Event Notification Report for March 15, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/14/2010 - 03/15/2010
EVENT NUMBERS
457674576845769459014577945876
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45767
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/15/2010
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 09:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2010
Notification Time: 12:51 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 09:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT BYPASS LEAKAGE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT
"Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing has determined that Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) has been exceeded for Unit 1. During performance of leak rate test SE-159-045, the combined SCBL limit of 15 scfh [standard cubic feet per hour] for as-found minimum pathway was exceeded as specified in Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.3.11.
"Acceptance Criteria Test results were within Acceptance Criteria for the 10CFR50 Appendix J limits of 0.6 La [maximum allowed leakage rate].
"This event is being reported as a degraded or unanalyzed condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."
The RHR system containment spray penetration isolation valve was being tested when the failure occurred. The valve will be repaired and re-tested.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Appendix J Local Leak Rate Testing has determined that Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) has been exceeded for Unit 1. During performance of leak rate test SE-159-045, the combined SCBL limit of 15 scfh [standard cubic feet per hour] for as-found minimum pathway was exceeded as specified in Tech Spec SR 3.6.1.3.11.
"Acceptance Criteria Test results were within Acceptance Criteria for the 10CFR50 Appendix J limits of 0.6 La [maximum allowed leakage rate].
"This event is being reported as a degraded or unanalyzed condition pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."
The RHR system containment spray penetration isolation valve was being tested when the failure occurred. The valve will be repaired and re-tested.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45768
Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM CASE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM CASE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/15/2010
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 08:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2010
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 08:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO COMPUTER FAILURE
"On March 15, 2010, at approximately 0810 hours EDT, the plant computer system (ICS) was taken out of service for a planned outage to set the computer time to Eastern Daylight Time. During the time change adjustment, the ICS experienced a hard memory fault which required additional efforts to recover the ICS. At approximately 1205 hours EDT, the ICS was restored to normal operation. During the time ICS was out of service, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) were unavailable.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On March 15, 2010, at approximately 0810 hours EDT, the plant computer system (ICS) was taken out of service for a planned outage to set the computer time to Eastern Daylight Time. During the time change adjustment, the ICS experienced a hard memory fault which required additional efforts to recover the ICS. At approximately 1205 hours EDT, the ICS was restored to normal operation. During the time ICS was out of service, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), and the automatic mode calculation of the Computer Aided Dose Assessment Program (CADAP) were unavailable.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as a condition that results in a major loss of offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45769
Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ROUND MOUNTAIN GOLD CORP
Region: 4
City: ROUND MOUNTAIN State: NV
County:
License #: 13-11-0097-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: ROUND MOUNTAIN GOLD CORP
Region: 4
City: ROUND MOUNTAIN State: NV
County:
License #: 13-11-0097-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SNEHA RAVIKUMAR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/16/2010
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 16:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2010
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 16:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
JIM LUEHMAN (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TWO PROCESS GAUGES WITH STUCK SHUTTERS
The following report information was received from the State of Nevada Dept of Health via e-mail:
"On March 15, 2010, at 1600 hrs, the [Nevada] Radiation Control Program was notified by phone of two stuck shutters on fixed gauges at the Round Mountain Gold Corporation Smoky Valley Common Operation Mill. [The gauges with the stuck open shutters] were identified during the 6 month inspection on March 10, 2010. Both sources are 15 feet overhead and functioning as normal.
"The licensee indicated that the RSO was briefed about the situation, and he documented, conducted safety briefings for all who work in the area, and posted signs to keep staff away from the vicinity of the stuck shutters.
"Manufacturer is scheduled to repair the stuck shutters.
"The Radiation Control Program will investigate this further and update this report. Violations will be cited as appropriate."
Ronan Engineering Model # SA1-C5; Serial #M4882; 1.0 Ci (37 GBq) Cs-137 Source # DE4220
Ronan Engineering Model # SA1-C10; Serial #JJ-593; 0.1 Ci (3.7 GBq) Cs-137 Source # DE4620
Nevada Event Report - NV100004
The following report information was received from the State of Nevada Dept of Health via e-mail:
"On March 15, 2010, at 1600 hrs, the [Nevada] Radiation Control Program was notified by phone of two stuck shutters on fixed gauges at the Round Mountain Gold Corporation Smoky Valley Common Operation Mill. [The gauges with the stuck open shutters] were identified during the 6 month inspection on March 10, 2010. Both sources are 15 feet overhead and functioning as normal.
"The licensee indicated that the RSO was briefed about the situation, and he documented, conducted safety briefings for all who work in the area, and posted signs to keep staff away from the vicinity of the stuck shutters.
"Manufacturer is scheduled to repair the stuck shutters.
"The Radiation Control Program will investigate this further and update this report. Violations will be cited as appropriate."
