Event Notification Report for April 19, 2010

TSC EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM DISCOVERED NON-FUNCTIONAL WHILE PLACING A CLEARANCE

"At 0158 [CDT] on 4/19/2010, during implementation of clearance order activities, it was identified that the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system would not transition to the emergency mode of operation. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The TSC ventilation system consists of normal ventilation equipment, including a normal air supply unit OAF-1, and an emergency air supply unit OAF-2 which provides conditioned air with HEPA and charcoal filtration. The system is placed in the emergency mode as follows:

"When TSC HEPA FILTER BYPASS switch is placed to EMER UP, the Energy Management System (EMS) receives an emergency signal and the following actions occur:

1. Air Dampers AD1443 and AD1445 close and cause OAF-1 to stop.
2. Air Dampers AD1442 and AD1444 open and cause OAF-2 to start.
3. Outside air to the TSC is routed through HEPA filter unit.

"During the clearance order activities, the TSC HEPA FILTER BYPASS switch was placed to EMER UP, but the actions above did not occur. A second attempt was made to place the system in the emergency mode, without success. Based upon these indications, it is considered that the TSC ventilation cannot be placed in the emergency mode. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the loss of the emergency response facility. Per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure 5.7.7 for Activation of TSC, personnel can relocate to the Alternate TSC (control room) and Alternate Operations Support Center (OSC) where the TSC functions will be performed. Both of these alternate facilities are equipped with emergency ventilation systems and are currently fully functional.

"Troubleshooting of the TSC ventilation system discrepancy will commence today."

This system was last tested successfully on 10/20/2008 and due for retest on 6/21/2010.

The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST BRACHYTHERAPY SEEDS

The following information was received from the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via facsimile:

"Licensee discovered 51 I-125 brachytherapy seeds missing on 13 April 2010. Initial notification to the state was on 16 April 2010, after working hours, to the [State of Florida] duty officer. A search of the premises and outside garbage containers was performed [with negative results]. The search is still on going. Investigation [of this incident has been] assigned to [the State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] Miami Office."

Florida Incident #: FL10-056

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE SHUTTERS STUCK OPEN

The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email:

"On April 20, 2010, the Agency [Texas Department of Health] was notified by the licensee that on April 19, 2010, while conducting calibrations on two continuous density measurement detectors, the associated nuclear gauge shutters were found to be stuck in the open position. Open is the normal position for these gauges. The gauges are Ohmart gauges containing 100 millicuries each of Cesium-137 (original activity). The gauges are model SR-A serial numbers 7613 GK and 8150 GK. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) has placed notification tags on the gauges to warn workers of the problem. The manufacturer has been contacted to provide repairs to the gauges."

Texas Incident # I-8732

RPS AND AFW ACTUATION SIGNALS WHILE SHUTDOWN IN MODE 4

"Unit 2 was in Hot Shutdown [Mode 4] for a Refueling Outage. At 0503 [CDT] on April 19, 2010, a valid Lo-Lo Steam Generator level condition occurred during restoration of feedwater system testing. The feedwater test was a planned activity and included isolation of feedwater to the steam generators. During performance of the test, steam generator levels decreased and the Lo-Lo level setpoint was reached on the 2D steam generator. This generated a reactor trip signal and auxiliary feedwater system start signal. Since the Unit was in Hot Shutdown, the reactor trip breakers were already open, and the auxiliary feedwater system was already removed from service when the steam generator water level unintentionally reached the Lo-Lo level setpoint. Additionally, the open steam generator blowdown isolation valves closed as expected at the Lo-Lo steam generator level setpoint. Steam generator level was promptly restored above the Lo-Lo steam generator setpoint. There was no impact on the reactor cooldown that was concurrently in progress as part of the preparation for refueling. Initial screening of the condition determined as not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv), however, based upon further review it has been determined the condition is reportable."

At the time of the event, both trains of shutdown cooling were in service and there were no challenges to offsite power. The licensee was not required to enter any Technical Specification LCO action statements as a result of the event, and the licensee is still investigating the cause of the decrease in steam generator level below the Lo-Lo level setpoint.

The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE LOSS OF CONTROL/DAMAGE TO PORTABLE GAUGE

The following report was received from the State via e-mail:

"At approximately 11 a.m. [EDT] on Monday, April 19, 2010, one of KeyTech's portable moisture density gauges (Troxler Model 4640B, Serial No. 2008, containing 9 mCi of Cs-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241) was struck by a steam-roller. The incident occurred at the intersection of Manchester Boulevard and Manchester Road in Manchester, NJ. On Wednesday, April 21, 2010, the licensee filed a report with the Manchester Police. The Manchester Police then contacted the Trenton Dispatch. At about 11 a.m., RMP [New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection Radioactive Materials Program] personnel were notified by Trenton Dispatch.

"The RMP contacted Manchester Police and it was learned that KeyTech reported that while the gauge was damaged the radioactive material remained intact within the device. KeyTech's RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] and administrator were contacted. The RSO stated that only the keyboard portion of the gauge was hit and that there was no damage to the radioactive material within the gauge. When the gauge was hit, the source rod was extended. The technician was able to retract the source rod into the safe position. The gauge was moved to a safe location and away from the public. RMP personnel went to KeyTech on Thursday, 4/22/10, to speak with the licensee and to conduct an investigation. The investigation concluded that the material was intact within the gauge and determined the licensee took appropriate actions to protect personnel and the public."

New Jersey Report #C348104

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf