Event Notification Report for April 16, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/15/2010 - 04/16/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
4585045851458474584845849483844591345981
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45850
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/17/2010
Notification Time: 01:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 19:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Notification Time: 01:29 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 19:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT SIGNAL DUE TO HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE SIGNAL
"On April 16, 2010 at 1917 hrs., Unit 1 received an ECCS [emergency core cooling system] loss of cooling accident (LOCA) signal on high drywell pressure. Based on plant data, drywell pressure reached a maximum pressure of approximately 1.25 psig, which is below the LOCA and RPS [reactor protection system] signal actuation pressure of 1.85 psig. At this time, the cause of the drywell pressure increase is under investigation. RPS logic did not initiate due to drywell pressure not reaching the actuation setpoint of 1.85 psig. Although the ECCS logic prematurely actuated, the signal is being treated as 'valid' for the ECCS actuation until further investigation is completed. All expected ECCS actions occurred as a result of the signal. The LOCA logic has been reset and all affected systems have been returned to normal or standby configuration.
"As a result of the LOCA system actuations, several cooling tower fans tripped and condenser vacuum began to decrease. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 86 percent as a result of decreasing condenser vacuum. Power is being maintained at approximately 86 - 88 percent at this time. There are no other plant issues or concerns at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
According to the licensee, normal drywell operating pressure is .5 to 1.2 psig. Prior to the event, drywell pressure had been steady at approximately 1.0 psig. Current drywell pressure is .6 psig. According to the licensee, ECCS systems that started (but did not inject) included: Core Spray pumps, Residual Heat Removal pumps, High Pressure Coolant Injection pump, and the Diesel Generators. An event review team is assessing this event to determine the root cause.
* * * RETRACTION FROM GRIFFIS TO KLCO ON 4/17/2010 AT 1719 EDT* * *
"On April 16, 2010, Hatch Unit 1 received a LOCA ECCS initiation from a high drywell pressure signal. Based on the information available at that time, a notification was made to the NRC assuming the signal to be valid until further investigation could be completed.
"After further review, the determination has been made that the initiation signal originated from a faulted ATTS [Analog Transmitter Trip System] card and not from a valid high drywell pressure condition. Based on this information, this condition did not require an NRC notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 and, as such, is being retracted through this updated response."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Hopper)
"On April 16, 2010 at 1917 hrs., Unit 1 received an ECCS [emergency core cooling system] loss of cooling accident (LOCA) signal on high drywell pressure. Based on plant data, drywell pressure reached a maximum pressure of approximately 1.25 psig, which is below the LOCA and RPS [reactor protection system] signal actuation pressure of 1.85 psig. At this time, the cause of the drywell pressure increase is under investigation. RPS logic did not initiate due to drywell pressure not reaching the actuation setpoint of 1.85 psig. Although the ECCS logic prematurely actuated, the signal is being treated as 'valid' for the ECCS actuation until further investigation is completed. All expected ECCS actions occurred as a result of the signal. The LOCA logic has been reset and all affected systems have been returned to normal or standby configuration.
"As a result of the LOCA system actuations, several cooling tower fans tripped and condenser vacuum began to decrease. Reactor power was reduced to approximately 86 percent as a result of decreasing condenser vacuum. Power is being maintained at approximately 86 - 88 percent at this time. There are no other plant issues or concerns at this time."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
According to the licensee, normal drywell operating pressure is .5 to 1.2 psig. Prior to the event, drywell pressure had been steady at approximately 1.0 psig. Current drywell pressure is .6 psig. According to the licensee, ECCS systems that started (but did not inject) included: Core Spray pumps, Residual Heat Removal pumps, High Pressure Coolant Injection pump, and the Diesel Generators. An event review team is assessing this event to determine the root cause.
* * * RETRACTION FROM GRIFFIS TO KLCO ON 4/17/2010 AT 1719 EDT* * *
"On April 16, 2010, Hatch Unit 1 received a LOCA ECCS initiation from a high drywell pressure signal. Based on the information available at that time, a notification was made to the NRC assuming the signal to be valid until further investigation could be completed.
"After further review, the determination has been made that the initiation signal originated from a faulted ATTS [Analog Transmitter Trip System] card and not from a valid high drywell pressure condition. Based on this information, this condition did not require an NRC notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 and, as such, is being retracted through this updated response."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Hopper)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45851
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/17/2010
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 22:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Notification Time: 02:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 22:37 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
STEVE ORTH (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 13 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP
"During a normal reactor shutdown for a refueling outage on Unit 2, a reactor trip occurred at approximately 13% power. This reactor trip was the result of a turbine trip due to high differential pressure between A & B condensers (greater than 2.5 inches). The cause for the vacuum difference between condensers is unknown at this time.
