Event Notification Report for April 30, 2010

SOURCE HOLDER MALFUNCTION

On Friday, April 30, 2010, at approximately 1200 EDT, while replacing sources in a Gamma-Metrics Model 2000 Bulk Material Analyzer, it was discovered that the right side source holder had dropped three Cf-252 sources back into the stored and shielded position. Two of the three sources have been recovered, but one remains in the body of the instrument inside the safe and shielded compartment. Exposure rate measurements have been taken and no exposure or safety hazards exist. Efforts to retrieve the remaining source will continue on May 6, 2010.

Each Cf-252 source is 0.8 micrograms, which is approximately 4.3 mCi in activity.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SHIPPING CONTAINER IDENTIFIED AFTER SHIPMENT

Energy Solutions notified the State of Tennessee about a shipping container that was found leaking radioactively contaminated liquid at their site. The container was part of a shipment of two containers containing radwaste shipped to Energy Solutions from Areva in Lynchburg, VA. After the shipment arrived onsite the containers were stored on a slope in a holding area for about fourteen hours.

The State dispatched people to the site who conducted surveys. When the shipping container was opened a bag of freestanding liquid was found near the doors of the container inside. The liquid was surveyed and determined to contain Co-60 and Cs-137. Cs-137 was not manifested on the shipping manifest. The liquid's consistency was described as semi-viscous similar to hydraulic fluid.

The State surveyed the area from where the containers came into the site gate to the area where they were stored with floor monitors and did not find radioactive contamination. The trailer and surrounding area were also surveyed with no contamination found.

Tennessee contacted Areva - Lynchburg and was told that the shipping container that contained the leaking bag was stored for a long period of time on top of the other shipping container at Lynchburg. Tennessee representatives surveyed the top of the other shipping container but again no radioactive contamination was found.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BILLY FREEMAN TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1354 ON 5/3/10 * * *

The State Radiation Health Department, upon consultation with Regional NRC representatives, has determined that this event does not meet the notification requirements of SA-300 and is retracting the event.

Notified R1DO (Cook), FSME DEO (McIntosh), NMSS EO (McCartin) and R2DO (Musser).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided this information via email:

"On April 30, 2010, at 1750 hours, the Agency [State] received a report from the licensee stating that a Troxler moisture/density gauge (Model 3430 - Serial # 31489) was missing from a construction site at 6185 Retail Road in Dallas, Texas. The gauge contains an 8 milliCuries Cesium (Cs) - 137 source serial # 750-6245, and a 40 milliCuries Americium - 241/Beryllium (Am\Be) source serial # 47- 5598.

"The license reported that the gauge user (worker) had used the gauge earlier in the day and had secured and locked it in their storage trailer at the site around 1300. The worker left the site around 1400 for his lunch break. The worker returned to the site around 1500, and around 1630 he returned to the storage trailer. At that time, he discovered the trailer lock and gauge were missing. The worker informed the Apex Project manager and the company service manager. The worker was instructed to conduct a thorough site search and contact all of their personnel with access to the site to see if they could determine the location of the gauge. After a thorough search and numerous telephone calls to various Apex personnel to make sure the gauge in fact was missing and not inadvertently picked up by another employee, the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer, Apex President, and this Agency was contacted to report the gauge missing.

"The licensee speculates that the gauge was stolen. They are not aware of any former employees who left under bad circumstances and would have reason to take the gauge as a prank or as a vehicle for reprisal against them. The licensee has spoken to others at the site and does not believe any one at the site is in possession of the gauge.

"The licensee has stated that they are considering a reward for the gauges' return."

Texas Incident Report # I-8738

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

LIGHT SOCKET SHORT CAUSES ISOLATION SYSTEMS TO ACTUATE

"At 1648 CDT, while the Control Bay AUO [Auxiliary Unit Operator] was attempting to change a light bulb for 1-IL-99-1AA, 1A [Reactor Protection System] RPS [Motor Generator] MG Set available light, the light socket shorted causing the loss of 1A RPS. The loss of 1A RPS resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiated Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. All systems responded as designed. The Control Room operators entered the appropriate abnormal operating instruction, 1-AOI-99-1, to restore the affected systems. Operations entered TS LCO 3.3.1.1 conditions A.1 (place channel in Trip in 12 hours) and C.1 (restore RPS trip capability in 1 hr). At 1734 CDT, Operations exited TS LCO 3.3.1.1 upon restoration of 1A RPS per 1-AOI-99-1.

"This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) [b. General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)], except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM RAY SWAFFORD TO DONG PARK AT 1522 EDT ON 6/29/10 * * *

"Retraction of an 8 hour non-emergency notification for invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation from a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A.

"Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) eight-hour non-emergency report made on April 30, 2010, at 2131 hours Central Daylight Time.

"BFN's initial report was categorized as a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B). The loss of power to RPS 1A resulted in PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. However, plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore, the actuation was invalid. As a consequence, TVA has concluded that this event does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A 60-day phone call will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). [See EN #46054]

"TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662). TVA has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

Notified R2DO (Desai).

