Event Notification Report for December 23, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/22/2009 - 12/23/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45587455884558945616
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45587
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID SCHUMACHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: DAVID SCHUMACHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 06:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 12:21 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 06:56 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
MICHAEL KUNOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
WINTER STORM POWER OUTAGES CAUSE ALERT SIREN INOPERABILITY
"On December 23, 2009, at 0656 hours, 40% of the alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable for greater than 60 minutes. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities offsite notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to power outages caused by a winter storm. Efforts are underway at the time of this notification to restore the sirens.
"This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As of 1100 hours, all but 6 EPZ sirens (12%) have been restored.
"A follow-up notification will be provided when the sirens have been restored."
* * * UPDATE FROM DEWEERTE TO TEAL AT 1707 ON 12/23/2009 * * *
"Repairs to the emergency sirens were completed as of 1456 CST hours. All sirens are restored."
"On December 23, 2009, at 0656 hours, 40% of the alert sirens in the Quad Cities Station Emergency Planning Zone were determined to be inoperable for greater than 60 minutes. This is considered a major loss of the Quad Cities offsite notification capability. The alert sirens were disabled due to power outages caused by a winter storm. Efforts are underway at the time of this notification to restore the sirens.
"This report is being made due to the reduction in public notification capabilities in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As of 1100 hours, all but 6 EPZ sirens (12%) have been restored.
"A follow-up notification will be provided when the sirens have been restored."
* * * UPDATE FROM DEWEERTE TO TEAL AT 1707 ON 12/23/2009 * * *
"Repairs to the emergency sirens were completed as of 1456 CST hours. All sirens are restored."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45588
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL DUNN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 15:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 17:18 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 15:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
MARK FRANKE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL RPS ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR
"At 1525 EST, Vogtle Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to a loss of instrument air to the turbine building.
"System operators were releasing a tagout and restoring one of two instrument air dryers that had been isolated for maintenance. Instrument air low pressure alarms were received in the control room and secondary side valves were responding to the loss of instrument air. Control room operators responded according to procedures. Main feed pump 'B' tripped on a loss of suction pressure and operators manually tripped the reactor.
"The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of a loss of feed water to the steam generators. All systems responded as required. AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] actuated as required for loss of feed water. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Instrument air has been restored to the turbine building and steam dumps are controlling RCS temperatures.
"Cause of the loss of instrument air is being investigated.
"[The NRC] Senior Resident [Inspector] was notified."
"At 1525 EST, Vogtle Unit 2 was manually tripped from 100% power due to a loss of instrument air to the turbine building.
"System operators were releasing a tagout and restoring one of two instrument air dryers that had been isolated for maintenance. Instrument air low pressure alarms were received in the control room and secondary side valves were responding to the loss of instrument air. Control room operators responded according to procedures. Main feed pump 'B' tripped on a loss of suction pressure and operators manually tripped the reactor.
"The reactor was manually tripped in anticipation of a loss of feed water to the steam generators. All systems responded as required. AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] actuated as required for loss of feed water. All control rods fully inserted on the reactor trip. Instrument air has been restored to the turbine building and steam dumps are controlling RCS temperatures.
"Cause of the loss of instrument air is being investigated.
"[The NRC] Senior Resident [Inspector] was notified."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45589
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: MISTRIS HOLDING GROUP, CONAM INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: BENECIA State: CA
County:
License #: 4886-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: MISTRIS HOLDING GROUP, CONAM INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: BENECIA State: CA
County:
License #: 4886-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Notification Time: 18:57 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
WAYNE WALKER (R4DO)
ANDREW PERSINKO (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE FAILED TO RETRACT
The following was received via email:
"The 48 Ci Iridium-192 source in an INC IR-100 radiography camera, sn 6617, failed to retract in that the safety latch popped up prematurely, locking the source in the un-captured position outside of the radiography camera. The radiographer approached and surveyed the radiography camera, depressed the latch, returned to the cranks and returned the source to the safe position. Upon examination of both the radiography camera and the cranks, no damage or excessive dirt was detected that could explain this type of failure. The radiographer and assistant did not pick up any excessive radiation exposure as a result of this incident. Note: the operations manual for this instrument indicates that this type of failure could occur and instructs the user/radiographer in the steps to take to correct the problem. These steps, mentioned above, were taken by the radiographer."
