO(Miller).
"At 1530 on May 14th, 2010, Three Mile Islands Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation, filtration and climate control system was identified as nonfunctional. Site emergency implementation procedures provide direction for performance of TSC functions in alternate locations. This failure affects the ability of the TSC ventilation to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this emergent condition. This condition is considered a major loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JEFF GOLDMAN TO JOE O'HARA AT 1934 ON 5/18/10 * * *
The TSC ventilation system has been repaired and is fully functional as of 1100 on May 15, 2010.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R1DO(Miller).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45930
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/15/2010
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 23:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2010
Notification Time: 01:17 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 23:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO INCREASING REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"At approximately 2301 hours EDT on May 14, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One reactor scrammed while performing a condensate pump trip test. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +51 inches and rising. The main turbine tripped due to high reactor water level. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -30 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew restored reactor water level to the normal operating band using RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur."
The licensee was performing testing on the digital feedwater control system which was installed during their recent refueling outage when the loss of level control occurred. It appears that the control system did not respond fast enough to control water level. This resulted in the reactor operator inserting a manual scram at +51 inches prior to reaching the reactor automatic scram setpoint of +54 inches for water level.
Currently, the plant is removing decay heat via main steam line drains to the condenser. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee has notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
"At approximately 2301 hours EDT on May 14, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit One reactor scrammed while performing a condensate pump trip test. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +51 inches and rising. The main turbine tripped due to high reactor water level. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to -30 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew restored reactor water level to the normal operating band using RCIC [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] and subsequently the feedwater system. All isolations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected.
"The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the shutdown is underway. Unit Two continued power operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur."
The licensee was performing testing on the digital feedwater control system which was installed during their recent refueling outage when the loss of level control occurred. It appears that the control system did not respond fast enough to control water level. This resulted in the reactor operator inserting a manual scram at +51 inches prior to reaching the reactor automatic scram setpoint of +54 inches for water level.
Currently, the plant is removing decay heat via main steam line drains to the condenser. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup with all safety equipment available. The licensee has notified the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45955
Rep Org: PA BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: HARSCO METALS AMERICAS
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0038
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: HARSCO METALS AMERICAS
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TOWNSHIP State: PA
County:
License #: PA-G0038
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ALLARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010
Notification Time: 18:37 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
CHRISTEPHER MCKENNEY (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ALLOY ANALYZER SHUTTER FAILURE
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: A letter from the Radiation Safety Officer dated May 17, 2010 was received May 21, 2010 by the Department of Environmental Protection explaining the event. Note: an initial review of the letter by PaDEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] and NRC Region I noted this was a 30-day NMED reporting [only] per 10CFR30.5(c)(5), but upon further review of 10CFR31.2 and 30.5(b)(2)(ii), it was concluded this event is a 24-hr report.
"Event Description: On May 14, 2010, Harsco Metals identified a failure of the shutter mechanism on a generally licensed portable alloy analyzer during the semi-annual test. The analyzer was a Niton model XLp818 (ser# 6500) with approximately 30 mCi (1.11 GBq) of Americium-241. A licensed contractor attempted to provide a radiation exposure survey and found the device could be operated without utilizing the [trigger switch] safety mechanism. No individuals were in contact with or exposed to the direct beam during this procedure.
"Cause of the Event: Equipment failure
"Actions: The device has been taken out of service and Harsco Metals will contact the device manufacturer for instruction on returning the instrument for repair or replacement. PaDEP considers this a closed incident at this time."
Event Report ID No: PA100006
The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax:
"Notifications: A letter from the Radiation Safety Officer dated May 17, 2010 was received May 21, 2010 by the Department of Environmental Protection explaining the event. Note: an initial review of the letter by PaDEP [Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection] and NRC Region I noted this was a 30-day NMED reporting [only] per 10CFR30.5(c)(5), but upon further review of 10CFR31.2 and 30.5(b)(2)(ii), it was concluded this event is a 24-hr report.
"Event Description: On May 14, 2010, Harsco Metals identified a failure of the shutter mechanism on a generally licensed portable alloy analyzer during the semi-annual test. The analyzer was a Niton model XLp818 (ser# 6500) with approximately 30 mCi (1.11 GBq) of Americium-241. A licensed contractor attempted to provide a radiation exposure survey and found the device could be operated without utilizing the [trigger switch] safety mechanism. No individuals were in contact with or exposed to the direct beam during this procedure.
"Cause of the Event: Equipment failure
"Actions: The device has been taken out of service and Harsco Metals will contact the device manufacturer for instruction on returning the instrument for repair or replacement. PaDEP considers this a closed incident at this time."
Event Report ID No: PA100006