"The reactor trip first actuated indication was a high flux rate trip and the turbine trip first out indication was not received. The reason for this difference is unknown at this time.
"The operating crew responded to the reactor trip utilizing emergency operating procedures for reactor trip and reactor trip recovery and transitioned into normal shutdown procedures.
"All rods inserted as expected and all other systems operated as expected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
According to the licensee: The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. No automatic relief valve operations occurred. The motor driven auxiliary feed pump was manually started. The main steam isolation valves are open and decay heat is being removed by steam through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser.
"During a normal reactor shutdown for a refueling outage on Unit 2, a reactor trip occurred at approximately 13% power. This reactor trip was the result of a turbine trip due to high differential pressure between A & B condensers (greater than 2.5 inches). The cause for the vacuum difference between condensers is unknown at this time.
"The reactor trip first actuated indication was a high flux rate trip and the turbine trip first out indication was not received. The reason for this difference is unknown at this time.
"The operating crew responded to the reactor trip utilizing emergency operating procedures for reactor trip and reactor trip recovery and transitioned into normal shutdown procedures.
"All rods inserted as expected and all other systems operated as expected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
According to the licensee: The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical lineup. No automatic relief valve operations occurred. The motor driven auxiliary feed pump was manually started. The main steam isolation valves are open and decay heat is being removed by steam through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45847
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC POWELL
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 04/16/2010
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 16:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2010
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 16:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO DISCOVERY OF DIESEL FUEL OIL IN A MONITORING WELL
"At 1649 [EDT], on April 16, 2010, Salem Unit 2 notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [NJDEP] via the NJDEP hotline of the discovery of fuel oil from a sample well. At 1645 [EDT], a sample was pulled from a monitoring well on the north east side of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building which contained approximately 1 pint of diesel fuel oil. This notification to the State of New Jersey is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The source of the diesel fuel oil is under investigation by the licensee.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State of Delaware.
"At 1649 [EDT], on April 16, 2010, Salem Unit 2 notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection [NJDEP] via the NJDEP hotline of the discovery of fuel oil from a sample well. At 1645 [EDT], a sample was pulled from a monitoring well on the north east side of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building which contained approximately 1 pint of diesel fuel oil. This notification to the State of New Jersey is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The source of the diesel fuel oil is under investigation by the licensee.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State of Delaware.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45848
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT MOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT MOG
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/16/2010
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 16:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2010
Notification Time: 22:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 16:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/16/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
UNPLANNED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR START DUE TO LOSS OF A 4160 V BUS
"At 1641 hours [EDT] on April 16, 2010, an [unplanned] automatic start signal was generated for the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Surveillance testing was being performed on the 1C 4160 volt bus to verify the ability to swap between the 13 and 14 Station Power Transformers (SPT) which are the offsite power in-feeds for the 1C 4160 volt bus. The [failure to] swap from the 13 SPT to 14 SPT resulted in a loss of power to the 1C 4160 volt vital bus generating the automatic start signal for the 1C EDG. The 1C EDG started but the output breaker did not close. Abnormal operating procedure S1.OP-AB.4KV-0003 was entered for loss of the 1C 4160 volt vital bus. Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with core reload (fuel movement) in progress. Fuel movement was stopped as a result of the loss of the 1C 4160 volt bus. All fuel assemblies were placed in a safe position. There was no impact to shutdown cooling and no loss of spent fuel pool cooling. Core reload has been suspended until power is restored to the 1C 4160 volt bus. Initial investigations determined the suspected cause to be a failed auxiliary contact associated with a SPT in-feed breaker. This prevented the opposite in-feed and EDG breaker from closing. Extent of condition review and repairs are in progress."
Fuel movement was suspended due to loss of the fuel handling building exhaust fan which is powered by the 1C 4160V bus. There was no further impact on any safety related equipment required in Mode 6.
The license will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Delaware.
