Event Notification Report for April 15, 2010

BENT FUEL SPACER FLOW WING

"During inspection of GNF2 reload fuel, a spacer flow wing on the corner rod position was discovered to be deformed (bent). A review of this condition and the associated root cause evaluation has determined that it could be present in previously manufactured GNF2 fuel that has been shipped for Fitzpatrick Cycle 19, Pilgrim Cycle 18, Vermont Yankee Cycle 28, Vermont Yankee GNF2 Lead Use Assemblies and Grand Gulf Cycle 18. It is not known that this condition exists in the GNF2 fuel for these plants, but it cannot be ruled out. A conservative assessment of thermal hydraulic impact of this condition resulted in a 0.01 OLMCPR [Operating Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio] impact for these plants. An OLMCPR impact of 0.01 is at the threshold for reportability."

UNPLANNED MANUAL REACTOR TRIP

"At 1539 [EDT], Unit 2 was manually tripped due to lifting of the 2B moisture separator reheater relief valve. The Unit commenced a rapid downpower and then a manual reactor trip was initiated at approximately 95% power. All CEA's [control element assemblies] fully inserted on the trip. Auxiliary feedwater automatically initiated on low steam generator level due the 2A steam generator 15% feedwater bypass not opening. No pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) opened. RCS heat removal is now being maintained with auxiliary feedwater and the steam bypass control system. Main feedwater is available. All other systems functioned normally, and the plant is stabilized at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to manual RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to auxiliary feedwater system actuation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO VOIDING IN DISCHARGE PIPING

"The Unit 2 HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] system was declared inoperable due to failure to meet acceptance criteria for air voiding in the discharge piping. UT [Ultrasonic Testing] inspection identified an air void of approximately 0.515 cubic ft. HPCI remains available and on-line risk remains green.

"The HPCI discharge piping has been vented. Preliminary post venting UT inspections indicate current void volume is less than acceptance criteria. Certified UT inspectors have been dispatched to validate preliminary UT results.

"The event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed of the event."

The acceptance criteria for voids is less than or equal to 0.052 cubic ft.

* * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS DITCHFIELD TO JOE O'HARA AT 1431 ON 6/2/2010 * * *

"Following the void identification, an engineering evaluation was initiated to determine the impact of the non-condensable gas pocket identified in the HPCI piping. The evaluation was completed and the following results were obtained.

"The pocket of non-condensable gas in the HPCI discharge piping did not adversely affect the ability of the system to maintain peak cladding temperatures below required limits.

"The pressure that would have been experienced during an initiation of the system was determined to be within the design pressure of the system.

"Additionally, the potential force imbalances that would be experienced during a system initiation were determined to be within the piping design allowables.

"Based on the engineering evaluation, the pocket of non-condensable gas did not have a detrimental effect on HPCI system operation. The ability of the HPCI system to perform its intended safety function was maintained throughout this condition. Therefore, the above notification is being retracted."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO(Pelke)

DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY

At 1410 MST on 4/15/10, a gauge operator was conducting a density reading near a culvert on Highway 28 in Hot Springs, MT. After placing the gauge at the target areas, the operator walked about twenty feet away. While he was away, a compactor that was compacting the road bed, slipped off the road near the culvert. When the compactor operator was backing up to get back on the road, he backed over the density gauge.

The gauge operator immediately secured the area and contacted the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). The RSO visually inspected the gauge and determined that both sources were retracted into the shielded position and appeared to be intact. He then surveyed the area and determined that no radiation release had occurred. The RSO conducted a wipe test and determined that no source leakage occurred. There were no personnel overexposures during this event. The gauge is currently in storage at the Montana Department of Transportation awaiting transport to Troxler for disposal.

The gauge was a model 3440, serial number 36152. It contained a Cs-137 source (serial number 77-3287, 8 mCi on 11/8/04) and an Am/Be-241 source (serial number 78-1047, 40 mCi on 10/13/04).