Event Notification Report for January 06, 2010
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/05/2010 - 01/06/2010
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 45609
Rep Org: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: KAKIVIK ASSET MANAGEMENT
Region: 4
City: ANCHORAGE State: AK
County:
License #: 50-27667-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEENAN REMELE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 01/06/2010
Notification Time: 11:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2010
Event Time: 01:50 [YST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2010
Notification Time: 11:41 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2010
Event Time: 01:50 [YST]
Last Update Date: 01/06/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
FAILURE TO FULLY RETRACT THE SOURCE OF A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
"On January 6th a radiography crew working the Kuparuk Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on an INC IR-100 exposure device.
"When returning the source (Ir-192, 108 curies) the locking bar deployed prematurely. The crew reset the locking bar and was able to return the source to the safe and secure position. The crew was working a remote location using a Tucker (tracked machine for traveling over snow) and called for the night foreman. They met at a drill site where the exposure device was reconnected to the drive cables. The source was extended and then retracted. It was noticed that on the return the crank assembly became hard to turn. After the locking bar tripped, the exposure device was surveyed with no noticeable indication that the source was not in the safe and secure position. When the crank assembly was disconnected it was noted that the pig tail was not in its proper position. The exposure device was transported back to the main office.
"When the lock was disassembled there the technician noted: 'The lock chamber had a reasonable amount of grit coated to the internals.' It should be noted that the exposure device had just been received the day prior.
"The weather was minus 10 degrees with a wind speed of 10 knots. The lock assembly was cleaned and reassembled as was the crank assembly. There was no exposure to the crew or the general public during this incident."
"On January 6th a radiography crew working the Kuparuk Oil Field on the North Slope of Alaska experienced a malfunctioning locking system on an INC IR-100 exposure device.
"When returning the source (Ir-192, 108 curies) the locking bar deployed prematurely. The crew reset the locking bar and was able to return the source to the safe and secure position. The crew was working a remote location using a Tucker (tracked machine for traveling over snow) and called for the night foreman. They met at a drill site where the exposure device was reconnected to the drive cables. The source was extended and then retracted. It was noticed that on the return the crank assembly became hard to turn. After the locking bar tripped, the exposure device was surveyed with no noticeable indication that the source was not in the safe and secure position. When the crank assembly was disconnected it was noted that the pig tail was not in its proper position. The exposure device was transported back to the main office.
"When the lock was disassembled there the technician noted: 'The lock chamber had a reasonable amount of grit coated to the internals.' It should be noted that the exposure device had just been received the day prior.
"The weather was minus 10 degrees with a wind speed of 10 knots. The lock assembly was cleaned and reassembled as was the crank assembly. There was no exposure to the crew or the general public during this incident."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45696
Rep Org: UNITED CONTROLS INTERNATIONAL
Licensee: THOMAS AND BETTS
Region: 1
City: TUCKER State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT B. HALE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: THOMAS AND BETTS
Region: 1
City: TUCKER State: GA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT B. HALE
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 02/12/2010
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/12/2010
Notification Time: 12:28 [ET]
Event Date: 01/06/2010
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/12/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
INSTALLATION OF INCORRECT TRANSFORMER ON A CONTROL BOARD FOR A BATTERY CHARGER
On January 6, 2010, Thomas & Betts (TNB) informed United Controls International (UCI) that TNB's sub-contractor (RBB Systems) had installed the incorrect transformer on a sub-component (control board) of a Cyberex battery charger.
During a review of the Bill of Material (BOM) and assembly documentation for the control board by TNB, it was discovered that the incorrect transformer was being installed on the board. The control board affected is designed for systems with a 120 VAC primary input voltage. The incorrect transformer installed is designed for systems with a 208 VAC primary input voltage.
Subsequent testing and risk assessment performed by TNB's sub-contractor, RBB Systems, found that under nominal input voltage, the control card operated marginally. Under low input voltage, the card could fail to operate properly, which could cause a failure of its parent component, the battery charger.
Per TNB, the only sale on record of the Cyberex battery charger is of eight units sold to Philadelphia Electric Company (now part of Exelon-Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Station) in 1993, which are designed for 120 VAC primary input voltage to the control board.
On January 6, 2010, Thomas & Betts (TNB) informed United Controls International (UCI) that TNB's sub-contractor (RBB Systems) had installed the incorrect transformer on a sub-component (control board) of a Cyberex battery charger.
During a review of the Bill of Material (BOM) and assembly documentation for the control board by TNB, it was discovered that the incorrect transformer was being installed on the board. The control board affected is designed for systems with a 120 VAC primary input voltage. The incorrect transformer installed is designed for systems with a 208 VAC primary input voltage.
Subsequent testing and risk assessment performed by TNB's sub-contractor, RBB Systems, found that under nominal input voltage, the control card operated marginally. Under low input voltage, the card could fail to operate properly, which could cause a failure of its parent component, the battery charger.
Per TNB, the only sale on record of the Cyberex battery charger is of eight units sold to Philadelphia Electric Company (now part of Exelon-Peach Bottom Nuclear Power Station) in 1993, which are designed for 120 VAC primary input voltage to the control board.