"At 1641 hours [EDT] on April 16, 2010, an [unplanned] automatic start signal was generated for the 1C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Surveillance testing was being performed on the 1C 4160 volt bus to verify the ability to swap between the 13 and 14 Station Power Transformers (SPT) which are the offsite power in-feeds for the 1C 4160 volt bus. The [failure to] swap from the 13 SPT to 14 SPT resulted in a loss of power to the 1C 4160 volt vital bus generating the automatic start signal for the 1C EDG. The 1C EDG started but the output breaker did not close. Abnormal operating procedure S1.OP-AB.4KV-0003 was entered for loss of the 1C 4160 volt vital bus. Salem Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with core reload (fuel movement) in progress. Fuel movement was stopped as a result of the loss of the 1C 4160 volt bus. All fuel assemblies were placed in a safe position. There was no impact to shutdown cooling and no loss of spent fuel pool cooling. Core reload has been suspended until power is restored to the 1C 4160 volt bus. Initial investigations determined the suspected cause to be a failed auxiliary contact associated with a SPT in-feed breaker. This prevented the opposite in-feed and EDG breaker from closing. Extent of condition review and repairs are in progress."
Fuel movement was suspended due to loss of the fuel handling building exhaust fan which is powered by the 1C 4160V bus. There was no further impact on any safety related equipment required in Mode 6.
The license will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, Lower Alloways Creek Township, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Delaware.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45849
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: BROCK LINDAU
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: BROCK LINDAU
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/16/2010
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 20:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Notification Time: 23:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 20:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER INOPERABLE DUE TO HVAC FAILURE
"At 2030 CDT [on 4/16/10], the Technical Support Center ventilation system was found not running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is not known at this time. This condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for emergency planning responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1321 EDT ON 4/17/10 * * *
"As of April 17, 2010 at 12:00 CDT, the Technical Support Center is once again available for Emergency Planning Responses. The cause of the failure was a broken belt on the TSC Air Handling Unit. This belt has been replaced."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
"At 2030 CDT [on 4/16/10], the Technical Support Center ventilation system was found not running. The cause for the failure of the Technical Support Center ventilation system is not known at this time. This condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for emergency planning responses. Alternate facilities are available. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1321 EDT ON 4/17/10 * * *
"As of April 17, 2010 at 12:00 CDT, the Technical Support Center is once again available for Emergency Planning Responses. The cause of the failure was a broken belt on the TSC Air Handling Unit. This belt has been replaced."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg).
Agreement State
Event Number: 48384
Rep Org: NH DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
Licensee: PROLERIZED NEW ENGLAND
Region: 1
City: CONCORD State: NH
County:
License #: 461R
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TWILA KENNA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: PROLERIZED NEW ENGLAND
Region: 1
City: CONCORD State: NH
County:
License #: 461R
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TWILA KENNA
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 11:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PORTABLE ANALYZER
The following information was obtained from the State of New Hampshire:
"NH Radiological Health (Agency) was contacted by NH Licensee 461R, Prolerized New England Co., LLC, a part of Schnitzer Northeast, on April 16, 2010. Their Niton Model XLp-818 XRF Analyzer, Serial No. 7170, with a 30 mCi AM-241 source, reported an error message regarding the shutter when turned on. The instrument was surveyed and a high reading of 120,000 cps was detected. When the instrument was turned off, high readings were still detected. The Agency detected 10 mR/hr at the shutter.
"The instrument was leak tested and properly stored until it could be sent back to the manufacturer. The manufacturer received the instrument on May 26, 2010. The description of repairs was that they 'found large metal shavings in front end. Small shaving was jammed in the shutter motor gear causing shutter to remain opened. Removed metal shavings and tested shutter. Shutter working properly. Ran detector calibration and found resolution to be out of spec. Top and bottom housings are damaged. Strongly recommend upgrading to new LCD/Power board.' Unit required a wipe test.
"The licensee turned the instrument in and purchased a new one."
During a records review, it was determined that this event was not reported but should have been. No personnel overexposures occurred.
The following information was obtained from the State of New Hampshire:
"NH Radiological Health (Agency) was contacted by NH Licensee 461R, Prolerized New England Co., LLC, a part of Schnitzer Northeast, on April 16, 2010. Their Niton Model XLp-818 XRF Analyzer, Serial No. 7170, with a 30 mCi AM-241 source, reported an error message regarding the shutter when turned on. The instrument was surveyed and a high reading of 120,000 cps was detected. When the instrument was turned off, high readings were still detected. The Agency detected 10 mR/hr at the shutter.
