Event Notification Report for April 26, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/25/2010 - 04/26/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
4587245873458744589145909
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45872
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PHIL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: PHIL HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 01:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 01:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 20 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING AN NI CALIBRATION
"This is a 4 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an Automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (scram). At 2126 hours [CDT] on April 25, 2010, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped due to 2 of 4 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels tripped. At the time of the trip, reactor power, as indicated by heat balance, was ~20%, while excore Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) indicated ~30%. The RPS high reactor power trip setpoint was 50% power. An NI calibration initiated an automatic withdrawal command to the control rod drive system. The rod withdrawal, resulted in one RPS channel tripping on high reactor power and another RPS channel tripping on high reactor coolant system pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no safety systems, other than RPS, actuated. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No primary safety valves lifted. Seven secondary safety valves lifted and subsequently reseated. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The licensee also informed the State of Arkansas and does not plan a press release.
The Unit 1 reactor trip was uncomplicated. Current means of decay heat removal is normal feedwater to the Steam Generators with steam discharge to the Main Condenser through Main Steam Bypass. The Main Generator was online at the time of the trip and the plant is currently in a normal post trip electrical line up. There is no indication of primary-secondary tube leakage. All systems functioned as required.
"This is a 4 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an Automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation (scram). At 2126 hours [CDT] on April 25, 2010, Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped due to 2 of 4 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channels tripped. At the time of the trip, reactor power, as indicated by heat balance, was ~20%, while excore Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) indicated ~30%. The RPS high reactor power trip setpoint was 50% power. An NI calibration initiated an automatic withdrawal command to the control rod drive system. The rod withdrawal, resulted in one RPS channel tripping on high reactor power and another RPS channel tripping on high reactor coolant system pressure. All control rods fully inserted into the core and no safety systems, other than RPS, actuated. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No primary safety valves lifted. Seven secondary safety valves lifted and subsequently reseated. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
The licensee also informed the State of Arkansas and does not plan a press release.
The Unit 1 reactor trip was uncomplicated. Current means of decay heat removal is normal feedwater to the Steam Generators with steam discharge to the Main Condenser through Main Steam Bypass. The Main Generator was online at the time of the trip and the plant is currently in a normal post trip electrical line up. There is no indication of primary-secondary tube leakage. All systems functioned as required.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45873
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DOUG PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 05:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/26/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 14 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM DUE TO HIGH TURBINE VIBRATIONS
"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual reactor scram due to rising vibrations on the #6 turbine bearing. A planned reactor shutdown was in progress with reactor power at 13.8% when turbine vibrations approached procedural limits which would require a manual scram of the reactor.
"The scram was uncomplicated; all control rods fully inserted. The reactor is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. Cooldown has been established to the condenser using main steam line drains. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for inserting a manual reactor scram due to rising vibrations on the #6 turbine bearing. A planned reactor shutdown was in progress with reactor power at 13.8% when turbine vibrations approached procedural limits which would require a manual scram of the reactor.
