Event Notification Report for March 22, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/21/2010 - 03/22/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45783
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID OAKES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID OAKES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/22/2010
Notification Time: 20:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 13:39 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2010
Notification Time: 20:50 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 13:39 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/22/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - CONTRACT SUPERVISOR
A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for drugs as a result of a pre-access fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A contract supervisor had a confirmed positive for drugs as a result of a pre-access fitness for duty test. The individual's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45784
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRADFORD ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: BRADFORD ROBINSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/22/2010
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 18:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2010
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 18:11 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2010
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
RYAN LANTZ (R4)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4)
RYAN LANTZ (R4)
BRIAN McDERMOTT (IRD)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 22, 2010 at approximately 1756 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 identified a rising level and temperature trend in the Reactor Drain Tank (RDT). PVNGS Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 93% power with normal RCS temperature and pressure at the time of discovery. Containment temperature and humidity trends are normal. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage), Condition 'A' was entered at 1811 due to unidentified leakage >10 gpm and the LCO allows 4 hours to restore leakage to <1 gpm. Also at 1811, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared due to unidentified leakage >10 gpm (MU5.1). PVNGS Unit 1 remains at power with all normal systems in operation; periodic pumping of the RDT is occurring.
"No automatic or manual reactor protection system or engineered safety features actuations occurred and none were required. There were no other component failures, testing or work in progress that contributed to the leak. The leak is located within the containment building, therefore there is no release of radioactivity to the environment and no impact to the health and safety of the public. There is no elevated RCS activity and heat removal is via normal steaming to the main turbine condenser. The electric grid is stable.
"Current plans are to enter containment and identify the source of leakage. State and Local authorities have been notified. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee notified the following state and local agencies: Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Buckeye Police Department, Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency, Arizona Division of Emergency Management, and the Maricopa County Emergency Management Agency.
* * * UPDATE FROM BRAD ROBINSON TO DONG PARK AT 0028 EDT ON 3/23/2010 * * *
At 2112 MST, the shift manager advised that the Pressurizer Main Spray Valve, 100E, packing leakage has been manually isolated. As of 2125 MST, the level trend in the RDT has stabilized. The licensee is working to verify the leakage rate, and remains in an Unusual Event. The plant remains stable in Mode 1 at 93% power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and the NRC Resident Inspector remains on site.
* * * UPDATE FROM BRAD ROBINSON TO DONG PARK AT 0121 EDT ON 3/23/2010 * * *
At 2146 MST, the licensee exited Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.14, RCS Operational Leakage. At 2219 MST, the Unusual Event was terminated.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Brown), IRD (McDermott), DHS (Moore), and FEMA (Canupp).
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 22, 2010 at approximately 1756 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 identified a rising level and temperature trend in the Reactor Drain Tank (RDT). PVNGS Unit 1 was in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 93% power with normal RCS temperature and pressure at the time of discovery. Containment temperature and humidity trends are normal. Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage), Condition 'A' was entered at 1811 due to unidentified leakage >10 gpm and the LCO allows 4 hours to restore leakage to <1 gpm. Also at 1811, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared due to unidentified leakage >10 gpm (MU5.1). PVNGS Unit 1 remains at power with all normal systems in operation; periodic pumping of the RDT is occurring.
"No automatic or manual reactor protection system or engineered safety features actuations occurred and none were required. There were no other component failures, testing or work in progress that contributed to the leak. The leak is located within the containment building, therefore there is no release of radioactivity to the environment and no impact to the health and safety of the public. There is no elevated RCS activity and heat removal is via normal steaming to the main turbine condenser. The electric grid is stable.
"Current plans are to enter containment and identify the source of leakage. State and Local authorities have been notified. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee notified the following state and local agencies: Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona Department of Public Safety, Buckeye Police Department, Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency, Arizona Division of Emergency Management, and the Maricopa County Emergency Management Agency.
* * * UPDATE FROM BRAD ROBINSON TO DONG PARK AT 0028 EDT ON 3/23/2010 * * *
At 2112 MST, the shift manager advised that the Pressurizer Main Spray Valve, 100E, packing leakage has been manually isolated. As of 2125 MST, the level trend in the RDT has stabilized. The licensee is working to verify the leakage rate, and remains in an Unusual Event. The plant remains stable in Mode 1 at 93% power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and the NRC Resident Inspector remains on site.
