Event Notification Report for February 09, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/08/2010 - 02/09/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45690
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MEIXELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MEIXELL
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2010
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2010
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO SOUTH CAROLINA DHEC CONCERNING TRITIUM FOUND IN GROUND WATER
"Event Description: Ground water monitoring wells were installed on the Oconee site and initially sampled in 2008 in support of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative (NEI 07-07). As part of an on-going investigation, a number of new monitoring wells have been installed and additional wells are in progress at Oconee. On February 8, 2010, Oconee was notified by the Duke Energy Environmental Lab that samples taken on January 26, 2010, from monitoring wells GM-7R and GM-7DR displayed tritium levels of 24,400 pCi/l and 35,400 pCi/l respectively, triggering the communication protocol of the NEI initiative. The threshold for initiating the communication protocol is 20,000 pCi/l. There is no public or plant worker risk associated with the GM-7R and GM-7DR well samples. Wells GM-7R and GM-7DR are not drinking water sources and therefore, there is no potential dose to the public or plant workers. Samples from surrounding monitoring wells indicate that tritium in ground water has not migrated off the plant site. Duke is continuing to investigate the source of tritium in wells GM-7R and GM-7DR. Tritium levels in samples from the remaining wells are below the communication protocol threshold. The licensee plans to notify the South Carolina DHEC state officials and local stakeholders of the sample results.
"Initial Safety Significance: There is no safety significance due to the tritium identified in ground water at Oconee. The subject wells are not drinking water sources, and there is no indication tritium has migrated off the Oconee site in the ground water.
"Corrective Action(s): The source of tritium in the ground water at Oconee is not understood at this time. Duke is continuing an investigation to identify the source and implement a corrective action plan."
The licensee will issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Event Description: Ground water monitoring wells were installed on the Oconee site and initially sampled in 2008 in support of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Ground Water Protection Initiative (NEI 07-07). As part of an on-going investigation, a number of new monitoring wells have been installed and additional wells are in progress at Oconee. On February 8, 2010, Oconee was notified by the Duke Energy Environmental Lab that samples taken on January 26, 2010, from monitoring wells GM-7R and GM-7DR displayed tritium levels of 24,400 pCi/l and 35,400 pCi/l respectively, triggering the communication protocol of the NEI initiative. The threshold for initiating the communication protocol is 20,000 pCi/l. There is no public or plant worker risk associated with the GM-7R and GM-7DR well samples. Wells GM-7R and GM-7DR are not drinking water sources and therefore, there is no potential dose to the public or plant workers. Samples from surrounding monitoring wells indicate that tritium in ground water has not migrated off the plant site. Duke is continuing to investigate the source of tritium in wells GM-7R and GM-7DR. Tritium levels in samples from the remaining wells are below the communication protocol threshold. The licensee plans to notify the South Carolina DHEC state officials and local stakeholders of the sample results.
"Initial Safety Significance: There is no safety significance due to the tritium identified in ground water at Oconee. The subject wells are not drinking water sources, and there is no indication tritium has migrated off the Oconee site in the ground water.
"Corrective Action(s): The source of tritium in the ground water at Oconee is not understood at this time. Duke is continuing an investigation to identify the source and implement a corrective action plan."
The licensee will issue a press release and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45692
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL STUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL STUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2010
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Notification Time: 22:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/09/2010
Event Time: 18:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
WILLIAM JONES (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN UNANALYZED CONDITION
"A potential Post-Fire Safe Shutdown issue associated with the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Control Circuitry has been discovered, should a Control Room fire cause a hot short in the 'B' EDG Voltage Control Circuitry. A fire in the control circuit that renders the 'B' EDG inoperable and is large enough to require the Control Room to be evacuated during a loss of offsite power is an unanalyzed condition. This condition was discovered during a planned maintenance outage for the 'B' EDG. Compensatory measures are being established for early detection and extinguishment of a fire associated with this circuit in the Control Room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"A potential Post-Fire Safe Shutdown issue associated with the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage Control Circuitry has been discovered, should a Control Room fire cause a hot short in the 'B' EDG Voltage Control Circuitry. A fire in the control circuit that renders the 'B' EDG inoperable and is large enough to require the Control Room to be evacuated during a loss of offsite power is an unanalyzed condition. This condition was discovered during a planned maintenance outage for the 'B' EDG. Compensatory measures are being established for early detection and extinguishment of a fire associated with this circuit in the Control Room.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."