Event Notification Report for February 03, 2010

TWO MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

During their biannual inventory, the licensee could not account for two tritium exit signs. Both signs were accounted for in the previous inventory. The first sign was installed in a wind tunnel that was transferred to the Air Force in 2006. After obtaining the wind tunnel, the Air Force claims to have removed the sign and, after a period of storage, recycled the sign with the others that were removed from the tunnel. The sign was manufactured on 7/20/94 by SRB Technologies (serial number 174501). The initial tritium load was 20 Ci. Calculated content on 2/26/10 was 8.33 Curies.

The second sign was installed in a building on Moffitt Field that is currently undergoing renovation. It is believed that the sign is under the control of the renovation contractor after is was removed during the painting process. The sign was manufactured on 5/1/91 by SRB Technologies (serial number 526854). The initial tritium load was 20 Ci. Calculated content on 2/26/10 was 6.95 Curies.

Both signs have contact information for the licensee attached. The licensee is conducting a search for both signs. They have notified Region 4 (Campbell).


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SHUTDOWN REQUIRED DUE TO CONTROL ROD OUT OF ALIGNMENT

"A shutdown of South Texas Project Unit 1 was initiated at 13:44 hours [CST] on February 3, 2010. When in Action b.2. of Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.1, 'Moveable Control Assemblies Group Height,' a second control rod, B-12, in Shutdown Bank A was declared inoperable when the rod came out of alignment with the remainder of the rods within its bank. The second control rod came out of alignment during the performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1.2; a surveillance to determine operability by movement of the rod.

"For the above condition, Action c. of TS 3.1.3.1 was entered. When the requirements of the action could not be met, South Texas Project Unit 1 entered TS 3.0.3. and a plant shutdown was initiated.

"Prior to initiation of this event, South Texas Project Unit 1 was in Action b.2 [of TS 3.1.3.1] with rod C-5 of Shutdown Bank D trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by Action a. The inoperable rod, C-5, was aligned within 12 steps of the remainder of the rods within its group and the rod sequence and insertion limits as specified in the Core Operating Limits Report were being maintained."

At the time of this report, South Texas Project Unit 1 was at 30% power and decreasing. The plant will enter Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, at approximately 1800 CST. Shutdown was initiated when rod B-12 could not be aligned within 12 steps of the remainder of rods within its bank as specified in Action c. of TS 3.1.3.1.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM BOB SCARBOROUGH TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2220 EST ON 2/03/10 * * *

"At 1730 [CST] during performance of the Unit 1 shutdown, control rod H-2 in Bank 1C inserted from 246 steps, as indicated by the digital rod-position indication system, to 234 steps indicated without a demand signal applied to the control bank. The group step counter remained at 249 steps with no other rods in Bank 1C indicating movement.

"The shutdown continued normally from that point. Control rod H-2 stepped with the rest on the rods in the bank down to zero steps. All control rods in Unit 1 are at zero steps. The shutdown rods are currently withdrawn."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).


* * * UPDATE FROM KEN TAPLETT TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1700 EST ON 2/5/2010 * * *

"This update corrects information provided earlier at 2230 EST on February 3, 2010 after reviewing post shutdown data. During the performance of the Unit 1 shutdown, control rod H-2 in Bank 1C inserted upon demand, as indicated by the digital rod-position indication system, but did not withdraw upon demand, as indicated. This occurred when controlling Bank 1C between 249 and 242 steps by alternating insertion and withdrawal demand signals to control reactivity. At approximately 1731, the shutdown continued normally from that point. Control rod H-2 stepped in with the rest of the rods in the bank down to zero steps. All control rods and shutdown rods in Unit 1 were subsequently driven in to zero step position."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

FEEDWATER CHECK VALVE LEAK RATE EXCEEDED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT

"At 1100 [CST] on February 3, 2010, it was discovered that a primary containment local leak rate test performed on feedwater check valve 1B21-F032B exceeded its acceptance criteria. Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.11 requires that the combined leakage rate for both primary containment feedwater penetrations to be less than or equal to 2 gallons per minute. The measured leakage for 1B21-F032B was reported to be 2.5 gallons per minute (gpm). Operations immediately declared 1B21-F032B inoperable and initiated action to close the feedwater inlet shutoff valve 1B21-F065B to isolate the affected penetration. At 1136 [CST], 1B21-F065B was closed and its breaker was turned off to comply with TS 3.6.1.3, Condition C required actions.

"At 1447 [CST], the Feedwater Leakage Control System (FWLCS) was declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.6.1.9 and the plant entered a 30-day action to restore FWLCS to an operable condition.

"After performance of a line flush, plans are underway to attempt to re-perform the local leak rate test for the feedwater check valve, 1B21-F032B. If unsuccessful, further corrective actions will be taken.

"The NRC Senior Resident has been informed."