"The instrument was leak tested and properly stored until it could be sent back to the manufacturer. The manufacturer received the instrument on May 26, 2010. The description of repairs was that they 'found large metal shavings in front end. Small shaving was jammed in the shutter motor gear causing shutter to remain opened. Removed metal shavings and tested shutter. Shutter working properly. Ran detector calibration and found resolution to be out of spec. Top and bottom housings are damaged. Strongly recommend upgrading to new LCD/Power board.' Unit required a wipe test.
"The licensee turned the instrument in and purchased a new one."
During a records review, it was determined that this event was not reported but should have been. No personnel overexposures occurred.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45913
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHONG VU
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PHONG VU
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/10/2010
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 05:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2010
Notification Time: 16:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 05:21 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
INADVERTENT STEAM ADMISSION TO AFW TURBINE
During maintenance on sliding links, the steam admission valve (SA-48) for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) turbine inadvertently opened. Inadequate isolation from the steam header allowed steam flow through SA-77 steam drain valve into the turbine. This small amount of steam caused the pump to rotate at approximately 1000 rpm for approximately 2 minutes. Due to the low discharge pressure, no water was injected into the steam generator during this actuation.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
During maintenance on sliding links, the steam admission valve (SA-48) for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) turbine inadvertently opened. Inadequate isolation from the steam header allowed steam flow through SA-77 steam drain valve into the turbine. This small amount of steam caused the pump to rotate at approximately 1000 rpm for approximately 2 minutes. Due to the low discharge pressure, no water was injected into the steam generator during this actuation.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45981
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BILL DUVALL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 06/07/2010
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 19:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2010
Notification Time: 11:03 [ET]
Event Date: 04/16/2010
Event Time: 19:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/07/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
STEVEN VIAS (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Invalid actuation of ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On April 16, 2010, at 1717 EDT, Unit 1 received a false ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) Loss Of Cooling Accident (LOCA) signal on high drywell pressure. Based on plant data, all plant conditions were normal prior to event. Investigation identified an ATTS Slave Card failed in one of the Card File Racks. The Card File Rack contains ten (10) cards with two (2) being Master Trip Units (MTUs) that actuate on high drywell pressure. For initiation of an ECCS LOCA signal, both of the MTUs in the card file rack would have had to actuate. Cause of the event appears to be a momentary drop in supply voltage on the card file rack due to the failed slave card that lowered the set point of the MTUs to a point where they tripped. The set point is an internal voltage setting within the MTU. The failed ATTS cards have been replaced.
"Actuations: Core Spray A and B pumps started; Residual Heat Removal A, B, C, D pumps started; Diesel Generator 1A, 1B, and 1C started; Standby Plant Service Water Pump started; Plant Service Water 1A pump started (it had been in standby); Plant Service Water Valves 1P41-F310A, B, C, D closed (These are the Turbine Building isolation valves); Turbine Building Chiller B tripped; Main Control Room Environmental Control trains A and B started; HPCI Started but was secured prior to injection; Cooling Tower fans on towers A, B, C tripped.
"Reactor Water Level was normal at +37 inches and the highest Drywell Pressure indicated was 1.25 psig."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Invalid actuation of ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) including: high-pressure and low-pressure core spray systems; high pressure coolant injection system; low pressure injection function of the residual heat removal system.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On April 16, 2010, at 1717 EDT, Unit 1 received a false ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) Loss Of Cooling Accident (LOCA) signal on high drywell pressure. Based on plant data, all plant conditions were normal prior to event. Investigation identified an ATTS Slave Card failed in one of the Card File Racks. The Card File Rack contains ten (10) cards with two (2) being Master Trip Units (MTUs) that actuate on high drywell pressure. For initiation of an ECCS LOCA signal, both of the MTUs in the card file rack would have had to actuate. Cause of the event appears to be a momentary drop in supply voltage on the card file rack due to the failed slave card that lowered the set point of the MTUs to a point where they tripped. The set point is an internal voltage setting within the MTU. The failed ATTS cards have been replaced.
"Actuations: Core Spray A and B pumps started; Residual Heat Removal A, B, C, D pumps started; Diesel Generator 1A, 1B, and 1C started; Standby Plant Service Water Pump started; Plant Service Water 1A pump started (it had been in standby); Plant Service Water Valves 1P41-F310A, B, C, D closed (These are the Turbine Building isolation valves); Turbine Building Chiller B tripped; Main Control Room Environmental Control trains A and B started; HPCI Started but was secured prior to injection; Cooling Tower fans on towers A, B, C tripped.
"Reactor Water Level was normal at +37 inches and the highest Drywell Pressure indicated was 1.25 psig."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.