Event Notification Report for January 31, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/30/2010 - 01/31/2010
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45668
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY CASEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY CASEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/31/2010
Notification Time: 14:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2010
Event Time: 10:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2010
Notification Time: 14:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2010
Event Time: 10:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEMA NOTIFIED OF A LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS
"At 1100 EST on 1/31/10, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Shift Manager was made aware of notifications made to an outside government agency regarding Loss of Offsite Response Capabilities. Specifically, on 1/30/10 at 1826 EST, the Operations Duty Specialist made a Courtesy notification to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of 9 offsite sirens which had failed their polling test. This is well below the normal reporting criteria for the Emergency Plan. Subsequently, on 1/31/10 at 1042 EST, TEMA was notified that 4 of the sirens had been repaired, and only 5 sirens are still not responding to the polling test."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1636 EST ON 1/31/2010 FROM MIKE BRUBAKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This amendment is being provided to clarify that a loss of offsite notification capabilities did not occur. At 1100 EST on 1/31/10, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Shift Manager was made aware of a courtesy notification made by the TVA Operations Duty Specialist to TEMA regarding loss of a small number of sirens due to inclement weather conditions. The courtesy notification was made on 1/30/10 at 1826 to inform TEMA that 9 offsite sirens had failed their polling test. A loss of 9 sirens does not constitute loss of emergency preparedness capability. This amends the original report which was made within 4 hours of the shift manager's notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Widman).
"At 1100 EST on 1/31/10, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Shift Manager was made aware of notifications made to an outside government agency regarding Loss of Offsite Response Capabilities. Specifically, on 1/30/10 at 1826 EST, the Operations Duty Specialist made a Courtesy notification to the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) of 9 offsite sirens which had failed their polling test. This is well below the normal reporting criteria for the Emergency Plan. Subsequently, on 1/31/10 at 1042 EST, TEMA was notified that 4 of the sirens had been repaired, and only 5 sirens are still not responding to the polling test."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1636 EST ON 1/31/2010 FROM MIKE BRUBAKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This amendment is being provided to clarify that a loss of offsite notification capabilities did not occur. At 1100 EST on 1/31/10, the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Shift Manager was made aware of a courtesy notification made by the TVA Operations Duty Specialist to TEMA regarding loss of a small number of sirens due to inclement weather conditions. The courtesy notification was made on 1/30/10 at 1826 to inform TEMA that 9 offsite sirens had failed their polling test. A loss of 9 sirens does not constitute loss of emergency preparedness capability. This amends the original report which was made within 4 hours of the shift manager's notification."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (Widman).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45669
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: KUPARUK OIL FIELD State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: KUPARUK OIL FIELD State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2010
Event Time: 01:30 [YST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2010
Notification Time: 13:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/31/2010
Event Time: 01:30 [YST]
Last Update Date: 02/01/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(a) - PROTECTIVE ACTION PREVENTED
10 CFR Section:
30.50(a) - PROTECTIVE ACTION PREVENTED
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO FULLY RETRACT INTO CAMERA
"On January 31st, two different radiography crews working the Kuparuk Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on the same INC IR-100 exposure device (serial number 6621).
"During the night shift, the locking mechanism tripped prematurely [approximately 1/4 inch before the retracted lock position]. A survey of the exposure device did not reveal any abnormal readings. When the crank assembly was disconnected, it was noted that the pigtail was not in the proper position. A trained technician removed the locking assembly and cleaned dirt and ice from the assembly. The exposure device was reassembled with the source in the safe and secure position.
"The day shift utilized the same device and experienced the same situation. When the lock was removed to be cleaned, there was a build up of ice in the locking assembly. The exposure device was reassembled with the source in the safe and secure position.
"Exposure Device: Industrial Nuclear IR-100; Device S/N: 6621; Source S/N: O835; Source Activity: 85 curies; Source Type: Ir-192.
"The weather was minus 15 degrees with a wind speed of 18 knots.
"There was no exposure to the crew or the General Public during this incident."
"On January 31st, two different radiography crews working the Kuparuk Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on the same INC IR-100 exposure device (serial number 6621).
"During the night shift, the locking mechanism tripped prematurely [approximately 1/4 inch before the retracted lock position]. A survey of the exposure device did not reveal any abnormal readings. When the crank assembly was disconnected, it was noted that the pigtail was not in the proper position. A trained technician removed the locking assembly and cleaned dirt and ice from the assembly. The exposure device was reassembled with the source in the safe and secure position.
"The day shift utilized the same device and experienced the same situation. When the lock was removed to be cleaned, there was a build up of ice in the locking assembly. The exposure device was reassembled with the source in the safe and secure position.
"Exposure Device: Industrial Nuclear IR-100; Device S/N: 6621; Source S/N: O835; Source Activity: 85 curies; Source Type: Ir-192.
"The weather was minus 15 degrees with a wind speed of 18 knots.
"There was no exposure to the crew or the General Public during this incident."