Ronan Engineering Model # SA1-C5; Serial #M4882; 1.0 Ci (37 GBq) Cs-137 Source # DE4220
Ronan Engineering Model # SA1-C10; Serial #JJ-593; 0.1 Ci (3.7 GBq) Cs-137 Source # DE4620
Nevada Event Report - NV100004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45901
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JIM PETERSON
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC SIMPSON
Notification Date: 05/05/2010
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 01:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2010
Notification Time: 14:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 01:38 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
OPTIONAL 60-DAY REPORT OF INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This telephone notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) for an invalid actuation reportable under 50.73 (a)(2) (iv)(A).
"On March 15, 2010 at 0138 hours, during full power operations, Division 2 Drywell Ventilation (VP) and Drywell Cooling (WO) Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) closed for isolation Groups 11 and 17. The affected valves were inboard PCIVs 1VP005A, 1VP005B, 1VP014A, 1VP014B, 1WO001B, 1W0002B, 1WO551B and1WO552B. The shunt trip devices for the breakers for the following components were tripped: Drywell cooling fan 1B (1VP01CB), Drywell cooling fan 1D (1VP01CD), Drywell chiller 18 oil pump, DC Motor Control Center (MCC) 1B ground detection, DC MCC 1B ground detection, Drywell Chiller 1B(1VP04CB), and Drywell Chiller control panel 1B.
"The cause of the isolation was determined to be that a Division 2 load driver card spuriously actuated all of its loads without a valid Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal or a manual initiation signal present. A reset of the Group 11 and 17 isolations was completed at 0208; the shunt trips were reset at 0215; and Drywell Cooling was restored by 0259 on March 15. The load driver circuit remained in service until a replacement load driver card could be installed on March 19, 2010. The cause of the card failure could not be determined; however the most probable cause is either an intermittent failure of the card or an intermittent short of the output connectors.
"The actuation of primary containment isolation Groups 11 and 17 was complete and the isolation/actuation was limited to only these two groups.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this notification."
"This telephone notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) for an invalid actuation reportable under 50.73 (a)(2) (iv)(A).
"On March 15, 2010 at 0138 hours, during full power operations, Division 2 Drywell Ventilation (VP) and Drywell Cooling (WO) Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) closed for isolation Groups 11 and 17. The affected valves were inboard PCIVs 1VP005A, 1VP005B, 1VP014A, 1VP014B, 1WO001B, 1W0002B, 1WO551B and1WO552B. The shunt trip devices for the breakers for the following components were tripped: Drywell cooling fan 1B (1VP01CB), Drywell cooling fan 1D (1VP01CD), Drywell chiller 18 oil pump, DC Motor Control Center (MCC) 1B ground detection, DC MCC 1B ground detection, Drywell Chiller 1B(1VP04CB), and Drywell Chiller control panel 1B.
"The cause of the isolation was determined to be that a Division 2 load driver card spuriously actuated all of its loads without a valid Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal or a manual initiation signal present. A reset of the Group 11 and 17 isolations was completed at 0208; the shunt trips were reset at 0215; and Drywell Cooling was restored by 0259 on March 15. The load driver circuit remained in service until a replacement load driver card could be installed on March 19, 2010. The cause of the card failure could not be determined; however the most probable cause is either an intermittent failure of the card or an intermittent short of the output connectors.
"The actuation of primary containment isolation Groups 11 and 17 was complete and the isolation/actuation was limited to only these two groups.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this notification."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45779
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUENTIN HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUENTIN HICKS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/19/2010
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 12:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2010
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 12:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/19/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"At 12:43 on Monday, March 15, 2010, the 103 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inadvertently started during standby circuit checks. The standby circuit checks test was a planned evolution that was not intended to cause a start of the EDG. Following the start of the EDG, the standby circuit check test was stopped and the running checks for the diesel were completed satisfactory at 12:50. The EDG was secured at 13:03, after functioning successfully.
"The EDG was not started by a valid initiation signal. A valid initiation signal is degraded or loss of voltage to the Power Board (PB) 103. Also, the EDG output breaker did not close since the PB 103 was not deenergized.
"This event is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) (requires reporting within 60 days when a event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the EDG AC Electrical Power Systems, including EDG System occurs.)
"EDG 103 is the train that actuated. EDG 103 actuation was not complete since breaker did not close. EDG 103 started and remained operable throughout the event; output breaker would have closed and supplied PB 103 if required.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program.
"There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
"At 12:43 on Monday, March 15, 2010, the 103 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inadvertently started during standby circuit checks. The standby circuit checks test was a planned evolution that was not intended to cause a start of the EDG. Following the start of the EDG, the standby circuit check test was stopped and the running checks for the diesel were completed satisfactory at 12:50. The EDG was secured at 13:03, after functioning successfully.