* * * UPDATE FROM BRAD ROBINSON TO DONG PARK AT 0121 EDT ON 3/23/2010 * * *
At 2146 MST, the licensee exited Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.4.14, RCS Operational Leakage. At 2219 MST, the Unusual Event was terminated.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Brown), IRD (McDermott), DHS (Moore), and FEMA (Canupp).
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 45785
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 03/23/2010
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2010
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 03/22/2010
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/23/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
RAYMOND LORSON (NMSS)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
RAYMOND LORSON (NMSS)
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO REQUIRED CONTINGENCY CONTROLS
"At approximately 0930 [EDT] on Monday, March 22nd, an operator noticed that a waste collection bag in the dry conversion area had torn away from its receptacle as it is designed to do when the mass of waste exceeds the specified threshold. The operator lifted the bag up and found it to be heavier than normal. The operator then transferred the bag to the decontamination area to sort through the contents and determine what had been placed in the bag per procedure. During the sorting process, the operator found two vacuum cleaner bags that contained uranium. Upon discovery of the vacuum bags, the operator promptly notified Nuclear Safety staff, who further notified Operations Management and the EHS Manager. Upon investigation it was determined that 8.7 kg of UO2 was present in the two vacuum bags, which is less than the criticality safety limit of 25kg UO2 specified in the Criticality Safety Analysis. As a result, no unsafe condition existed.
"Since uranium was placed directly into the waste collection receptacle, one of the administrative requirements for double contingency was violated. The second control functioned as designed and the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was controlled to less than the safe mass limit. Therefore, this event resulted in a failure of an administrative requirement necessary to meet double contingency and is being reported per internal procedural requirements.
"As an immediate corrective action, the material was transferred into a favorable geometry 3-gallon can per procedure. In addition, a stand down of DCP operations was promptly performed to inform operators of the issue and retrain on the waste collection control requirements. All subsequent shifts have been briefed of the issue and retrained on the control requirements prior to returning to work.
"The double contingency controls required include (1) only contaminated items may be placed in a waste container. No uranium or containers with unknown uranium contents are allowed in the waste collection containers and (2) waste bags are designed to physically tear from their holders prior to accumulating greater than a safe mass in the bag. Material may not be placed in the bag after it has torn from the holder.
"Uranium was removed from the waste collection bag and placed into a 3-gallon can, which is a favorable geometry.
"Immediate corrective actions are complete. Investigation of the event and implementation of long term corrective actions are pending.
"At no time did an unsafe condition exist as the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was less than the safe mass limit."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, and the North Carolina State Department of Radiation.
"At approximately 0930 [EDT] on Monday, March 22nd, an operator noticed that a waste collection bag in the dry conversion area had torn away from its receptacle as it is designed to do when the mass of waste exceeds the specified threshold. The operator lifted the bag up and found it to be heavier than normal. The operator then transferred the bag to the decontamination area to sort through the contents and determine what had been placed in the bag per procedure. During the sorting process, the operator found two vacuum cleaner bags that contained uranium. Upon discovery of the vacuum bags, the operator promptly notified Nuclear Safety staff, who further notified Operations Management and the EHS Manager. Upon investigation it was determined that 8.7 kg of UO2 was present in the two vacuum bags, which is less than the criticality safety limit of 25kg UO2 specified in the Criticality Safety Analysis. As a result, no unsafe condition existed.
"Since uranium was placed directly into the waste collection receptacle, one of the administrative requirements for double contingency was violated. The second control functioned as designed and the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was controlled to less than the safe mass limit. Therefore, this event resulted in a failure of an administrative requirement necessary to meet double contingency and is being reported per internal procedural requirements.
"As an immediate corrective action, the material was transferred into a favorable geometry 3-gallon can per procedure. In addition, a stand down of DCP operations was promptly performed to inform operators of the issue and retrain on the waste collection control requirements. All subsequent shifts have been briefed of the issue and retrained on the control requirements prior to returning to work.
"The double contingency controls required include (1) only contaminated items may be placed in a waste container. No uranium or containers with unknown uranium contents are allowed in the waste collection containers and (2) waste bags are designed to physically tear from their holders prior to accumulating greater than a safe mass in the bag. Material may not be placed in the bag after it has torn from the holder.
"Uranium was removed from the waste collection bag and placed into a 3-gallon can, which is a favorable geometry.
"Immediate corrective actions are complete. Investigation of the event and implementation of long term corrective actions are pending.
"At no time did an unsafe condition exist as the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was less than the safe mass limit."
The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, and the North Carolina State Department of Radiation.