"The scram was uncomplicated; all control rods fully inserted. The reactor is in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown. Cooldown has been established to the condenser using main steam line drains. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45874
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TEREZAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TEREZAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/26/2010
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 08:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2010
Notification Time: 11:51 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 08:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On April 25, 2010, at 1130 EDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to removing both Control Room Booster fans from service in order to support charcoal absorber replacement in the common filtration train as part of scheduled outage maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service on 4/26/10.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM FRED POLLACK TO DONG PARK AT 0321 EDT ON 5/1/2010 * * *
"Charcoal absorber replacement and post maintenance testing has been completed satisfactorily and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, and thus the Technical Support Center Ventilation System, has been declared back in service at 0140 on 05/01/2010.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
"On April 25, 2010, at 1130 EDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 was declared out of service due to removing both Control Room Booster fans from service in order to support charcoal absorber replacement in the common filtration train as part of scheduled outage maintenance. The Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system is part of the Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered non-functional during the course of the work activities. The TSC ventilation is expected to be returned to service on 4/26/10.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM FRED POLLACK TO DONG PARK AT 0321 EDT ON 5/1/2010 * * *
"Charcoal absorber replacement and post maintenance testing has been completed satisfactorily and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, and thus the Technical Support Center Ventilation System, has been declared back in service at 0140 on 05/01/2010.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R2DO (McCoy).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45891
Rep Org: PARTICLE DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES
Licensee: PARTICLE DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: PINEDALE State: WY
County:
License #: TEXAS #G02344
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROB O'DONEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: PARTICLE DRILLING TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 4
City: PINEDALE State: WY
County:
License #: TEXAS #G02344
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROB O'DONEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/01/2010
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2010
Notification Time: 16:28 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 05/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
JAMES DANNA (FSME)
GAUGE SHUTTERS STUCK OPEN
On April 26, 2010, while the licensee, Particle Drilling Technologies out of Houston, Texas was performing a scheduled shutter operation check, the shutter on a Ronan Model SA1 nuclear gauge failed to close. They were at a remote drilling site in the Pinedale, Wyoming when this occurred and was using the gauge as generally licensed material under its Texas license. The gauge contains 20 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) 137 (S/N #6198CN). The gauge is in its normal operating position and a radiation survey conducted by the licensee indicated that radiation levels are normal. The gauge was leak tested and the test sent for analysis. The licensee stated that there is no risk of additional exposure to their workers. The licensee is working with the manufacturer to schedule the repair of the gauge on May 18, 2010. The licensee reported this incident to the NRC Operations Center on April 27, 2010, and it was logged until it could be determined whether this incident should be reported to the State of Texas or the NRC. It was determined that since the event occurred in Wyoming, it is an NRC report.
On May 1, 2010, the licensee was performing shutter checks when they discovered two more shutters were stuck in the open position. These are also Ronan Model SA1 gauges that contain 20 mCi Cs-137 sources. Their serial numbers are 6115CN and 5808CN. The vendor is still scheduled for onsite repairs on May 18.
On April 26, 2010, while the licensee, Particle Drilling Technologies out of Houston, Texas was performing a scheduled shutter operation check, the shutter on a Ronan Model SA1 nuclear gauge failed to close. They were at a remote drilling site in the Pinedale, Wyoming when this occurred and was using the gauge as generally licensed material under its Texas license. The gauge contains 20 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) 137 (S/N #6198CN). The gauge is in its normal operating position and a radiation survey conducted by the licensee indicated that radiation levels are normal. The gauge was leak tested and the test sent for analysis. The licensee stated that there is no risk of additional exposure to their workers. The licensee is working with the manufacturer to schedule the repair of the gauge on May 18, 2010. The licensee reported this incident to the NRC Operations Center on April 27, 2010, and it was logged until it could be determined whether this incident should be reported to the State of Texas or the NRC. It was determined that since the event occurred in Wyoming, it is an NRC report.
On May 1, 2010, the licensee was performing shutter checks when they discovered two more shutters were stuck in the open position. These are also Ronan Model SA1 gauges that contain 20 mCi Cs-137 sources. Their serial numbers are 6115CN and 5808CN. The vendor is still scheduled for onsite repairs on May 18.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45909
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: H&H X-RAY SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: RINGOLD State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2970-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANN TROXLER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Licensee: H&H X-RAY SERVICES, INC
Region: 4
City: RINGOLD State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2970-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANN TROXLER
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 05/07/2010
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Notification Time: 09:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/26/2010
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK/DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE
Received this report from the State of Louisiana via facsimile:
"On April 26, 2010, at a temporary job site a field crew was performing an X-Ray on a pipeline when the X-Ray source could not be returned to the shielded position. Using their survey meters, the crew determined the source was exposed and could not be retrieved. They called the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer who came and did a source retrieval and [received] a 150 mrem exposure. With the source shielded, the licensee transported the camera to QSA Global in Baton Rouge, LA for analysis. The equipment was a Sentinel, model 660B, S/N 82187, loaded with 69.5 Ci of Ir-l92, S/N 60611B. QSA Global observed the source and performed further evaluation. The results were that the weld on the source cracked and the capsule was catching on the exit port of the camera. QSA Global put out a recall for that particular lot of sources and forwarded the damaged camera to QSA Global in Burlington, MA."