"The EDG was not started by a valid initiation signal. A valid initiation signal is degraded or loss of voltage to the Power Board (PB) 103. Also, the EDG output breaker did not close since the PB 103 was not deenergized.
"This event is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) (requires reporting within 60 days when a event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the EDG AC Electrical Power Systems, including EDG System occurs.)
"EDG 103 is the train that actuated. EDG 103 actuation was not complete since breaker did not close. EDG 103 started and remained operable throughout the event; output breaker would have closed and supplied PB 103 if required.
"The event has been entered into the corrective action program.
"There are no other adverse impacts to the station based on this event."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45876
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: MARY BIRD PERKINS CANCER CENTER
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2651-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: MARY BIRD PERKINS CANCER CENTER
Region: 4
City: BATON ROUGE State: LA
County:
License #: LA-2651-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/27/2010
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2010
Notification Time: 12:04 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2010
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/27/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
JEFF CLARK (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RADIATION UNDERDOSE AT PRESCRIBED LOCATION
The following information below is a summary of a facsimile provided by the State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality concerning a reported medical event:
"A medical event occurred involving a patient under treatment for adenocarcinoma of the prostate gland. The patient involved received a prostate brachytherapy implant on March 12, 2010, using radioactive iodine-125 seeds [95 seeds of I-125 were implanted at 0.322 mCi/seed].
"The radiation oncologist with the assistance of the urologist inserted the needles through the appropriate holes in the needle template. During the procedure, the radiation oncologist used the ultrasound to guide the needle placement. However, the radiation oncologist and ultrasound technologist had difficulty seeing the balloon location (indicating the prostate base) clearly on the sagittal view of the ultrasound during the dispensing of the seeds from the needles. It was felt that it was possible that the patient may have moved during the procedure which may have caused the balloon and ultimately the base plane to have shifted.
"A variance was suspected by the radiation oncologist after reviewing the post implant seed count x-ray. The patient was called to return for an early post-implant CT on March 22, 2010 to confirm the implanted seed locations. Using these images, a treatment plan was constructed using the treatment planning system's post-plan software. Based on this postoperative plan, it has been estimated that the entire implanted volume was shifted approximately 3.0-cm inferiorly, resulting in D90% of 12.88 Gy (dose that covers 90% of the prostate volume outlined on the post implant CT images). The prescription dose was 145.0 Gy. The post-implant planning results were referred to the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) for review. After review, the RSC decided to interpret the implant as a medical event. This decision was made based on the fact that the V100 (volume of the prostate that received 100% of the prescribed dose) was less than 50% and the event classification was felt to be that of a wrong site.
"The information provided to the patient was that a treatment delivery inaccuracy occurred on March 15, 2010. The radiation oncologist explained to the patient that the dose delivered was not as planned and that supplemental treatment is recommended to treat his prostate cancer. A waiting period is recommended to allow the sources to decay and to determine any possible complications."
Louisiana Report # LA100003
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following information below is a summary of a facsimile provided by the State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality concerning a reported medical event:
"A medical event occurred involving a patient under treatment for adenocarcinoma of the prostate gland. The patient involved received a prostate brachytherapy implant on March 12, 2010, using radioactive iodine-125 seeds [95 seeds of I-125 were implanted at 0.322 mCi/seed].
"The radiation oncologist with the assistance of the urologist inserted the needles through the appropriate holes in the needle template. During the procedure, the radiation oncologist used the ultrasound to guide the needle placement. However, the radiation oncologist and ultrasound technologist had difficulty seeing the balloon location (indicating the prostate base) clearly on the sagittal view of the ultrasound during the dispensing of the seeds from the needles. It was felt that it was possible that the patient may have moved during the procedure which may have caused the balloon and ultimately the base plane to have shifted.
"A variance was suspected by the radiation oncologist after reviewing the post implant seed count x-ray. The patient was called to return for an early post-implant CT on March 22, 2010 to confirm the implanted seed locations. Using these images, a treatment plan was constructed using the treatment planning system's post-plan software. Based on this postoperative plan, it has been estimated that the entire implanted volume was shifted approximately 3.0-cm inferiorly, resulting in D90% of 12.88 Gy (dose that covers 90% of the prostate volume outlined on the post implant CT images). The prescription dose was 145.0 Gy. The post-implant planning results were referred to the Radiation Safety Committee (RSC) for review. After review, the RSC decided to interpret the implant as a medical event. This decision was made based on the fact that the V100 (volume of the prostate that received 100% of the prescribed dose) was less than 50% and the event classification was felt to be that of a wrong site.
"The information provided to the patient was that a treatment delivery inaccuracy occurred on March 15, 2010. The radiation oncologist explained to the patient that the dose delivered was not as planned and that supplemental treatment is recommended to treat his prostate cancer. A waiting period is recommended to allow the sources to decay and to determine any possible complications."
Louisiana Report # LA100003
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.