Event Notification Report for January 13, 2010

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO CONTROL ROOM CHILLERS OUT OF SERVICE

"The A-YC chiller [was] shutdown and tagged for yearly inspection and work. The B-YC chiller has developed a refrigerant leak and has been declared inoperable. This places both Unit 1 and Unit 2 in Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both units will have to be in Mode 3 within 7 hours; Mode 4 within 13 hours; and 37 hours to be in Mode 5. 3.0.3 was declared at 2332 on 1/12/2010. The event time is when Unit 1 began load reduction. Unit 2 will commence load reduction at 0230."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

WRONG TRAIN OF EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM REMOVED FROM SERVICE

"On January 13, 2010, at about 1125 PST, Train A suction piping from the SONGS Unit 3 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was determined to be inoperable following detection of weld flaw indications during ultrasonic testing. Due to miscommunication, operators mistakenly declared the Train B Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) header inoperable at about 1125 and removed DC control power to the Train B ECCS pumps. This resulted in both trains of Unit 3 ECCS being inoperable and entry into the Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 one-hour shut down action. At 1140 PST, the DC control power was restored to the Train B ECCS pumps, Train B ECCS was declared operable, and TS 3.0.3 was exited. SCE is reporting this in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"SCE is further evaluating the indications found on Train A piping to determine if the piping is capable of performing its safety function. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was in a Steam Generator Replacement Outage, and Unit 3 was at approximately 100% power."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY LEE KELLY TO DONG PARK AT 1402 EST ON 1/19/10 * * *

"On January 13, 2010, SCE reported that both trains of Unit 3 Emergency Core Cooling System were inoperable for approximately 15 minutes because Train B ECCS was mistakenly taken out of service when weld flaw indications were found on Train A ECCS piping. This resulted in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. Consequently, both trains of ECCS in Unit 3 were declared inoperable and the unit entered into Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 1134 PST (Time of Discovery). At 1140 PST, Train B ECCS was declared operable and TS 3.0.3 was exited.

"Event Notification 45628 was conservatively made because, although Train A ECCS piping remained capable of performing its safety function, this was not yet formally documented at the time the 8-hour report was due. Subsequently, an engineering evaluation was completed at 2308 PST on January 13, 2010, that demonstrates the as-found condition of the Train A ECCS piping was operable because the flaw meets the evaluation criteria of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case N-513-2. Since Train A ECCS piping was operable, this event did not constitute a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Consequently, SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC on January 13, 2010. The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this report."

Notified R4DO (Werner).

PROCESS GAS LEAK DETECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 0850 CST, on 1-13-10 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 B-Booster UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) system was inoperable due to loss of power to the system. The purpose of the PGLD System is to detect a UF6 release and alert operators in the ACR by sounding an alarm. At the time this was discovered, some areas covered by this PGLD system were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the areas covered by this PGLD system are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the B-Booster PGLD system inoperable, none of the required heads were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.D.1 and 2.4.4.1.E.1 were entered, and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. An investigation was initiated and it was determined that power was interrupted during planned maintenance activities and there was a failure to identify that the power supply to this PGLD system would be impacted prior to performing the maintenance. Power was restored and the system was tested and declared operable at 1542 hours. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."