This event occurred at Shell Oil Refinery in Martinez, California.
California report number 122309.
The following was received via email:
"The 48 Ci Iridium-192 source in an INC IR-100 radiography camera, sn 6617, failed to retract in that the safety latch popped up prematurely, locking the source in the un-captured position outside of the radiography camera. The radiographer approached and surveyed the radiography camera, depressed the latch, returned to the cranks and returned the source to the safe position. Upon examination of both the radiography camera and the cranks, no damage or excessive dirt was detected that could explain this type of failure. The radiographer and assistant did not pick up any excessive radiation exposure as a result of this incident. Note: the operations manual for this instrument indicates that this type of failure could occur and instructs the user/radiographer in the steps to take to correct the problem. These steps, mentioned above, were taken by the radiographer."
This event occurred at Shell Oil Refinery in Martinez, California.
California report number 122309.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45616
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEON RAFNER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: LEON RAFNER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/08/2010
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 10:14 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2010
Notification Time: 18:15 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2009
Event Time: 10:14 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/08/2010
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
LOSS OF RHR COOLING CAPABILITY DUE TO ISOLATION OF THE SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING HEAT SINK
"This is a late eight hour report submitted under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Loss of Safety Function to (B) Remove Residual Heat'
"On December 23, 2009 at about 0957 PST, with SONGS Unit 2 defueled for the Cycle 16 refueling outage, a decrease in salt water cooling flow to the Train A Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger indicated debris was entering the system. The loss of flow appears to have been caused by debris entering the system through a failed pump suction screen. At 1014 PST operators removed the heat exchanger from service for approximately one hour to reverse the salt water cooling flow though the heat exchanger and clear the debris. The Train B cooling system had previously been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, relying on the single Train A heat exchanger to supply cooling to the Spent Fuel Pool cooling system.
"Salt water cooling flow was fully restored at approximately 1118 PST. Operators conservatively declared the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System inoperable and maintained compliance with the conditions of Licensee Controlled Specification 3.7.106. Time to exceed the 160 degree Fahrenheit allowable pool temperature was estimated at over twenty three hours.
"It has been determined that the temporary isolation of the heat sink from the spent fuel pool constituted a loss of safety function for residual heat removal. Therefore SCE is reporting this occurrence as a loss of safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The safety significance of this event was minimal. Flow reversal to clear ocean debris from the heat exchangers is a routine procedurally controlled evolution and bounded by design calculations which consider post-accident heat loads with a full core offload in the spent fuel pool. These actions are within the limits of both the Technical Specifications and Licensee Controlled Specifications."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a late eight hour report submitted under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Loss of Safety Function to (B) Remove Residual Heat'
"On December 23, 2009 at about 0957 PST, with SONGS Unit 2 defueled for the Cycle 16 refueling outage, a decrease in salt water cooling flow to the Train A Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger indicated debris was entering the system. The loss of flow appears to have been caused by debris entering the system through a failed pump suction screen. At 1014 PST operators removed the heat exchanger from service for approximately one hour to reverse the salt water cooling flow though the heat exchanger and clear the debris. The Train B cooling system had previously been removed from service for scheduled maintenance, relying on the single Train A heat exchanger to supply cooling to the Spent Fuel Pool cooling system.
"Salt water cooling flow was fully restored at approximately 1118 PST. Operators conservatively declared the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System inoperable and maintained compliance with the conditions of Licensee Controlled Specification 3.7.106. Time to exceed the 160 degree Fahrenheit allowable pool temperature was estimated at over twenty three hours.
"It has been determined that the temporary isolation of the heat sink from the spent fuel pool constituted a loss of safety function for residual heat removal. Therefore SCE is reporting this occurrence as a loss of safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).
"The safety significance of this event was minimal. Flow reversal to clear ocean debris from the heat exchangers is a routine procedurally controlled evolution and bounded by design calculations which consider post-accident heat loads with a full core offload in the spent fuel pool. These actions are within the limits of both the Technical Specifications and Licensee Controlled Specifications."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.