INADVERTENT SYSTEM ACTUATION OCCURRED DURING A SURVEILLANCE TEST

"Unit 2 was performing a planned refueling outage surveillance test, FNP-2-STP-40.0, Safety Injection with Loss of Off-Site Power. The system was being returned to normal following the actuation portion of the test. When the B2F Sequencer was reset, a loss of off-site power (LOSP) occurred, which caused a loss of the 'A' Train 4kV busses, and an LOSP signal was generated. The 1-2A Diesel Generator was already running at normal speed, and voltage. Therefore, the diesel generator output breaker opened, and then reclosed which then allowed the LOSP loads to automatically start. This included the 2A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, and the 2A High Head Safety Injection Pump. Therefore, during the test, the system actuated in a way that was not part of the planned evolution.

"The investigation indicated that a recent design change on the diesel generator output breaker circuitry had not been fully incorporated into the test procedure. The test procedure currently in progress was revised to provide guidance for operating the B2G Sequencer Test Trip Override switch. The restoration section for the 'B' Train was completed with no further complications when the B2G Sequencer Test Trip Override switch was operated before resetting the B2G Sequencer."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TAR FOUND ON OVERPRESSURE RUPTURE DISCS POTENTIALLY CHANGING THE RELIEF SET POINT

"On 04/30/10 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that while performing maintenance on C-337 Unit 2 Cell 4 Odd R-114 rupture disc replacement, roofing tar was discovered in the upper rupture disc. C-337 U/2 C/4 Odd system was not in a mode of applicability according to TSR [Technical Safety Requirement] 2.4.3.4. The presence of the roofing tar on an operable R-114 coolant overpressure control system rupture disc would not allow the rupture disc to perform its intended safety function as required by TSR 2.4.3.4. The R-114 rupture disc is the primary component of the R-114 coolant overpressure control system. The R-114 coolant overpressure control system prevents excess coolant pressure from rupturing the coolant system and releasing coolant into the UF6 primary system that could result in the subsequent release of UF6 due to over pressurization of the UF6 system. TSR 2.4.3.4 and 2.3.3.2 require that the R-114 coolant overpressure control system be operable. An extent of condition inspection of in use R-114 rupture discs is in progress. Roofing tar was discovered on R-114 coolant overpressure control system rupture discs in the following locations: C-337 cells U/3 C/2 Odd, U/1 C/5 Odd, U/1 C/6 Odd, U/6 C/4 Odd, U/2 C/5 Even, U/5 C/4 Odd, U/5 C/6 Even, U/5 C/8 Odd, U/4 C/7 Even (Not in an applicable mode), U/2 C/4 Odd (Not in an applicable mode). U/6 C/7 Odd (Not in an applicable mode). C-331 U/1 C/4 (Not in an applicable mode). Buildings C-310 and C-335 R-114 coolant overpressure control system rupture discs were inspected and were free of any foreign material. Systems that are in an applicable mode according to TSR 2.4.3.4 and were discovered to have roofing tar on the rupture discs were declared inoperable and an operator was stationed to continuously monitor the R-114 pressure in order to take action according to TSR 2.4.3.4.

"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-l0-1131; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2010-6"

* * * UPDATE FROM JOE BARLETTO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2254 EDT ON 5/1/10 * * *

"On 05-01-2010 at 2225 hours, extent of condition walk downs have been completed. Additional R-114 rupture disc locations were discovered with either roofing tar and/or shipping caps in the upper rupture disc. The presence of either would not allow the R-114 rupture disc to perform its intended safety function as required by TSR 2.4.3.4. Systems that are in an applicable mode according to TSR 2.4.3.4 and were discovered to have roofing tar and/or shipping caps on the upper rupture discs were declared inoperable and an operator was stationed to continuously monitor the R-114 pressure in order to take action according to TSR 2.4.3.4."

The licensee provided a list of 28 cells that had shipping caps installed and 13 cells with roofing tar on the discs.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

* * * UPDATE FROM ROD COOK TO JOHN KNOKE @ 1737 EDT ON 5/2/10 * * *

"On 5/02/2010 at 0636 hours during a review of the extent of condition inspection notes, engineering identified that C-333 U/4 C/9 Even R-114 Over-pressurization system had been omitted from the report due to oversight. Engineering had identified a shipping cover with tar on it was present on the rupture disc.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATRC-10-1141; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2010-6. Responsible Division: Operations"

Notified R2 DO (Randy Musser) and NMSS EO (Tim McCartin)

LOSS SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) DUE TO COMPUTER PROBLEMS

"At 0300 [CDT] on 04/30/2010, the Plant Computer Group identified that the SPDS stalled and was not updating data points as required. The SPDS also supplies data to several Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) points. Redundant, normal control room indications are still available to the operators. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and therefore, reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"SPDS was restored at 0356 [CDT] on 4/30/2010.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION FROM A LOSS-OF-POWER TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) 1A

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of a written report, under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.

"On April 30, 2010, at 1648 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT) with Unit 1 at 100 percent thermal power, while attempting to change a light bulb, the light socket shorted causing a loss of 1A RPS. The loss resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. BFN's review of the event found that the bulb caused a direct short and caused the loss of RPS 1A. Plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywall pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore the actuation was invalid.

"The affected equipment responded as designed. On April 30, 2010, at approximately 1702 hours CDT Unit 1 operations personnel restored 1A RPS and by 1728 hours CDT, the recovery of the loss of 1A RPS was complete. This event had no safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public. The event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."