Event Notification Report for April 18, 2010

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO FATALITY DURING MEDICAL TRANSPORT

"On 4/18/10, Salem management was notified that a contract employee working 1R20 (Salem Unit 1 outage) was complaining of respiratory issues. Site protection was contacted at about 0700 hours and they immediately responded to the control point area where the employee was resting. The employee was evaluated by site protection and immediately sent via ambulance to Salem County hospital (0721 hours). While enroute to the hospital the contract employee died in the ambulance (0750 hours).

"There were no other injuries associated with this event.

"There were no affects on plant systems or safety features as a result of this event.

"A notification has been made to the NRC Resident Inspector in accordance with 11.8.2.a."

The contract employee was not working in a radiological control area (RCA) at the time and there was no personnel contamination associated with this incident.

The licensee will inform local agencies (Lower Alloways Creek Township) and the states of New Jersey and Delaware including the New Jersey State Police.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING (AMERTAP) BALLS

"During the auto shutdown process of TP 1539, Amertap Ball Check, an equipment malfunction occurred when the ball catching flap did not auto reposition to the 'catch' position. This resulted in a loss of amertap balls to the external circulating water system. The quantity of balls lost to the environment is unknown but could potentially be the entire quantity of 1500 balls.

"The Xcel Energy Environmental Service informed the plant that a report will be made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency during business hours on 4/19/2010.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

"A news release is not planned."

The Amertap system is out of service until repaired. The licensee will also be notifying the Prairie Island Indian Nation and Goodhue County, MN of this incident.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING REACTOR STARTUP

"This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency, 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) notification due to an RPS actuation (scram). Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 was manually tripped from 11% power at 1357 hrs. CDT. The cause of the trip was operator judgment due to a small fire reported in the high pressure turbine enclosure at governor valve number 3 by a fire watch stationed at that location and an unrelated failure of P-32C Reactor Coolant Pump 3rd stage seal (upper seal) occurring earlier that afternoon. No additional equipment issues were noted. An extinguishing agent (CO2) was applied within approximately 30 seconds. All control rods fully inserted. No primary safeties lifted. No secondary safeties lifted. Emergency feedwater did not actuate and was not needed. No safety systems actuated. The plant will be cooled down to repair the P-32C Reactor Coolant Pump Seal.

"The NRC Resident has been notified."

There was no effect on Unit 2. The grid is stable with Unit 1 in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to condenser using normal feed to the steam generators. The licensee will be notifying the Arkansas Department of Health.

LCO 3.0.3 ENTRY AND LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION DUE TO LOSS OF TURBINE BUILDING HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK COMPENSATORY MEASURE

"At 2225 CDT on 4/18/2010, Operations discovered that the Unit 1 Turbine Building Truck Aisle Rollup Door Security Fence was closed. This fence was to be maintained open as the truck aisle is a required drainage path from the Unit 1 Turbine Building to outside in the event of flooding resulting from a High Energy Line Break (HELB). With the expanded metal mesh door [fence] closed, turbine building debris could clog the drainage path and result in a higher than calculated water level being reached for this event. As the final water level cannot be predicted, this represented an unanalyzed condition. The higher water levels would be reached at least one hour after the postulated turbine building HELB event. High water levels could result in a Loss of Safety Function for Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generators. Auxiliary Feedwater (both units) and DC Electrical Power (both units) if water levels exceed critical heights in the associated rooms.

"The doors [fence] were reopened at 2227 CDT. Unit 1 entered LCO 3.0.3 for this two minute period. With the doors [fence] opened, Unit 1 and 2 LCO conditions were again satisfied.

"The Unit 2 truck aisle was in the assumed condition, and Unit 2 is in Mode 5 so loss of AFW or DC power would not result in an LCO 3.0.3 entry. Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators are not affected as the Unit 2 truck aisle drain path would prevent water levels from reaching critical heights.

"The initial investigation determined that a Security Officer had closed the gate at approximately 1855 CDT on 4/18/2010.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A press release is not planned."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1454 ON 4/22/2010 FROM DARRELL LAPCINSKI TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"In reference to the 4/18/2010 discovery of the security fences (screen door) closed on the Unit One Turbine Building truck aisle door and the Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3 entry on Unit One, further analysis of HELB flooding scenarios in the plant configuration known to be in effect at that time has shown that the LCO 3.0.3 entry was not warranted. Engineering analysis demonstrates that water levels in the Unit One Turbine Building from a postulated worst case HELB flooding event would only have rendered the 12 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump inoperable. Thus TS LCO 3.7.5 Condition B would have been the only LCO action statement required to be entered. No loss of safety function existed."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Skokowski).