This event is Louisiana report # LA1000004
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SUMARES TO CHARLES TEAL VIA FAX AT 1054 ON 5/21/10 * * *
This report was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"On May 3, 2010 an agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts Bureau of Radiation Protection] inspector visited QSA Global in response to this event. The inspector observed the route cards for all 6 sources from this production lot of the problem source assembly, serial number 60611B, manufactured for H and H X-Ray of Louisiana only. All 6 sources were returned to QSA Global for analysis and the other 5 sources were found to be properly welded and wipe testing of all 5 sources indicated no sources were leaking. In addition, wipe test of the problem source indicated this source was not leaking. [The] inspector also observed the next day's test weld which was analyzed and deemed acceptable prior to welding sources for the next days source production.
"[The] inspector observed the outer encapsulation of the source that caused this event. The outer capsule laser weld was not completed along the weld joint, but slightly below the weld joint, thus the capsule was not properly welded. At the time of manufacture, leak testing (vacuum bubble test) of the problem sources weld did not reveal an improperly welded capsule. The inner capsule was properly welded and sealed, Thus the leak test (wipe test) did not reveal contamination. QSA Global ascertained that human error allowed the improperly welded outer capsule to pass the vacuum bubble test. QSA assembled a test outer encapsulation in the same manner as the problem source (i.e. an improper weld, located below the weld joint) and found that the vacuum bubble test easily detects that the capsule was not properly welded. QSA Global committed to submit a final report to the agency within a few weeks."
Notified R4DO (Pick) and FSME (McIntosh).
Received this report from the State of Louisiana via facsimile:
"On April 26, 2010, at a temporary job site a field crew was performing an X-Ray on a pipeline when the X-Ray source could not be returned to the shielded position. Using their survey meters, the crew determined the source was exposed and could not be retrieved. They called the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer who came and did a source retrieval and [received] a 150 mrem exposure. With the source shielded, the licensee transported the camera to QSA Global in Baton Rouge, LA for analysis. The equipment was a Sentinel, model 660B, S/N 82187, loaded with 69.5 Ci of Ir-l92, S/N 60611B. QSA Global observed the source and performed further evaluation. The results were that the weld on the source cracked and the capsule was catching on the exit port of the camera. QSA Global put out a recall for that particular lot of sources and forwarded the damaged camera to QSA Global in Burlington, MA."
This event is Louisiana report # LA1000004
* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN SUMARES TO CHARLES TEAL VIA FAX AT 1054 ON 5/21/10 * * *
This report was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:
"On May 3, 2010 an agency [Commonwealth of Massachusetts Bureau of Radiation Protection] inspector visited QSA Global in response to this event. The inspector observed the route cards for all 6 sources from this production lot of the problem source assembly, serial number 60611B, manufactured for H and H X-Ray of Louisiana only. All 6 sources were returned to QSA Global for analysis and the other 5 sources were found to be properly welded and wipe testing of all 5 sources indicated no sources were leaking. In addition, wipe test of the problem source indicated this source was not leaking. [The] inspector also observed the next day's test weld which was analyzed and deemed acceptable prior to welding sources for the next days source production.
"[The] inspector observed the outer encapsulation of the source that caused this event. The outer capsule laser weld was not completed along the weld joint, but slightly below the weld joint, thus the capsule was not properly welded. At the time of manufacture, leak testing (vacuum bubble test) of the problem sources weld did not reveal an improperly welded capsule. The inner capsule was properly welded and sealed, Thus the leak test (wipe test) did not reveal contamination. QSA Global ascertained that human error allowed the improperly welded outer capsule to pass the vacuum bubble test. QSA assembled a test outer encapsulation in the same manner as the problem source (i.e. an improper weld, located below the weld joint) and found that the vacuum bubble test easily detects that the capsule was not properly welded. QSA Global committed to submit a final report to the agency within a few weeks."
Notified R4DO (Pick) and FSME (McIntosh).